proof_system 0.34.0

Proof system to comprise various cryptographic primitives
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
use crate::{
    derived_params::{DerivedParamsTracker, StatementDerivedParams},
    error::ProofSystemError,
    meta_statement::{MetaStatement, MetaStatements},
    setup_params::SetupParams,
    statement::{
        bound_check_smc::{SmcParamsAndCommitmentKey, SmcParamsWithPairingAndCommitmentKey},
        Statement, Statements,
    },
};
use ark_ec::pairing::Pairing;
use ark_serialize::{CanonicalDeserialize, CanonicalSerialize, SerializationError};
use ark_std::{
    collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet},
    io::{Read, Write},
    vec::Vec,
};
use bbs_plus::setup::{
    PreparedPublicKeyG2 as PreparedBBSPlusPk,
    PreparedSignatureParams23G1 as PreparedBBSSigParams23,
    PreparedSignatureParamsG1 as PreparedBBSPlusSigParams, PublicKeyG2 as BBSPlusPk,
    SignatureParams23G1 as BBSSigParams23, SignatureParamsG1 as BBSPlusSigParams,
};
use coconut_crypto::setup::{
    PreparedPublicKey as PreparedPSPk, PreparedSignatureParams as PreparedPSSigParams,
    PublicKey as PSPk, SignatureParams as PSSigParams,
};
use dock_crypto_utils::commitment::PedersenCommitmentKey;
use legogroth16::{
    aggregation::srs::{ProverSRS, VerifierSRS},
    PreparedVerifyingKey as LegoPreparedVerifyingKey, VerifyingKey as LegoVerifyingKey,
};
use saver::prelude::{
    ChunkedCommitmentGens, EncryptionGens, EncryptionKey, PreparedEncryptionGens,
    PreparedEncryptionKey, PreparedVerifyingKey as SaverPreparedVerifyingKey,
    VerifyingKey as SaverVerifyingKey,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use smc_range_proof::prelude::MemberCommitmentKey;
use vb_accumulator::{
    kb_positive_accumulator::setup::{
        PreparedPublicKey as KBPreparedAccumPk, PreparedSetupParams as KBPreparedAccumParams,
        PublicKey as KBAccumPublicKey, SetupParams as KBAccumParams,
    },
    setup::{
        PreparedPublicKey as PreparedAccumPk, PreparedSetupParams as PreparedAccumParams,
        PublicKey as AccumPk, SetupParams as AccumParams,
    },
};

// TODO: Serialize snarkpack params
/// SRS used for Groth16 and LegoGroth16 proof aggregation using SnarkPack.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum SnarkpackSRS<E: Pairing> {
    /// SRS used by prover
    ProverSrs(ProverSRS<E>),
    /// SRS used by verifier
    VerifierSrs(VerifierSRS<E>),
}

/// Describes the relations that need to proven. This is created independently by the prover and verifier and must
/// be agreed upon and be same before creating a `Proof`. Represented as collection of `Statement`s and `MetaStatement`s.
/// Also contains other instructions like which proofs to aggregate.
#[derive(
    Clone, Debug, PartialEq, CanonicalSerialize, CanonicalDeserialize, Serialize, Deserialize,
)]
#[serde(bound = "")]
pub struct ProofSpec<E: Pairing> {
    pub statements: Statements<E>,
    pub meta_statements: MetaStatements,
    pub setup_params: Vec<SetupParams<E>>,
    /// `context` is any arbitrary data that needs to be hashed into the proof and it must be kept
    /// same while creating and verifying the proof. Eg of `context` are the purpose of
    /// the proof or the verifier's identity or some verifier-specific identity of the holder
    /// or all of the above combined.
    pub context: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    /// Statement indices for which Groth16 proof should be aggregated. Each BTreeSet represents one
    /// group of statements whose proof will be aggregated into 1 aggregate proof. The number of aggregate
    /// proofs is the length of the vector
    pub aggregate_groth16: Option<Vec<BTreeSet<usize>>>,
    /// Same as `aggregate_groth16` above but aggregates LegoGroth16 proof instead of Groth16.
    pub aggregate_legogroth16: Option<Vec<BTreeSet<usize>>>,
    // TODO: Remove this skip
    #[serde(skip)]
    pub snark_aggregation_srs: Option<SnarkpackSRS<E>>,
}

impl<E: Pairing> ProofSpec<E> {
    /// Create a new `ProofSpec`
    pub fn new(
        statements: Statements<E>,
        meta_statements: MetaStatements,
        setup_params: Vec<SetupParams<E>>,
        context: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            statements,
            meta_statements,
            setup_params,
            context,
            aggregate_groth16: None,
            aggregate_legogroth16: None,
            snark_aggregation_srs: None,
        }
    }

    /// Same as `Self::new` but specifies which proofs should be aggregated.
    pub fn new_with_aggregation(
        statements: Statements<E>,
        meta_statements: MetaStatements,
        setup_params: Vec<SetupParams<E>>,
        context: Option<Vec<u8>>,
        aggregate_groth16: Option<Vec<BTreeSet<usize>>>,
        aggregate_legogroth16: Option<Vec<BTreeSet<usize>>>,
        snark_aggregation_srs: Option<SnarkpackSRS<E>>,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            statements,
            meta_statements,
            setup_params,
            context,
            aggregate_groth16,
            aggregate_legogroth16,
            snark_aggregation_srs,
        }
    }

    pub fn add_statement(&mut self, statement: Statement<E>) -> usize {
        self.statements.add(statement)
    }

    pub fn add_meta_statement(&mut self, meta_statement: MetaStatement) -> usize {
        self.meta_statements.add(meta_statement)
    }

    /// Sanity check to ensure the proof spec is valid. This should never error as these are used
    /// by same entity creating them.
    pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), ProofSystemError> {
        // Ensure that messages(s) being revealed are not used in a witness equality.
        let mut revealed_wit_refs = BTreeSet::new();

        if (self.aggregate_groth16.is_some() || self.aggregate_legogroth16.is_some())
            && self.snark_aggregation_srs.is_none()
        {
            return Err(ProofSystemError::SnarckpackSrsNotProvided);
        }

        // Check that the same statement id does not occur in self.aggregate_groth16 and self.aggregate_legogroth16
        fn check_disjoint_in_same_list(
            st_ids: &Vec<BTreeSet<usize>>,
        ) -> Result<(), ProofSystemError> {
            let len_st_ids = st_ids.len();
            for (i, s_ids) in st_ids.iter().enumerate() {
                if i < (len_st_ids - 1) {
                    for j in (i + 1)..len_st_ids {
                        if !s_ids.is_disjoint(&st_ids[j]) {
                            return Err(
                                ProofSystemError::SameStatementIdsFoundInMultipleAggregations(
                                    s_ids.intersection(&st_ids[j]).cloned().collect(),
                                ),
                            );
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
            Ok(())
        }

        if let Some(g16) = &self.aggregate_groth16 {
            check_disjoint_in_same_list(g16)?
        }
        if let Some(lg16) = &self.aggregate_legogroth16 {
            check_disjoint_in_same_list(lg16)?
        }
        if let (Some(g16), Some(lg16)) = (&self.aggregate_groth16, &self.aggregate_legogroth16) {
            let len_lg16 = lg16.len();
            for s_ids in g16 {
                for j in 0..len_lg16 {
                    if !s_ids.is_disjoint(&lg16[j]) {
                        return Err(
                            ProofSystemError::SameStatementIdsFoundInMultipleAggregations(
                                s_ids.intersection(&lg16[j]).cloned().collect(),
                            ),
                        );
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        // Check that a message signed with BBS+ being revealed does not occur as a witness in any zero
        // knowledge proof
        for (i, st) in self.statements.0.iter().enumerate() {
            match st {
                Statement::PoKBBSSignatureG1Prover(s) => {
                    for k in s.revealed_messages.keys() {
                        revealed_wit_refs.insert((i, *k));
                    }
                }
                Statement::PoKPSSignature(s) => {
                    for k in s.revealed_messages.keys() {
                        revealed_wit_refs.insert((i, *k));
                    }
                }
                _ => continue,
            }
        }
        for mt in &self.meta_statements.0 {
            match mt {
                // All witness equalities should be valid
                MetaStatement::WitnessEquality(w) => {
                    if !w.is_valid() {
                        return Err(ProofSystemError::InvalidWitnessEquality);
                    }
                    for r in w.0.iter() {
                        if revealed_wit_refs.contains(r) {
                            return Err(ProofSystemError::WitnessAlreadyBeingRevealed(r.0, r.1));
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Derive commitment keys for Schnorr protocol from public params. This is done to avoid
    /// creating them if the same public params are used in multiple statements and is effectively a
    /// pre-processing step done for optimization.
    pub fn derive_commitment_keys(
        &self,
    ) -> Result<
        (
            StatementDerivedParams<Vec<E::G1Affine>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<Vec<E::G1Affine>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<(Vec<E::G1Affine>, Vec<E::G1Affine>)>,
            StatementDerivedParams<Vec<E::G1Affine>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<[E::G1Affine; 2]>,
            StatementDerivedParams<[E::G1Affine; 2]>,
            StatementDerivedParams<[E::G1Affine; 2]>,
        ),
        ProofSystemError,
    > {
        let mut derived_bound_check_lego_comm =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<LegoVerifyingKey<E>, Vec<E::G1Affine>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_ek_comm =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<EncryptionKey<E>, Vec<E::G1Affine>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_chunked_comm = DerivedParamsTracker::<
            (&ChunkedCommitmentGens<E::G1Affine>, u8),
            (Vec<E::G1Affine>, Vec<E::G1Affine>),
            E,
        >::new();
        let mut derived_r1cs_comm =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<LegoVerifyingKey<E>, Vec<E::G1Affine>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_bound_check_bpp_comm =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<(E::G1Affine, E::G1Affine), [E::G1Affine; 2], E>::new();
        let mut derived_bound_check_smc_comm =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<MemberCommitmentKey<E::G1Affine>, [E::G1Affine; 2], E>::new();
        let mut derived_ineq_comm =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<PedersenCommitmentKey<E::G1Affine>, [E::G1Affine; 2], E>::new();

        // To avoid creating variable with short lifetime
        let mut saver_comm_keys = BTreeMap::new();
        let mut bpp_comm_keys = BTreeMap::new();

        for (s_idx, statement) in self.statements.0.iter().enumerate() {
            match statement {
                Statement::SaverProver(_) | Statement::SaverVerifier(_) => {
                    let (comm_gens, chunk_bit_size) = match statement {
                        Statement::SaverProver(s) => (
                            s.get_chunked_commitment_gens(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?,
                            s.chunk_bit_size,
                        ),
                        Statement::SaverVerifier(s) => (
                            s.get_chunked_commitment_gens(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?,
                            s.chunk_bit_size,
                        ),
                        _ => unreachable!(),
                    };
                    saver_comm_keys.insert(s_idx, (comm_gens, chunk_bit_size));
                }
                Statement::BoundCheckBpp(s) => {
                    let ck = s
                        .get_setup_params(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?
                        .get_pedersen_commitment_key();
                    bpp_comm_keys.insert(s_idx, ck);
                }
                _ => (),
            }
        }
        for (s_idx, statement) in self.statements.0.iter().enumerate() {
            match statement {
                Statement::SaverProver(_) | Statement::SaverVerifier(_) => {
                    let enc_key = match statement {
                        Statement::SaverProver(s) => {
                            s.get_encryption_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?
                        }
                        Statement::SaverVerifier(s) => {
                            s.get_encryption_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?
                        }
                        _ => unreachable!(),
                    };

                    derived_ek_comm.on_new_statement_idx(enc_key, s_idx);
                    derived_chunked_comm
                        .on_new_statement_idx(saver_comm_keys.get(&s_idx).unwrap(), s_idx);
                }

                Statement::BoundCheckLegoGroth16Prover(_)
                | Statement::BoundCheckLegoGroth16Verifier(_) => {
                    let verifying_key = match statement {
                        Statement::BoundCheckLegoGroth16Prover(s) => {
                            &s.get_proving_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?.vk
                        }
                        Statement::BoundCheckLegoGroth16Verifier(s) => {
                            s.get_verifying_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?
                        }
                        _ => unreachable!(),
                    };
                    derived_bound_check_lego_comm.on_new_statement_idx(verifying_key, s_idx);
                }

                Statement::R1CSCircomProver(_) | Statement::R1CSCircomVerifier(_) => {
                    let verifying_key = match statement {
                        Statement::R1CSCircomProver(s) => {
                            &s.get_proving_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?.vk
                        }
                        Statement::R1CSCircomVerifier(s) => {
                            s.get_verifying_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?
                        }
                        _ => unreachable!(),
                    };
                    derived_r1cs_comm.on_new_statement_idx(verifying_key, s_idx);
                }
                Statement::BoundCheckBpp(_) => {
                    let ck = bpp_comm_keys.get(&s_idx).unwrap();
                    derived_bound_check_bpp_comm.on_new_statement_idx(ck, s_idx);
                }
                Statement::BoundCheckSmc(_)
                | Statement::BoundCheckSmcWithKVProver(_)
                | Statement::BoundCheckSmcWithKVVerifier(_) => {
                    let comm_key = match statement {
                        Statement::BoundCheckSmc(s) => s.get_comm_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?,
                        Statement::BoundCheckSmcWithKVProver(s) => {
                            s.get_comm_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?
                        }
                        Statement::BoundCheckSmcWithKVVerifier(s) => {
                            s.get_comm_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?
                        }
                        _ => unreachable!(),
                    };
                    derived_bound_check_smc_comm.on_new_statement_idx(comm_key, s_idx);
                }
                Statement::PublicInequality(s) => {
                    let ck = s.get_comm_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_ineq_comm.on_new_statement_idx(ck, s_idx);
                }
                _ => (),
            }
        }
        Ok((
            derived_bound_check_lego_comm.finish(),
            derived_ek_comm.finish(),
            derived_chunked_comm.finish(),
            derived_r1cs_comm.finish(),
            derived_bound_check_bpp_comm.finish(),
            derived_bound_check_smc_comm.finish(),
            derived_ineq_comm.finish(),
        ))
    }

    /// Derive prepared keys for performing pairings. This is done to avoid preparing the same
    /// parameters again and is effectively a pre-processing step done for optimization.
    pub fn derive_prepared_parameters(
        &self,
    ) -> Result<
        (
            StatementDerivedParams<LegoPreparedVerifyingKey<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<PreparedEncryptionGens<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<PreparedEncryptionKey<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<SaverPreparedVerifyingKey<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<PreparedBBSPlusSigParams<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<PreparedBBSPlusPk<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<PreparedAccumParams<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<PreparedAccumPk<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<KBPreparedAccumParams<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<KBPreparedAccumPk<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<PreparedPSSigParams<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<PreparedPSPk<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<PreparedBBSSigParams23<E>>,
            StatementDerivedParams<SmcParamsWithPairingAndCommitmentKey<E>>,
        ),
        ProofSystemError,
    > {
        let mut derived_lego_vk =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<LegoVerifyingKey<E>, LegoPreparedVerifyingKey<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_enc_gens =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<EncryptionGens<E>, PreparedEncryptionGens<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_ek =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<EncryptionKey<E>, PreparedEncryptionKey<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_saver_vk =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<SaverVerifyingKey<E>, SaverPreparedVerifyingKey<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_bbs_p =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<BBSPlusSigParams<E>, PreparedBBSPlusSigParams<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_bbs =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<BBSSigParams23<E>, PreparedBBSSigParams23<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_bbs_pk =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<BBSPlusPk<E>, PreparedBBSPlusPk<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_accum_p =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<AccumParams<E>, PreparedAccumParams<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_accum_pk = DerivedParamsTracker::<AccumPk<E>, PreparedAccumPk<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_ps_p =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<PSSigParams<E>, PreparedPSSigParams<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_ps_pk = DerivedParamsTracker::<PSPk<E>, PreparedPSPk<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_smc_p = DerivedParamsTracker::<
            SmcParamsAndCommitmentKey<E>,
            SmcParamsWithPairingAndCommitmentKey<E>,
            E,
        >::new();
        let mut derived_kb_accum_p =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<KBAccumParams<E>, KBPreparedAccumParams<E>, E>::new();
        let mut derived_kb_accum_pk =
            DerivedParamsTracker::<KBAccumPublicKey<E>, KBPreparedAccumPk<E>, E>::new();

        macro_rules! set_derived_for_accum {
            ($s: ident, $s_idx: ident, $derived_accum_p: ident, $derived_accum_pk: ident) => {
                let params = $s.get_params(&self.setup_params, $s_idx)?;
                $derived_accum_p.on_new_statement_idx(params, $s_idx);

                let pk = $s.get_public_key(&self.setup_params, $s_idx)?;
                $derived_accum_pk.on_new_statement_idx(pk, $s_idx);
            };
        }

        for (s_idx, statement) in self.statements.0.iter().enumerate() {
            match statement {
                Statement::PoKBBSSignatureG1Verifier(s) => {
                    let params = s.get_params(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_bbs_p.on_new_statement_idx(params, s_idx);

                    let pk = s.get_public_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_bbs_pk.on_new_statement_idx(pk, s_idx);
                }
                Statement::PoKBBSSignature23G1Verifier(s) => {
                    let params = s.get_params(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_bbs.on_new_statement_idx(params, s_idx);

                    let pk = s.get_public_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_bbs_pk.on_new_statement_idx(pk, s_idx);
                }
                Statement::PoKBBSSignature23IETFG1Verifier(s) => {
                    let params = s.get_params(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_bbs.on_new_statement_idx(params, s_idx);

                    let pk = s.get_public_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_bbs_pk.on_new_statement_idx(pk, s_idx);
                }
                Statement::VBAccumulatorMembership(s) => {
                    set_derived_for_accum!(s, s_idx, derived_accum_p, derived_accum_pk);
                }
                Statement::VBAccumulatorNonMembership(s) => {
                    set_derived_for_accum!(s, s_idx, derived_accum_p, derived_accum_pk);
                }
                Statement::KBUniversalAccumulatorMembership(s) => {
                    set_derived_for_accum!(s, s_idx, derived_accum_p, derived_accum_pk);
                }
                Statement::KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembership(s) => {
                    set_derived_for_accum!(s, s_idx, derived_accum_p, derived_accum_pk);
                }
                Statement::VBAccumulatorMembershipCDHVerifier(s) => {
                    set_derived_for_accum!(s, s_idx, derived_accum_p, derived_accum_pk);
                }
                Statement::VBAccumulatorNonMembershipCDHVerifier(s) => {
                    set_derived_for_accum!(s, s_idx, derived_accum_p, derived_accum_pk);
                }
                Statement::KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipCDHVerifier(s) => {
                    set_derived_for_accum!(s, s_idx, derived_accum_p, derived_accum_pk);
                }
                Statement::KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipCDHVerifier(s) => {
                    set_derived_for_accum!(s, s_idx, derived_accum_p, derived_accum_pk);
                }
                Statement::KBPositiveAccumulatorMembership(s) => {
                    set_derived_for_accum!(s, s_idx, derived_kb_accum_p, derived_kb_accum_pk);
                }
                Statement::KBPositiveAccumulatorMembershipCDH(s) => {
                    set_derived_for_accum!(s, s_idx, derived_kb_accum_p, derived_kb_accum_pk);
                }
                Statement::SaverVerifier(s) => {
                    let gens = s.get_encryption_gens(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_enc_gens.on_new_statement_idx(gens, s_idx);

                    let enc_key = s.get_encryption_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_ek.on_new_statement_idx(enc_key, s_idx);

                    let verifying_key = s.get_snark_verifying_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_saver_vk.on_new_statement_idx(verifying_key, s_idx);
                }
                Statement::BoundCheckLegoGroth16Verifier(s) => {
                    let verifying_key = s.get_verifying_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_lego_vk.on_new_statement_idx(verifying_key, s_idx);
                }
                Statement::R1CSCircomVerifier(s) => {
                    let verifying_key = s.get_verifying_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_lego_vk.on_new_statement_idx(verifying_key, s_idx);
                }
                Statement::PoKPSSignature(s) => {
                    let params = s.get_params(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_ps_p.on_new_statement_idx(params, s_idx);

                    let pk = s.get_public_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_ps_pk.on_new_statement_idx(pk, s_idx);
                }
                Statement::BoundCheckSmc(s) => {
                    let params = s.get_params_and_comm_key(&self.setup_params, s_idx)?;
                    derived_smc_p.on_new_statement_idx(params, s_idx);
                }
                _ => (),
            }
        }
        Ok((
            derived_lego_vk.finish(),
            derived_enc_gens.finish(),
            derived_ek.finish(),
            derived_saver_vk.finish(),
            derived_bbs_p.finish(),
            derived_bbs_pk.finish(),
            derived_accum_p.finish(),
            derived_accum_pk.finish(),
            derived_kb_accum_p.finish(),
            derived_kb_accum_pk.finish(),
            derived_ps_p.finish(),
            derived_ps_pk.finish(),
            derived_bbs.finish(),
            derived_smc_p.finish(),
        ))
    }
}

impl<E: Pairing> Default for ProofSpec<E> {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            statements: Statements::new(),
            meta_statements: MetaStatements::new(),
            setup_params: Vec::new(),
            context: None,
            aggregate_groth16: None,
            aggregate_legogroth16: None,
            snark_aggregation_srs: None,
        }
    }
}

mod serialization {
    use super::*;
    use ark_serialize::{Compress, Valid, Validate};

    impl<E: Pairing> Valid for SnarkpackSRS<E> {
        fn check(&self) -> Result<(), SerializationError> {
            match self {
                Self::ProverSrs(s) => s.check(),
                Self::VerifierSrs(s) => s.check(),
            }
        }
    }

    impl<E: Pairing> CanonicalSerialize for SnarkpackSRS<E> {
        fn serialize_with_mode<W: Write>(
            &self,
            mut writer: W,
            compress: Compress,
        ) -> Result<(), SerializationError> {
            match self {
                Self::ProverSrs(s) => {
                    CanonicalSerialize::serialize_with_mode(&0u8, &mut writer, compress)?;
                    CanonicalSerialize::serialize_with_mode(s, &mut writer, compress)
                }
                Self::VerifierSrs(s) => {
                    CanonicalSerialize::serialize_with_mode(&1u8, &mut writer, compress)?;
                    CanonicalSerialize::serialize_with_mode(s, &mut writer, compress)
                }
            }
        }

        fn serialized_size(&self, compress: Compress) -> usize {
            match self {
                Self::ProverSrs(s) => 0u8.serialized_size(compress) + s.serialized_size(compress),
                Self::VerifierSrs(s) => 1u8.serialized_size(compress) + s.serialized_size(compress),
            }
        }
    }

    impl<E: Pairing> CanonicalDeserialize for SnarkpackSRS<E> {
        fn deserialize_with_mode<R: Read>(
            mut reader: R,
            compress: Compress,
            validate: Validate,
        ) -> Result<Self, SerializationError> {
            let t: u8 =
                CanonicalDeserialize::deserialize_with_mode(&mut reader, compress, validate)?;
            match t {
                0u8 => Ok(Self::ProverSrs(
                    CanonicalDeserialize::deserialize_with_mode(&mut reader, compress, validate)?,
                )),
                1u8 => Ok(Self::VerifierSrs(
                    CanonicalDeserialize::deserialize_with_mode(&mut reader, compress, validate)?,
                )),
                _ => Err(SerializationError::InvalidData),
            }
        }
    }
}