weirdnet-push 0.1.0

Weirdnet push wake-up: fixed-size wake payloads sealed to the device, opaque wake handles with rotation and revocation, a client, and a self-hostable server delivering through APNs, FCM and Weirdnet relays.
Documentation

weirdnet-push

Push wake-up for Weirdnet devices. A suspended phone can't keep a connection, so a peer or the home relay that holds sealed messages for it asks a push service to wake it. This crate is that service, its client, and the payload format.

  • Wake payloads ([wake]): exactly 96 bytes, sealed to the device's push key (X25519, HKDF-SHA256, ChaCha20-Poly1305, a fresh key per payload) and bound to its handle. Inside is only a reason code (message waiting, connection requested), a random value and a time. [ReplayGuard] refuses repeats and stale wakes on the device.
  • Wake handles ([handle]): 32 random bytes. The device shares its handle and push public key ([WakeCard]) only with its home relay and trusted peers, sealed. A control secret it keeps rotates the handle (the old one stops at once) or revokes it: the per-device off switch.
  • Client ([PushClient], feature client, on by default): register, rotate, unregister, wake, and follow relay announcements.
  • Server (feature server, the weirdnet-push binary): self-hostable; delivers through APNs (token auth, alert push with mutable-content for a Notification Service Extension; iOS background wake needs it), FCM HTTP v1 (high-priority data message, for Play builds), and the relay wake path (opt-in on the device: relays following the server pass the payload to devices connected to them, for F-Droid and builds without Google services). A token the provider rejects revokes its handle.
  • Relay wake path ([relaywake], feature relay-wake, on by default): the wire protocol /weirdnet/wake/1. A device that opted in keeps a stream open to its home relay and subscribes its handles; trusted peers deliver sealed payloads to that relay, and the relay also passes on the push service's relay announcements. weirdnet-relay serves it.

What each party sees

Party Sees
Apple / Google the device token, the time, and 96 bytes of ciphertext (the alert text is a fixed placeholder; the device writes the real one after decrypting)
The push service the handle's hash and the device token (stored), the handle and time (per wake)
Relays carrying announcements, and the home relay on the wake path the handle, the time, the ciphertext (and, for the home relay, which peer is subscribed)
Senders the handle and push public key they were given

Nobody but the device sees the reason, and nobody sees message content, the sender, peer ids, addresses or site names. The server stores only SHA-256 hashes of handles and control secrets, and logs no handles or tokens.

Running the server

cargo install weirdnet-push --features server
weirdnet-push relay-token                      # for each relay that follows
weirdnet-push check -c /etc/weirdnet-push/config.toml
weirdnet-push serve -c /etc/weirdnet-push/config.toml

See [server::Config] for the config file. Put TLS in front (a reverse proxy). Phase 1 abuse control is handle revocation and rotation; there are no rate limits yet. UnifiedPush is phase 2.

BSD-3-Clause.