weirdnet-push
Push wake-up for Weirdnet devices. A suspended phone can't keep a connection, so a peer or the home relay that holds sealed messages for it asks a push service to wake it. This crate is that service, its client, and the payload format.
- Wake payloads ([
wake]): exactly 96 bytes, sealed to the device's push key (X25519, HKDF-SHA256, ChaCha20-Poly1305, a fresh key per payload) and bound to its handle. Inside is only a reason code (message waiting, connection requested), a random value and a time. [ReplayGuard] refuses repeats and stale wakes on the device. - Wake handles ([
handle]): 32 random bytes. The device shares its handle and push public key ([WakeCard]) only with its home relay and trusted peers, sealed. A control secret it keeps rotates the handle (the old one stops at once) or revokes it: the per-device off switch. - Client ([
PushClient], featureclient, on by default): register, rotate, unregister, wake, and follow relay announcements. - Server (feature
server, theweirdnet-pushbinary): self-hostable; delivers through APNs (token auth, alert push withmutable-contentfor a Notification Service Extension; iOS background wake needs it), FCM HTTP v1 (high-priority data message, for Play builds), and the relay wake path (opt-in on the device: relays following the server pass the payload to devices connected to them, for F-Droid and builds without Google services). A token the provider rejects revokes its handle. - Relay wake path ([
relaywake], featurerelay-wake, on by default): the wire protocol/weirdnet/wake/1. A device that opted in keeps a stream open to its home relay and subscribes its handles; trusted peers deliver sealed payloads to that relay, and the relay also passes on the push service's relay announcements. weirdnet-relay serves it.
What each party sees
| Party | Sees |
|---|---|
| Apple / Google | the device token, the time, and 96 bytes of ciphertext (the alert text is a fixed placeholder; the device writes the real one after decrypting) |
| The push service | the handle's hash and the device token (stored), the handle and time (per wake) |
| Relays carrying announcements, and the home relay on the wake path | the handle, the time, the ciphertext (and, for the home relay, which peer is subscribed) |
| Senders | the handle and push public key they were given |
Nobody but the device sees the reason, and nobody sees message content, the sender, peer ids, addresses or site names. The server stores only SHA-256 hashes of handles and control secrets, and logs no handles or tokens.
Running the server
See [server::Config] for the config file. Put TLS in front (a reverse proxy). Phase 1
abuse control is handle revocation and rotation; there are no rate limits yet.
UnifiedPush is phase 2.
BSD-3-Clause.