# weirdnet-push
Push wake-up for Weirdnet devices. A suspended phone can't keep a connection, so a peer or
the home relay that holds sealed messages for it asks a push service to wake it. This crate
is that service, its client, and the payload format.
- **Wake payloads** ([`wake`]): exactly 96 bytes, sealed to the device's push key (X25519,
HKDF-SHA256, ChaCha20-Poly1305, a fresh key per payload) and bound to its handle. Inside
is only a reason code (message waiting, connection requested), a random value and a time.
[`ReplayGuard`] refuses repeats and stale wakes on the device.
- **Wake handles** ([`handle`]): 32 random bytes. The device shares its handle and push
public key ([`WakeCard`]) only with its home relay and trusted peers, sealed. A control
secret it keeps rotates the handle (the old one stops at once) or revokes it: the
per-device off switch.
- **Client** ([`PushClient`], feature `client`, on by default): register, rotate,
unregister, wake, and follow relay announcements.
- **Server** (feature `server`, the `weirdnet-push` binary): self-hostable; delivers through
APNs (token auth, alert push with `mutable-content` for a Notification Service Extension;
iOS background wake needs it), FCM HTTP v1 (high-priority data message, for Play builds),
and the relay wake path (opt-in on the device: relays following the server pass the
payload to devices connected to them, for F-Droid and builds without Google services).
A token the provider rejects revokes its handle.
- **Relay wake path** ([`relaywake`], feature `relay-wake`, on by default): the wire
protocol `/weirdnet/wake/1`. A device that opted in keeps a stream open to its home relay
and subscribes its handles; trusted peers deliver sealed payloads to that relay, and the
relay also passes on the push service's relay announcements. weirdnet-relay serves it.
## What each party sees
| Apple / Google | the device token, the time, and 96 bytes of ciphertext (the alert text is a fixed placeholder; the device writes the real one after decrypting) |
| The push service | the handle's hash and the device token (stored), the handle and time (per wake) |
| Relays carrying announcements, and the home relay on the wake path | the handle, the time, the ciphertext (and, for the home relay, which peer is subscribed) |
| Senders | the handle and push public key they were given |
Nobody but the device sees the reason, and nobody sees message content, the sender,
peer ids, addresses or site names. The server stores only SHA-256 hashes of handles and
control secrets, and logs no handles or tokens.
## Running the server
```sh
cargo install weirdnet-push --features server
weirdnet-push relay-token # for each relay that follows
weirdnet-push check -c /etc/weirdnet-push/config.toml
weirdnet-push serve -c /etc/weirdnet-push/config.toml
```
See [`server::Config`] for the config file. Put TLS in front (a reverse proxy). Phase 1
abuse control is handle revocation and rotation; there are no rate limits yet.
UnifiedPush is phase 2.
BSD-3-Clause.