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//! Code for the prover to generate a `Proof`
use crate::{
constants::{
BBDT16_KVAC_LABEL, BBS_23_LABEL, BBS_PLUS_LABEL, COMPOSITE_PROOF_CHALLENGE_LABEL,
COMPOSITE_PROOF_LABEL, CONTEXT_LABEL, KB_POS_ACCUM_CDH_MEM_LABEL, KB_POS_ACCUM_MEM_LABEL,
KB_UNI_ACCUM_CDH_MEM_LABEL, KB_UNI_ACCUM_CDH_NON_MEM_LABEL, KB_UNI_ACCUM_MEM_LABEL,
KB_UNI_ACCUM_NON_MEM_LABEL, NONCE_LABEL, PS_LABEL, VB_ACCUM_CDH_MEM_LABEL,
VB_ACCUM_CDH_NON_MEM_LABEL, VB_ACCUM_MEM_LABEL, VB_ACCUM_NON_MEM_LABEL, VE_TZ_21_LABEL,
VE_TZ_21_ROBUST_LABEL,
},
error::ProofSystemError,
meta_statement::{EqualWitnesses, WitnessRef},
prelude::SnarkpackSRS,
proof::{AggregatedGroth16, Proof},
proof_spec::ProofSpec,
statement::Statement,
statement_proof::StatementProof,
sub_protocols::{
accumulator::{
cdh::{
KBPositiveAccumulatorMembershipCDHSubProtocol,
KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipCDHSubProtocol,
KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipCDHSubProtocol,
VBAccumulatorMembershipCDHSubProtocol, VBAccumulatorNonMembershipCDHSubProtocol,
},
keyed_verification::{
KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipKVSubProtocol,
KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipKVSubProtocol,
VBAccumulatorMembershipKVSubProtocol,
},
KBPositiveAccumulatorMembershipSubProtocol,
KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipSubProtocol,
KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipSubProtocol, VBAccumulatorMembershipSubProtocol,
VBAccumulatorNonMembershipSubProtocol,
},
bbdt16_kvac::PoKOfMACSubProtocol,
bbs_23::PoKBBSSigG1SubProtocol,
bbs_23_ietf::PoKBBSSigIETFG1SubProtocol,
bbs_plus::PoKBBSSigG1SubProtocol as PoKBBSPlusSigG1SubProtocol,
bound_check_bpp::BoundCheckBppProtocol,
bound_check_legogroth16::BoundCheckLegoGrothProtocol,
bound_check_smc::BoundCheckSmcProtocol,
bound_check_smc_with_kv::BoundCheckSmcWithKVProtocol,
inequality::InequalityProtocol,
ps_signature::PSSignaturePoK,
r1cs_legogorth16::R1CSLegogroth16Protocol,
saver::SaverProtocol,
schnorr::SchnorrProtocol,
verifiable_encryption_tz_21::VeTZ21Protocol,
SubProtocol,
},
witness::{Witness, Witnesses},
};
use ark_ec::pairing::Pairing;
use ark_serialize::{CanonicalDeserialize, CanonicalSerialize};
use ark_std::{
collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet},
format,
rand::RngCore,
vec,
vec::Vec,
UniformRand,
};
use digest::Digest;
use dock_crypto_utils::{
aliases::FullDigest,
expect_equality,
hashing_utils::field_elem_from_try_and_incr,
signature::MultiMessageSignatureParams,
transcript::{MerlinTranscript, Transcript},
};
use legogroth16::aggregation::srs::PreparedProverSRS;
use saver::encryption::Ciphertext;
/// The SAVER randomness, ciphertext and proof to reuse when creating the composite proof. This is more
/// efficient than generating a new ciphertext and proof.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, CanonicalSerialize, CanonicalDeserialize)]
pub struct OldSaverProof<E: Pairing>(
pub E::ScalarField,
pub Ciphertext<E>,
pub ark_groth16::Proof<E>,
);
/// The LegoGroth16 randomness and proof to reuse when creating the composite proof. This is more
/// efficient than generating a new proof.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, CanonicalSerialize, CanonicalDeserialize)]
pub struct OldLegoGroth16Proof<E: Pairing>(pub E::ScalarField, pub legogroth16::Proof<E>);
/// Passed to the prover during proof creation
#[derive(Clone, Debug, CanonicalSerialize, CanonicalDeserialize)]
pub struct ProverConfig<E: Pairing> {
pub reuse_saver_proofs: Option<BTreeMap<usize, OldSaverProof<E>>>,
pub reuse_legogroth16_proofs: Option<BTreeMap<usize, OldLegoGroth16Proof<E>>>,
}
impl<E: Pairing> Default for ProverConfig<E> {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
reuse_saver_proofs: None,
reuse_legogroth16_proofs: None,
}
}
}
impl<E: Pairing> ProverConfig<E> {
/// Get SAVER randomness, ciphertext and proof to reuse for the given statement id
fn get_saver_proof(&mut self, statement_id: &usize) -> Option<OldSaverProof<E>> {
self.reuse_saver_proofs
.as_mut()
.and_then(|p| p.remove(statement_id))
}
/// Get LegoGroth16 randomness and proof to reuse for the given statement id
fn get_legogroth16_proof(&mut self, statement_id: &usize) -> Option<OldLegoGroth16Proof<E>> {
self.reuse_legogroth16_proofs
.as_mut()
.and_then(|p| p.remove(statement_id))
}
}
macro_rules! err_incompat_witness {
($s_idx:ident, $s: ident, $witness: ident) => {
return Err(ProofSystemError::WitnessIncompatibleWithStatement(
$s_idx,
format!("{:?}", $witness),
format!("{:?}", $s),
))
};
}
impl<E: Pairing> Proof<E> {
/// Create a new proof. `nonce` is random data that needs to be hashed into the proof and
/// it must be kept same while creating and verifying the proof. One use of `nonce` is for replay
/// protection, here the prover might have chosen its nonce to prevent the verifier from reusing
/// the proof as its own or the verifier might want to require the user to create fresh proof.
/// Also returns the randomness used by statements using SAVER and LegoGroth16 proofs which can
/// then be used as helpers in subsequent proof creations where these proofs are reused than
/// creating fresh proofs.
pub fn new<R: RngCore, D: FullDigest + Digest>(
rng: &mut R,
proof_spec: ProofSpec<E>,
witnesses: Witnesses<E>,
nonce: Option<Vec<u8>>,
mut config: ProverConfig<E>,
) -> Result<(Self, BTreeMap<usize, E::ScalarField>), ProofSystemError> {
proof_spec.validate()?;
// There should be a witness for each statement
expect_equality!(
proof_spec.statements.len(),
witnesses.len(),
ProofSystemError::UnequalWitnessAndStatementCount
);
// Keep blinding for each witness reference that is part of an equality. This means that for
// any 2 witnesses that are equal, same blinding will be stored. This will be drained during
// proof creation and should be empty by the end.
let mut blindings = BTreeMap::<WitnessRef, E::ScalarField>::new();
// Prepare blindings for any witnesses that need to be proven equal.
let mut disjoint_equalities = vec![];
if !proof_spec.meta_statements.is_empty() {
disjoint_equalities = proof_spec.meta_statements.disjoint_witness_equalities();
for eq_wits in disjoint_equalities.clone() {
let blinding = E::ScalarField::rand(rng);
for wr in eq_wits.0 {
// Duplicating the same blinding for faster search
blindings.insert(wr, blinding);
}
}
}
// Prepare commitment keys for running Schnorr protocols of all statements.
let (
bound_check_lego_comm,
ek_comm,
chunked_comm,
r1cs_comm_keys,
bound_check_bpp_comm,
bound_check_smc_comm,
ineq_comm,
) = proof_spec.derive_commitment_keys()?;
let mut sub_protocols = Vec::<SubProtocol<E>>::with_capacity(proof_spec.statements.0.len());
// Randomness used by SAVER and LegoGroth16 proofs. This is tracked and returned so subsequent proofs for
// the same public params and witness can reuse this randomness
let mut commitment_randomness = BTreeMap::<usize, E::ScalarField>::new();
let mut transcript = MerlinTranscript::new(COMPOSITE_PROOF_LABEL);
if let Some(n) = nonce.as_ref() {
transcript.append_message(NONCE_LABEL, n);
}
if let Some(ctx) = &proof_spec.context {
transcript.append_message(CONTEXT_LABEL, ctx);
}
macro_rules! accum_protocol_init {
($s: ident, $s_idx: ident, $w: ident, $protocol: ident, $protocol_variant: ident, $label: ident) => {{
let blinding = blindings.remove(&($s_idx, 0));
let params = $s.get_params(&proof_spec.setup_params, $s_idx)?;
let pk = $s.get_public_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, $s_idx)?;
let prk = $s.get_proving_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, $s_idx)?;
let mut sp = $protocol::new($s_idx, params, pk, prk, $s.accumulator_value);
sp.init(rng, blinding, $w)?;
transcript.set_label($label);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::$protocol_variant(sp));
}};
}
macro_rules! sig_protocol_init {
($s: ident, $s_idx: ident, $w: ident, $protocol: ident, $func_name: ident, $protocol_variant: ident, $label: ident) => {{
// Prepare blindings for this signature proof
let blindings_map = build_blindings_map::<E>(
&mut blindings,
$s_idx,
$w.unrevealed_messages.keys().cloned(),
);
let sig_params = $s.get_params(&proof_spec.setup_params, $s_idx)?;
let mut sp = $protocol::$func_name($s_idx, &$s.revealed_messages, sig_params);
sp.init(rng, blindings_map, $w)?;
transcript.set_label($label);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::$protocol_variant(sp));
}};
}
macro_rules! ped_comm_protocol_init {
($s: ident, $s_idx: ident, $w: ident, $cm_key_func: ident, $protocol_variant: ident) => {{
let blindings_map = build_blindings_map::<E>(&mut blindings, $s_idx, 0..$w.len());
let comm_key = $s.$cm_key_func(&proof_spec.setup_params, $s_idx)?;
let mut sp = SchnorrProtocol::new($s_idx, comm_key, $s.commitment);
sp.init(rng, blindings_map, $w)?;
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::$protocol_variant(sp));
}};
}
macro_rules! accum_kv_protocol_init {
($s: ident, $s_idx: ident, $w: ident, $protocol: ident, $protocol_variant: ident, $label: ident) => {{
let blinding = blindings.remove(&($s_idx, 0));
let mut sp = $protocol::new($s_idx, $s.accumulator_value);
sp.init(rng, blinding, $w)?;
transcript.set_label($label);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::$protocol_variant(sp));
}};
}
macro_rules! ve_tz_21_init {
($rng: ident, $s_idx: ident, $s: ident, $w: ident, $init_name: ident, $label: ident) => {{
let witness_count = $w.len();
let comm_key = $s.get_comm_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, $s_idx)?;
// +1 since commitment includes randomness as well to make it perfectly hiding
if comm_key.len() < (witness_count + 1) {
return Err(ProofSystemError::IncompatiblePedCommSetupParamAtIndex(
$s_idx,
));
}
// Get blindings for all the witnesses
let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(witness_count);
for i in 0..witness_count {
if let Some(blinding) = blindings.remove(&($s_idx, i)) {
b.push(blinding);
} else {
return Err(ProofSystemError::MissingBlindingForStatementAtIndex(
$s_idx, i,
));
}
}
let enc_params = $s.get_enc_params(&proof_spec.setup_params, $s_idx)?;
let mut sp = VeTZ21Protocol::new($s_idx, comm_key, enc_params);
sp.$init_name::<R>($rng, $w, b)?;
transcript.set_label($label);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::VeTZ21(sp));
}};
}
/// Build a map of blindings for witnesses of given the statement index. The key is the witness
/// index and value is the blinding. Also removes that blinding from the global blindings map
/// containing blinding for each witness reference.
fn build_blindings_map<E: Pairing>(
blindings: &mut BTreeMap<WitnessRef, E::ScalarField>,
s_idx: usize,
wit_idx: impl Iterator<Item = usize>,
) -> BTreeMap<usize, E::ScalarField> {
let mut blindings_map = BTreeMap::new();
for k in wit_idx {
match blindings.remove(&(s_idx, k)) {
Some(b) => blindings_map.insert(k, b),
None => None,
};
}
blindings_map
}
// Initialize sub-protocols for each statement
for (s_idx, (statement, witness)) in proof_spec
.statements
.0
.iter()
.zip(witnesses.0.into_iter())
.enumerate()
{
match statement {
Statement::PoKBBSSignatureG1Prover(s) => match witness {
Witness::PoKBBSSignatureG1(w) => {
sig_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
PoKBBSPlusSigG1SubProtocol,
new_for_prover,
PoKBBSSignatureG1,
BBS_PLUS_LABEL
);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::PoKBBSSignature23G1Prover(s) => match witness {
Witness::PoKBBSSignature23G1(w) => {
sig_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
PoKBBSSigG1SubProtocol,
new_for_prover,
PoKBBSSignature23G1,
BBS_23_LABEL
);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::PoKBBSSignature23IETFG1Prover(s) => match witness {
Witness::PoKBBSSignature23G1(w) => {
sig_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
PoKBBSSigIETFG1SubProtocol,
new_for_prover,
PoKBBSSignature23IETFG1,
BBS_23_LABEL
);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::VBAccumulatorMembership(s) => match witness {
Witness::VBAccumulatorMembership(w) => {
accum_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
VBAccumulatorMembershipSubProtocol,
VBAccumulatorMembership,
VB_ACCUM_MEM_LABEL
)
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::VBAccumulatorNonMembership(s) => match witness {
Witness::VBAccumulatorNonMembership(w) => {
accum_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
VBAccumulatorNonMembershipSubProtocol,
VBAccumulatorNonMembership,
VB_ACCUM_NON_MEM_LABEL
)
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::KBUniversalAccumulatorMembership(s) => match witness {
Witness::KBUniAccumulatorMembership(w) => {
accum_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipSubProtocol,
KBUniversalAccumulatorMembership,
KB_UNI_ACCUM_MEM_LABEL
)
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembership(s) => match witness {
Witness::KBUniAccumulatorNonMembership(w) => {
accum_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipSubProtocol,
KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembership,
KB_UNI_ACCUM_NON_MEM_LABEL
)
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::VBAccumulatorMembershipCDHProver(s) => match witness {
Witness::VBAccumulatorMembership(w) => {
let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
let mut sp = VBAccumulatorMembershipCDHSubProtocol::new_for_prover(
s_idx,
s.accumulator_value,
);
sp.init(rng, blinding, w)?;
transcript.set_label(VB_ACCUM_CDH_MEM_LABEL);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::VBAccumulatorMembershipCDH(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::VBAccumulatorNonMembershipCDHProver(s) => match witness {
Witness::VBAccumulatorNonMembership(w) => {
let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
let params = s.get_params(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let mut sp = VBAccumulatorNonMembershipCDHSubProtocol::new_for_prover(
s_idx,
s.accumulator_value,
s.Q,
params,
);
sp.init(rng, blinding, w)?;
transcript.set_label(VB_ACCUM_CDH_NON_MEM_LABEL);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::VBAccumulatorNonMembershipCDH(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipCDHProver(s) => match witness {
Witness::KBUniAccumulatorMembership(w) => {
let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
let mut sp = KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipCDHSubProtocol::new_for_prover(
s_idx,
s.accumulator_value,
);
sp.init(rng, blinding, w)?;
transcript.set_label(KB_UNI_ACCUM_CDH_MEM_LABEL);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipCDH(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipCDHProver(s) => match witness {
Witness::KBUniAccumulatorNonMembership(w) => {
let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
let mut sp =
KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipCDHSubProtocol::new_for_prover(
s_idx,
s.accumulator_value,
);
sp.init(rng, blinding, w)?;
transcript.set_label(KB_UNI_ACCUM_CDH_NON_MEM_LABEL);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipCDH(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::KBPositiveAccumulatorMembership(s) => match witness {
Witness::KBPosAccumulatorMembership(w) => {
accum_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
KBPositiveAccumulatorMembershipSubProtocol,
KBPositiveAccumulatorMembership,
KB_POS_ACCUM_MEM_LABEL
)
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::KBPositiveAccumulatorMembershipCDH(s) => match witness {
Witness::KBPosAccumulatorMembership(w) => {
accum_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
KBPositiveAccumulatorMembershipCDHSubProtocol,
KBPositiveAccumulatorMembershipCDH,
KB_POS_ACCUM_CDH_MEM_LABEL
)
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::PedersenCommitment(s) => match witness {
Witness::PedersenCommitment(w) => {
ped_comm_protocol_init!(s, s_idx, w, get_commitment_key, PoKDiscreteLogs);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::PedersenCommitmentG2(s) => match witness {
Witness::PedersenCommitment(w) => {
ped_comm_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
get_commitment_key_g2,
PoKDiscreteLogsG2
);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::SaverProver(s) => match witness {
Witness::Saver(w) => {
let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
let enc_gens = s.get_encryption_gens(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let comm_gens =
s.get_chunked_commitment_gens(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let enc_key = s.get_encryption_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let cc_keys = chunked_comm.get(s_idx).unwrap();
let ck_comm_ct = ek_comm.get(s_idx).unwrap();
let pk = s.get_snark_proving_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let mut sp = SaverProtocol::new_for_prover(
s_idx,
s.chunk_bit_size,
enc_gens,
comm_gens,
enc_key,
pk,
);
match config.get_saver_proof(&s_idx) {
// Found a proof to reuse.
Some(OldSaverProof(v, ct, proof)) => {
sp.init_with_ciphertext_and_proof(
rng, ck_comm_ct, &cc_keys.0, &cc_keys.1, w, blinding, v, ct,
proof,
)?;
}
None => {
sp.init(rng, ck_comm_ct, &cc_keys.0, &cc_keys.1, w, blinding)?;
}
}
commitment_randomness.insert(
s_idx,
*sp.sp_ciphertext
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.witnesses
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.last()
.unwrap(),
);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::Saver(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::BoundCheckLegoGroth16Prover(s) => match witness {
Witness::BoundCheckLegoGroth16(w) => {
let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
let proving_key = s.get_proving_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let comm_key = bound_check_lego_comm.get(s_idx).unwrap();
let mut sp = BoundCheckLegoGrothProtocol::new_for_prover(
s_idx,
s.min,
s.max,
proving_key,
);
match config.get_legogroth16_proof(&s_idx) {
// Found a proof to reuse.
Some(OldLegoGroth16Proof(v, proof)) => sp
.init_with_old_randomness_and_proof(
rng, comm_key, w, blinding, v, proof,
)?,
None => sp.init(rng, comm_key, w, blinding)?,
}
commitment_randomness.insert(
s_idx,
*sp.sp
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.witnesses
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.last()
.unwrap(),
);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::BoundCheckLegoGroth16(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::R1CSCircomProver(s) => match witness {
Witness::R1CSLegoGroth16(w) => {
let proving_key = s.get_proving_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let mut blindings_map = BTreeMap::new();
for i in 0..proving_key.vk.commit_witness_count as usize {
match blindings.remove(&(s_idx, i)) {
Some(b) => blindings_map.insert(i, b),
None => None,
};
}
let comm_key = r1cs_comm_keys.get(s_idx).unwrap();
let mut sp = R1CSLegogroth16Protocol::new_for_prover(s_idx, proving_key);
match config.get_legogroth16_proof(&s_idx) {
Some(OldLegoGroth16Proof(v, proof)) => sp
.init_with_old_randomness_and_proof(
rng,
comm_key,
w,
blindings_map,
v,
proof,
)?,
None => {
let r1cs = s.get_r1cs(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let wasm_bytes =
s.get_wasm_bytes(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
sp.init(rng, r1cs.clone(), wasm_bytes, comm_key, w, blindings_map)?
}
}
commitment_randomness.insert(
s_idx,
*sp.sp
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.witnesses
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.last()
.unwrap(),
);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::R1CSLegogroth16Protocol(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::PoKPSSignature(s) => match witness {
Witness::PoKPSSignature(w) => {
// Prepare blindings for this PS sig proof
let blindings_map = build_blindings_map::<E>(
&mut blindings,
s_idx,
w.unrevealed_messages.keys().cloned(),
);
let params = s.get_params(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let pk = s.get_public_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let mut sp = PSSignaturePoK::new(s_idx, &s.revealed_messages, params, pk);
sp.init::<R>(rng, blindings_map, w)?;
transcript.set_label(PS_LABEL);
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::PSSignaturePoK(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::BoundCheckBpp(s) => match witness {
Witness::BoundCheckBpp(w) => {
let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
let bpp_setup_params =
s.get_setup_params(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let comm_key = bound_check_bpp_comm.get(s_idx).unwrap();
let mut sp =
BoundCheckBppProtocol::new(s_idx, s.min, s.max, bpp_setup_params);
sp.init(rng, comm_key.as_slice(), w, blinding)?;
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::BoundCheckBpp(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::BoundCheckSmc(s) => match witness {
Witness::BoundCheckSmc(w) => {
let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
let params_comm_key =
s.get_params_and_comm_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let comm_key_as_slice = bound_check_smc_comm.get(s_idx).unwrap();
let mut sp =
BoundCheckSmcProtocol::new(s_idx, s.min, s.max, params_comm_key);
sp.init(rng, comm_key_as_slice, w, blinding)?;
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::BoundCheckSmc(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::BoundCheckSmcWithKVProver(s) => match witness {
Witness::BoundCheckSmcWithKV(w) => {
let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
let params_comm_key =
s.get_params_and_comm_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let comm_key_as_slice = bound_check_smc_comm.get(s_idx).unwrap();
let mut sp = BoundCheckSmcWithKVProtocol::new_for_prover(
s_idx,
s.min,
s.max,
params_comm_key,
);
sp.init(rng, comm_key_as_slice, w, blinding)?;
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::BoundCheckSmcWithKV(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::PublicInequality(s) => match witness {
Witness::PublicInequality(w) => {
let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
let comm_key = s.get_comm_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
let mut sp =
InequalityProtocol::new(s_idx, s.inequal_to.clone(), &comm_key);
sp.init(rng, ineq_comm.get(s_idx).unwrap().as_slice(), w, blinding)?;
sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::Inequality(sp));
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::DetachedAccumulatorMembershipProver(s) => match witness {
Witness::VBAccumulatorMembership(_w) => {
// let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
// let params = s.get_params(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
// let pk = s.get_public_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
// let prk = s.get_proving_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
// let mut sp =
// DetachedAccumulatorMembershipSubProtocol::new(s_idx, params, pk, prk);
// sp.init(rng, s.accumulator_value, blinding, w)?;
// transcript.set_label(VB_ACCUM_MEM_LABEL);
// sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
// sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::DetachedAccumulatorMembership(sp));
todo!()
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::DetachedAccumulatorNonMembershipProver(s) => match witness {
Witness::VBAccumulatorNonMembership(_w) => {
// let blinding = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, 0));
// let params = s.get_params(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
// let pk = s.get_public_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
// let prk = s.get_proving_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
// let mut sp = DetachedAccumulatorNonMembershipSubProtocol::new(
// s_idx, params, pk, prk,
// );
// sp.init(rng, s.accumulator_value, blinding, w)?;
// transcript.set_label(VB_ACCUM_NON_MEM_LABEL);
// sp.challenge_contribution(&mut transcript)?;
// sub_protocols.push(SubProtocol::DetachedAccumulatorNonMembership(sp));
todo!()
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::PoKBBDT16MAC(s) => match witness {
Witness::PoKOfBBDT16MAC(w) => {
sig_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
PoKOfMACSubProtocol,
new,
PoKOfBBDT16MAC,
BBDT16_KVAC_LABEL
);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::VBAccumulatorMembershipKV(s) => match witness {
Witness::VBAccumulatorMembership(w) => {
accum_kv_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
VBAccumulatorMembershipKVSubProtocol,
VBAccumulatorMembershipKV,
VB_ACCUM_MEM_LABEL
);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipKV(s) => match witness {
Witness::KBUniAccumulatorMembership(w) => {
accum_kv_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipKVSubProtocol,
KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipKV,
KB_UNI_ACCUM_MEM_LABEL
);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipKV(s) => match witness {
Witness::KBUniAccumulatorNonMembership(w) => {
accum_kv_protocol_init!(
s,
s_idx,
w,
KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipKVSubProtocol,
KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipKV,
KB_UNI_ACCUM_NON_MEM_LABEL
);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::VeTZ21(s) => match witness {
Witness::VeTZ21(w) => {
ve_tz_21_init!(rng, s_idx, s, w, init, VE_TZ_21_LABEL);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
Statement::VeTZ21Robust(s) => match witness {
Witness::VeTZ21Robust(w) => {
ve_tz_21_init!(rng, s_idx, s, w, init_robust, VE_TZ_21_ROBUST_LABEL);
}
_ => err_incompat_witness!(s_idx, s, witness),
},
_ => return Err(ProofSystemError::InvalidStatement),
}
}
// If all blindings are not consumed, it means that there was some witness equality which was
// incorrect like either statement index was wrong or witness index for certain statement was wrong.
if !blindings.is_empty() {
return Err(ProofSystemError::InvalidWitnessEqualities(
blindings.keys().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>(),
));
}
// Generate the challenge
let challenge = transcript.challenge_scalar(COMPOSITE_PROOF_CHALLENGE_LABEL);
// Get each sub-protocol's proof
let mut statement_proofs = Vec::with_capacity(sub_protocols.len());
// Tracks if response generated for witness equality. The set member is the witness equality index
let mut resp_generated = BTreeSet::new();
for p in sub_protocols {
statement_proofs.push(match p {
SubProtocol::PoKBBSSignatureG1(mut sp) => {
let s_id = sp.id;
let total_msgs = sp.signature_params.supported_message_count();
let skip_responses_for = Self::get_responses_to_skip(
s_id,
total_msgs,
&disjoint_equalities,
&mut resp_generated,
);
if skip_responses_for.is_empty() {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
} else {
let revealed_idx =
BTreeSet::<usize>::from_iter(sp.revealed_messages.keys().cloned());
sp.gen_partial_proof_contribution(
&challenge,
&revealed_idx,
&skip_responses_for,
)?
}
}
SubProtocol::VBAccumulatorMembership(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::VBAccumulatorNonMembership(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::PoKDiscreteLogs(mut sp) => {
let s_id = sp.id;
let total_msgs = sp.witnesses.as_ref().unwrap().len();
let skip_responses_for = Self::get_responses_to_skip(
s_id,
total_msgs,
&disjoint_equalities,
&mut resp_generated,
);
if skip_responses_for.is_empty() {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
} else {
sp.gen_partial_proof_contribution(&challenge, &skip_responses_for)?
}
}
SubProtocol::PoKDiscreteLogsG2(mut sp) => {
let s_id = sp.id;
let total_msgs = sp.witnesses.as_ref().unwrap().len();
let skip_responses_for = Self::get_responses_to_skip(
s_id,
total_msgs,
&disjoint_equalities,
&mut resp_generated,
);
if skip_responses_for.is_empty() {
sp.gen_proof_contribution_g2(&challenge)?
} else {
sp.gen_partial_proof_contribution_g2(&challenge, &skip_responses_for)?
}
}
SubProtocol::Saver(mut sp) => sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?,
SubProtocol::BoundCheckLegoGroth16(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::R1CSLegogroth16Protocol(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::PSSignaturePoK(mut sp) => {
let s_id = sp.id;
let total_msgs = sp.signature_params.supported_message_count();
Self::update_resp_generated(
s_id,
total_msgs,
&disjoint_equalities,
&mut resp_generated,
);
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::PoKBBSSignature23G1(mut sp) => {
let s_id = sp.id;
let total_msgs = sp.signature_params.supported_message_count();
let skip_responses_for = Self::get_responses_to_skip(
s_id,
total_msgs,
&disjoint_equalities,
&mut resp_generated,
);
if skip_responses_for.is_empty() {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
} else {
let revealed_idx =
BTreeSet::<usize>::from_iter(sp.revealed_messages.keys().cloned());
sp.gen_partial_proof_contribution(
&challenge,
&revealed_idx,
&skip_responses_for,
)?
}
}
SubProtocol::PoKBBSSignature23IETFG1(mut sp) => {
let s_id = sp.id;
let total_msgs = sp.signature_params.supported_message_count();
let skip_responses_for = Self::get_responses_to_skip(
s_id,
total_msgs,
&disjoint_equalities,
&mut resp_generated,
);
if skip_responses_for.is_empty() {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
} else {
let revealed_idx =
BTreeSet::<usize>::from_iter(sp.revealed_messages.keys().cloned());
sp.gen_partial_proof_contribution(
&challenge,
&revealed_idx,
&skip_responses_for,
)?
}
}
SubProtocol::BoundCheckBpp(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(rng, &challenge, &mut transcript)?
}
SubProtocol::BoundCheckSmc(mut sp) => sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?,
SubProtocol::BoundCheckSmcWithKV(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::Inequality(mut sp) => sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?,
SubProtocol::DetachedAccumulatorMembership(mut _sp) => {
// sp.gen_proof_contribution(rng, &challenge)?
todo!()
}
SubProtocol::DetachedAccumulatorNonMembership(mut _sp) => {
// sp.gen_proof_contribution(rng, &challenge)?
todo!()
}
SubProtocol::KBUniversalAccumulatorMembership(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembership(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::VBAccumulatorMembershipCDH(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::VBAccumulatorNonMembershipCDH(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipCDH(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipCDH(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::KBPositiveAccumulatorMembership(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::KBPositiveAccumulatorMembershipCDH(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::PoKOfBBDT16MAC(mut sp) => {
let s_id = sp.id;
let total_msgs = sp.mac_params.supported_message_count();
let skip_responses_for = Self::get_responses_to_skip(
s_id,
total_msgs,
&disjoint_equalities,
&mut resp_generated,
);
if skip_responses_for.is_empty() {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
} else {
let revealed_idx =
BTreeSet::<usize>::from_iter(sp.revealed_messages.keys().cloned());
sp.gen_partial_proof_contribution(
&challenge,
&revealed_idx,
&skip_responses_for,
)?
}
}
SubProtocol::VBAccumulatorMembershipKV(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipKV(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipKV(mut sp) => {
sp.gen_proof_contribution(&challenge)?
}
SubProtocol::VeTZ21(mut sp) => {
if sp.variant_type {
sp.gen_proof_contribution::<_, R, D>(rng, &challenge, &mut transcript)?
} else {
sp.gen_proof_contribution_robust::<_, R, D>(
rng,
&challenge,
&mut transcript,
)?
}
}
});
}
// TODO: Revisit - aggregating after challenge generation, is this correct?
let mut aggregated_groth16 = vec![];
let mut aggregated_legogroth16 = vec![];
let aggregate_snarks =
proof_spec.aggregate_groth16.is_some() || proof_spec.aggregate_legogroth16.is_some();
if !aggregate_snarks {
// TODO: Check no of groth16 and legogroth16
}
if aggregate_snarks {
// The validity of `ProofSpec` ensures that statements are not being repeated
let srs = match proof_spec.snark_aggregation_srs {
Some(SnarkpackSRS::ProverSrs(srs)) => srs,
_ => return Err(ProofSystemError::SnarckpackSrsNotProvided),
};
let prepared_srs = PreparedProverSRS::from(srs);
if proof_spec.aggregate_groth16.is_some() {
let to_aggr = proof_spec.aggregate_groth16.unwrap();
let mut proofs = vec![];
for a in to_aggr {
for i in &a {
let p = match statement_proofs.get(*i).unwrap() {
StatementProof::Saver(s) => &s.snark_proof,
_ => return Err(ProofSystemError::NotASaverStatementProof),
};
proofs.push(p.clone());
}
let ag_proof = legogroth16::aggregation::groth16::aggregate_proofs(
prepared_srs.clone(),
&mut transcript,
&proofs,
)
.map_err(|e| ProofSystemError::LegoGroth16Error(e.into()))?;
aggregated_groth16.push(AggregatedGroth16 {
proof: ag_proof,
statements: a,
});
}
}
if proof_spec.aggregate_legogroth16.is_some() {
let to_aggr = proof_spec.aggregate_legogroth16.unwrap();
let mut proofs = vec![];
for a in to_aggr {
for i in &a {
let p = match statement_proofs.get(*i).unwrap() {
StatementProof::BoundCheckLegoGroth16(s) => &s.snark_proof,
StatementProof::R1CSLegoGroth16(s) => &s.snark_proof,
_ => return Err(ProofSystemError::NotASaverStatementProof),
};
proofs.push(p.clone());
}
let (ag_proof, _) =
legogroth16::aggregation::legogroth16::using_groth16::aggregate_proofs(
prepared_srs.clone(),
&mut transcript,
&proofs,
)
.map_err(|e| ProofSystemError::LegoGroth16Error(e.into()))?;
aggregated_legogroth16.push(AggregatedGroth16 {
proof: ag_proof,
statements: a,
});
}
}
}
Ok((
Self {
statement_proofs,
aggregated_groth16: if !aggregated_groth16.is_empty() {
Some(aggregated_groth16)
} else {
None
},
aggregated_legogroth16: if !aggregated_legogroth16.is_empty() {
Some(aggregated_legogroth16)
} else {
None
},
},
commitment_randomness,
))
}
pub fn statement_proof(&self, index: usize) -> Result<&StatementProof<E>, ProofSystemError> {
self.statement_proofs()
.get(index)
.ok_or(ProofSystemError::InvalidStatementProofIndex(index))
}
pub fn statement_proofs(&self) -> &[StatementProof<E>] {
&self.statement_proofs
}
/// Hash bytes to a field element. This is vulnerable to timing attack and is only used when input
/// is public anyway like when generating setup parameters or challenge
pub fn generate_challenge_from_bytes<D: Digest>(bytes: &[u8]) -> E::ScalarField {
field_elem_from_try_and_incr::<E::ScalarField, D>(bytes)
}
pub fn for_aggregate(&self) -> Self {
let mut statement_proofs = vec![];
for sp in self.statement_proofs() {
match sp {
StatementProof::Saver(sp) => statement_proofs
.push(StatementProof::SaverWithAggregation(sp.for_aggregation())),
StatementProof::BoundCheckLegoGroth16(b) => statement_proofs.push(
StatementProof::BoundCheckLegoGroth16WithAggregation(b.for_aggregation()),
),
StatementProof::R1CSLegoGroth16(b) => statement_proofs.push(
StatementProof::R1CSLegoGroth16WithAggregation(b.for_aggregation()),
),
_ => statement_proofs.push(sp.clone()),
}
}
Self {
statement_proofs,
aggregated_groth16: self.aggregated_groth16.clone(),
aggregated_legogroth16: self.aggregated_legogroth16.clone(),
}
}
/// Get indices of witnesses of statement index `s_id` for which response should not be generated since it already exists.
/// If the response didn't exists, then the given `resp_generated` will be updated
fn get_responses_to_skip(
s_id: usize,
total_msgs: usize,
disjoint_equalities: &[EqualWitnesses],
resp_generated: &mut BTreeSet<usize>,
) -> BTreeSet<usize> {
let mut skip_responses_for = BTreeSet::new();
for w_id in 0..total_msgs {
let wit_ref = (s_id, w_id);
for (i, eq) in disjoint_equalities.iter().enumerate() {
if eq.has_wit_ref(&wit_ref) {
if resp_generated.contains(&i) {
skip_responses_for.insert(w_id);
} else {
resp_generated.insert(i);
}
// Exit loop because equalities are disjoint
break;
}
}
}
skip_responses_for
}
fn update_resp_generated(
s_id: usize,
total_msgs: usize,
disjoint_equalities: &[EqualWitnesses],
resp_generated: &mut BTreeSet<usize>,
) {
for w_id in 0..total_msgs {
let wit_ref = (s_id, w_id);
for (i, eq) in disjoint_equalities.iter().enumerate() {
if eq.has_wit_ref(&wit_ref) {
if !resp_generated.contains(&i) {
resp_generated.insert(i);
}
// Exit loop because equalities are disjoint
break;
}
}
}
}
// fn get_ve_func_args<'a, 'b: 'a>(s_idx: usize, s: &'a VerifiableEncryptionTZ21<E::G1Affine>, proof_spec: &'b ProofSpec<E>, witness_count: usize, blindings: &'b mut BTreeMap<WitnessRef, E::ScalarField>) -> Result<(Vec<E::ScalarField>, &'a [E::G1Affine], &'a ElgamalEncryptionParams<E::G1Affine>), ProofSystemError> {
// let comm_key = s.get_comm_key(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
// // +1 since commitment includes randomness as well to make it perfectly hiding
// if comm_key.len() < (witness_count + 1) {
// return Err(ProofSystemError::IncompatiblePedCommSetupParamAtIndex(s_idx))
// }
// let mut b = Vec::with_capacity(witness_count);
// for i in 0..witness_count {
// if let Some(blinding) = blindings.remove(&(s_idx, i)) {
// b.push(blinding);
// } else {
// return Err(ProofSystemError::MissingBlindingForStatementAtIndex(s_idx, i))
// }
// }
// let enc_params = s.get_enc_params(&proof_spec.setup_params, s_idx)?;
// Ok((b, comm_key.as_slice(), enc_params))
// }
}