chrome-agent
Disclaimer: This is an independent, community-driven project. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Google or the Chrome team.
You're not the user. Your LLM is.
You don't need to read this README. Your agent does. Install it, run
chrome-agent --help, and let the LLM figure it out. The CLI embeds its own usage guide, every error comes with a hint for the next action, and--jsongives an agent structured data without you writing an adapter. This page is here because GitHub expects one.
The one thing it does that others don't
Every browser tool can hand a page to a model. The question is what shape it arrives in.
No selectors. No model call to find the rows. The pattern is detected structurally, with MDR/DEPTA-style heuristics that score sibling similarity, content heterogeneity and text-to-link ratio.
Measured on that page with scripts/measure.sh, which you can run yourself:
| what you hand the model | tokens | what it gets |
|---|---|---|
extract --limit 30 |
1,571 | 30 stories as records, with URLs |
inspect (accessibility tree) |
5,652 | the tree, stories mixed into the surrounding page |
| raw HTML | 8,727 | everything, including markup nobody reads |
All three contain the same 30 stories. Only the first hands them over as records. The others hand over the page and leave the model to find the stories in it, which you pay for twice: once in input tokens, again in the reasoning to parse them.
How wide that gap is depends on the page. On a blog archive that is nothing but a list,
extract returns ~12,500 tokens against ~16,100 for the tree, because there is little
surrounding markup to strip. The win comes from pages where the records sit inside a lot of other page furniture.
Every rival makes an agent either write per-site selectors, which break on the next deploy, or pay a model to read the DOM, which is the recurring cost this tooling exists to avoid.
How is this different from agent-browser?
agent-browser (Vercel) is the closest thing to this, it is also a Rust CLI built for agents, and it is well ahead: more features, more users, near-daily releases. If you want a platform, use it. Two honest differences:
| chrome-agent | agent-browser | |
|---|---|---|
| Repeating-record extraction | extract, structural, no LLM call |
not built in; read returns readable text |
| Bot detection | 7 in-binary CDP patches, --connect to real Chrome |
no stealth in core; delegated to paid cloud providers |
| Process model | one command, one connection, exits | background daemon |
| Element IDs | backendNodeId, still valid on the next inspect of the same page |
sequential @e1, reassigned on every snapshot |
| Browser-native downloads | download --uid/--selector clicks and captures the file, and says so when none began |
supported |
| MCP server | none | yes |
Where it is genuinely behind: agent-browser has an encrypted credential vault, cloud
provider integrations and an MCP mode. It also reuses your real
Chrome profile, same as --copy-cookies here, so logged-in access is not a differentiator
for either of us.
Why you shouldn't use chrome-agent
Borrowed from ripgrep, because the fastest way to waste your afternoon is a README that only lists strengths.
- You need a test framework. Use Playwright. Assertions, retries, trace viewer, a test runner, and Microsoft maintaining it.
- You want a supported product. This is one person's project. No SLA, no roadmap promises, no enterprise support.
- You need MCP. There is no MCP server here. If your coding agent can't shell out, this is the wrong tool.
- You need a browser fleet. No cloud, no proxy pool, no CAPTCHA solving. Browserbase, Steel and Browserless do that.
- Your target is behind DataDome or Kasada.
--stealthwon't get you through. You'll need--connectto a real Chrome, and even then, no promises. - You need Firefox or Safari. This speaks CDP. Chrome only.
What it's built on
- One binary, zero runtime. No Node, no npm, no Playwright download. Linux builds are static (musl), so they run on any distro without a glibc version to match.
- Errors are instructions. Every failure carries a
hintfor the next action:{"ok":false,"error":"...","hint":"run inspect"}. - Stable element IDs. uids come from Chrome's
backendNodeId, son82still points at the same node on the next inspect. They do change after a navigation, anddiffwill tell you when that happened instead of pretending to compare two different pages. - Sessions persist. Chrome stays alive between calls, so a command costs a connection, not a browser launch.
- Parallel agents don't collide.
--browser agent1,--browser agent2, separate Chrome instances and separate session state.
chrome-agent (3 MB Rust binary)
| CDP over WebSocket
v
Chrome (headless, no Node.js, no runtime)
Install
# For AI agents -- installs a SKILL.md your agent reads automatically
# Or just the binary
Quick start
# Navigate and see the page
# Click by uid
# Fill a form
# CSS selectors work too
# Article content (Readability -- like Firefox Reader Mode)
# Visible text, scoped and capped
# Run JS
# Screenshot (returns a file path, not binary)
Commands
Navigation
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
goto <url> [--inspect] [--max-depth N] [--header "K: V"] |
Navigate. Auto-prefixes https://. --header (repeatable) sends extra HTTP headers. |
back |
History back. |
forward |
History forward. |
close [--purge] |
Stop browser. --purge deletes cookies/profile. |
close --orphans |
Close every running browser no session entry claims. status lists them; the profiles they leave are what --purge-orphans sweeps. |
Inspection
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
inspect [--verbose] [--max-depth N] [--uid nN] [--filter "role,role"] [--scroll] [--limit N] [--urls] [--max-chars N] [--offset K] |
a11y tree with UIDs. --scroll --limit for infinite scroll. --urls resolves href on links. --max-chars/--offset cap and page the output. Every one of these narrows what is PRINTED only: the snapshot stored for diff is the full tree, and every uid on the page stays actionable. |
diff |
What changed since last inspect. Compared against the FULL tree, whatever narrowing flags the inspect printed with — a --filtered view is not a baseline, and using one reports every node the filter hid as an addition. |
screenshot [--filename name] [--format jpeg|png] [--quality N] [--max-width N] [--uid nN|--selector "css"] |
Screenshot to file. JPEG/quality/max-width shrink it; --uid/--selector clip to one element. |
pdf [--filename name] [--landscape] [--background] |
Print the current page to a PDF file. |
tabs |
List open tabs. |
Interaction
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
click <uid> [--inspect] |
Click by uid. Falls back to JS .click() when no box model. |
click --selector "css" [--inspect] |
Click by CSS selector. |
click --xy 100,200 |
Click by coordinates. |
dblclick <uid> [--inspect] |
Double-click by uid, --selector, or --xy. |
fill --uid <uid> <value> [--inspect] |
Fill input by uid. |
fill --selector "css" <value> |
Fill by selector. |
fill-form <uid=val>... |
Batch fill. |
select --uid <uid> <value> |
Select dropdown option by value or visible text. |
select --selector "css" <value> |
Select by CSS selector. |
check <uid> |
Ensure checkbox/radio is checked. Idempotent. |
uncheck <uid> |
Ensure checkbox/radio is unchecked. Idempotent. |
upload --uid <uid> <file>... |
Upload file(s) to a file input. |
upload --selector "css" <file>... |
Upload by CSS selector. |
drag <from-uid> <to-uid> |
Drag element to another element. |
type <text> [--selector "css"] |
Type into focused element. |
press <key> |
Enter, Tab, Escape, etc. |
scroll <down|up|uid> |
Scroll page or element into view. |
hover <uid> |
Hover. |
wait <text|url|selector> <pattern> |
Wait for a condition. |
wait network-idle [--idle-ms N] [--timeout N] |
Wait until the network is quiet for --idle-ms (default 500). Beats fixed sleeps for SPA/XHR settle. |
Assertions
The exit code is the answer: 0 the claim held, 2 it did not, 1 it could not be checked (no browser, a selector matching nothing, an unparseable regex, a CDP timeout). No other command returns 2, and a bad flag exits 1 — so a CI job can tell "the page is wrong" from "the tool broke".
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
assert value (--selector "css"|--uid <uid>) (--equals|--contains|--matches) <s> |
A form control's value. Secret fields are compared but never printed. |
assert text (--contains|--matches) <s> [--selector "css"|--uid <uid>] |
Visible text of the page, or of one element. |
assert url (--equals|--matches) <s> |
The current URL. |
assert state (--selector "css"|--uid <uid>) (--checked|--unchecked|--selected <opt>|--enabled|--disabled|--visible) |
Checked (native or aria-checked), the <select>'s option, disabled (:disabled or aria-disabled), or rendered. |
assert exists --selector "css" [--count N|--min N] |
How many elements match. --count 0 asserts absence. |
;
# 0 if the field holds it. 2 if a mask or a controlled component rewrote it — and the
# response then names what the page kept: {"actual":"","held":false}
assert is a read: no change report, no verdict, and it never clicks. --matches is a Rust
regex (\d/\w/\s are ASCII-only, no \p{...}; (?i) works). In batch/pipe there is no
exit code — a failed assertion is ok:false with the same assertion object.
Content extraction
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
read [--html] [--truncate N] |
Article extraction via Mozilla Readability. |
text [uid] [--selector "css"] [--truncate N] |
Visible text from page or element. |
eval <expression> [--selector "css"] |
JS in page context. el = matched element. |
extract [--selector "css"] [--limit N] [--scroll] [--a11y] |
Auto-detect repeating data. --a11y for React SPAs (X.com). |
download <url> [--out path] [--timeout N] [--max-bytes N] |
Download a URL fetched in-page, so cookies/auth carry over (login-gated files). Rejects responses over 64 MiB by default. Returns {path,bytes,mime}. |
download --uid n47 | --selector "css" |
Click the element and capture the browser-native download it triggers — the only route to a file built in the page (Blob) or served by a POST no anchor names. Returns {path,bytes,suggested_filename,source_url,delivery}. A click that landed and produced nothing answers ok:true with downloaded:false. |
Monitoring
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
network [--filter "pattern"] [--body] [--live N] [--abort "pattern"] |
Network requests and API responses. --abort blocks matching requests. |
console [--level error] [--clear] |
console.log/warn/error + JS exceptions. |
Advanced
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
frame <selector|main> |
Switch eval/inspect into an iframe (or back to main). Persists only within a pipe/batch process. |
emulate device --width W --height H [--dpr N] [--mobile] [--touch] [--orientation portrait|landscape] [--label name] |
Apply explicit device metrics to the current named page. |
emulate status|reset |
Report requested and page-observed metrics, or clear that page's overrides. |
webmcp list |
List tools a page registered on document.modelContext. No outputSchema — the protocol defines none. |
webmcp call <name> [--args '{"k":"v"}'] [--inspect] |
Call a tool by name and report what it declared next to what the page's accessibility tree measurably did. |
batch |
Execute multiple commands from a JSON array on stdin. |
pipe |
Persistent JSON stdin/stdout connection. |
Global flags
These are accepted on either side of the verb: fill --selector "#q" x --json works as well as
--json fill --selector "#q" x. The exceptions are --timeout and --max-depth. A command that
declares its own takes it after the verb (wait selector ".x" --timeout 5 keeps wait's 10 s
default, not the global 30 s); everywhere else those two must come before it, and passing one
where it is not declared is a usage error naming the invocation which works.
--browser <name> Named browser profile (default: "default")
--page <name> Named tab (default: "default")
--connect [url] Attach to a running Chrome
--proxy-server <url> Proxy a managed Chrome (http(s), socks4/5; explicit port required)
--headed Show browser window (default: headless)
--stealth Anti-detection patches. Clears a Cloudflare JS challenge
("Just a moment..."); does NOT clear a managed Turnstile or
DataDome -- see the protection table below
--copy-cookies Use cookies from your real Chrome profile
--chrome-arg <flag> Extra flag for the Chrome chrome-agent launches (repeatable)
--timeout <seconds> Command timeout (default: 30)
--max-depth <N> Limit inspect depth
--verdict <mode> auto (default): an action reports what changed. off: report the action only
--budget <chars> Cap that change report (default 1200; 0 = uncapped)
--on-intercept <mode> dispatch (default), guard, or refuse — see the table below
--ignore-https-errors Accept self-signed certs
--json Structured JSON output
--dialog <mode> JS dialog policy: accept (default), dismiss, or manual
--dialog-text <text> Text to submit for prompt() dialogs when --dialog accept
--proxy-server is launch-only and is persisted with the named browser session. Close or purge a
running named browser before changing its proxy. Attached browsers (--connect) must be configured
with their proxy before ChromeAgent attaches. Proxy URLs containing credentials are rejected.
--chrome-arg passes an extra flag straight to the Chrome chrome-agent launches, repeatable:
Like --proxy-server, it is launch-only (no effect under --connect — that Chrome is already
running) and fixed for the life of a named browser: a follow-up command that omits it inherits
whatever flags the browser already runs with, and one that names different flags is refused.
Close or purge the browser to change them. A handful of flags are refused outright because
chrome-agent depends on its own values for them to find and reconnect to the browser it launched:
--user-data-dir, --remote-debugging-port, --remote-debugging-pipe, --proxy-server (use the
dedicated flag above), and --headless (use --headed).
JS dialogs (alert/confirm/prompt/beforeunload) are auto-answered by default (--dialog accept). A native dialog otherwise blocks the page with no DOM signal and the agent's next command hangs. Use --dialog dismiss to cancel them, or --dialog manual to opt out.
The loop: inspect, act
# uid=n52 textbox "Email" focusable
# uid=n58 textbox "Password" focusable
# uid=n63 button "Sign In" focusable
# ~ uid=n52 textbox "Email" focusable value="" -> value="user@test.com"
# Page navigated — previous uids are gone. New page:
# uid=n101 heading "Dashboard" level=1
An action says what it changed, so there is no second call to find out whether it landed. That is the whole point: an agent loop pays for turns, not just for tokens.
UIDs stay the same between inspects as long as the DOM node exists. After a navigation they are all reassigned, which is why the click above reports the page rather than a diff.
What a response tells you
ok:true means the command ran, not that the page complied. Every mutating action carries a
verdict, a verdict_reason and a next — one token from a closed set of six, so an empty
change report is never ambiguous and a caller can branch without parsing prose.
verdict |
verdict_reason |
next |
What it means |
|---|---|---|---|
changed |
tree_delta, nodes_moved, focus_only |
proceed |
The page moved; delta says how. On focus_only the move was focus alone, onto a real element — focus.to names what RECEIVED focus, which is often a focusable ancestor of the node clicked (a span inside a link focuses the link). Focus landing on the document is not counted: it is what a click on nothing focusable leaves behind, so it answers identical_tree instead. |
changed |
value_kept |
proceed / inspect |
The state was confirmed by the read-back on the element itself, and the tree could not show it — a secret field renders as a fixed marker, so re-filling one leaves no delta to point at, and on a fresh session there is no tree to compare at all. fill, select and check/uncheck all reach it, through the same value.verbatim. The only row whose next is not a function of the reason alone: when the page read failed too, the verdict still stands (it is about the element) and next becomes inspect (nothing else was seen). |
changed |
values_lost |
confirm |
It moved and emptied a field that held a value — values_lost names each one. A form that submitted and cleared itself looks identical to one that threw the input away. |
navigated |
document_replaced |
inspect |
New document; every stored uid is dead. |
intercepted |
hit_test_receiver, modal_dialog |
dismiss |
Another element occupied the point aimed at and received the event. intercepted_by names it (tag, id, class, uid, z-index, whether it is a modal). Nothing is known about the target. hit_test_receiver is the one that fires in practice — 8 interceptions over 61 real sites, all of them it. modal_dialog needs the top layer (:modal: a <dialog> opened with showModal(), or fullscreen), is covered by a fixture and has not been seen in the wild: the <div role="dialog"> overlays most sites ship never enter the top layer. Read tag/id/class rather than z_index, which was auto on 7 of those 8 and on both fixtures — scrims usually stack by DOM order and position. |
not_kept |
value_reverted, value_rewritten |
stop |
The write reached the element and it does not hold it: empty on the first, rewritten by a mask or normaliser on the second. Read value.actual; a second fill produces the same answer. |
no_effect |
delivered_no_change |
confirm |
Delivery proven by a hit test and the tree stayed still inside observed_after_ms. |
unchanged |
identical_tree |
confirm |
The tree was identical while the tool watched — delivery not proven. |
unknown |
no_baseline, read_failed, identity_unreadable |
inspect |
Nothing could be compared. Never "nothing happened". |
unknown |
aim_point_off_target |
inspect |
Nothing was dispatched, and the readings agreed — so a repeat aims at the same point and refuses again. |
unknown |
scroll_not_settled |
retry |
Nothing was dispatched at all and the readings disagreed, so a repeat duplicates nothing and can succeed. |
not_checked |
reporting_disabled |
proceed |
You passed --verdict off. |
Two of those rungs report that nothing was dispatched and only one asks for a retry, because what
separates them is whether two readings of the aim point agreed: scroll_not_settled is transient
(they disagreed — the point was still moving, so the next attempt aims at a settled box and
works), while aim_point_off_target is stable (they agreed and the point still could not be aimed
at, so an identical retry misses identically). The stable rung covers two shapes, and aim tells
them apart: a coordinate on screen means the element has no box a pointer can reach (a wrapped
inline box, a clipped container), and a coordinate outside the viewport means the page is holding
it there — a consent wall in position: fixed over a document whose scroll is locked, where
scroll reports success and moves nothing.
unchanged means the page did not change while the tool watched — not "the action had no
effect", which it cannot know: an unchanged tree is also what a click swallowed by an overlay
looks like. That is why pointer-targeted actions also report delivery (target_hit, intercepted,
off_target, not_settled, js, not_probed) from a hit test at the coordinate about to be
dispatched: no_effect is only ever emitted behind target_hit, and not_settled/off_target
mean nothing was sent. --on-intercept refuse turns an interception into an error instead of
sending the event anyway — ok:false, exit 1, and the same fields the dispatch would have
carried (delivery, intercepted_by, verdict, next, verdict_hint, hint) plus
dispatched:false, because the mode that refuses to act is the one whose caller has the most
re-planning to do.
--on-intercept |
Sends through the receiver when it looks... | Refuses when it looks... |
|---|---|---|
dispatch (default) |
anything | never — always sends |
guard |
inert (no interactive tag/role, not focusable, no cursor: pointer) |
actionable, or an <iframe> (opaque — see below), or unidentified |
refuse |
never — always refuses | anything |
guard is the middle ground: neither extreme was right for an interception measured during a
site audit, where a click aimed at unrelated navigation landed on a consent wall's own "accept"
button and dispatch sent the click through it, accepting the wall on the caller's behalf. Five
of eight interceptions measured that day were inert (a HEADER, plain text, an image, a search
<iframe>) and would have been wrongly refused by a blanket refuse; three could act (that
consent button, a CMP <iframe>, a country-selector cell) and were wrongly sent through by
dispatch. guard reads intercepted_by.actionable — a native interactive tag, an ARIA
interactive role, explicit keyboard focusability, or a cursor: pointer computed style,
whichever the receiver has — computed inside the same probe call, so it costs no extra round
trip. It is deliberately not a keyword match against the receiver's text or class name
("accept", "agree", "j'accepte", a CMP vendor's own class fragment): those carried the
information to a person reading the field data, but a wordlist is never complete and never will
be, in every language a consent wall might use. An <iframe> receiver refuses under guard
regardless — its content is opaque from outside, so "inert" would be assumed, not measured, and
between a false refusal on an inert search box and a false dispatch into an unseen consent wall
this project accepts the former. The default stays dispatch: guard's predicate has not been
measured at the scale that justifies dispatch's own default (12/12 on the design fixtures, and
separately checked across dozens of real sites), and flipping the default would change outcomes
for every overlapping-button case, not only consent walls. A refusal under guard carries the
exact same payload a refusal under refuse does (delivery, intercepted_by — now with
actionable — verdict, next, verdict_hint, hint, dispatched:false); the two differ
only in the words explaining why nothing was dispatched.
waited_ms rides on a mutating response when the action waited for the page to load after it,
and only then — a click that navigates carries it, a click that did not does not, and it is what
answers "why did that take so long" without the caller guessing. A pointer event that Chrome does
not acknowledge within 8 s fails instead of waiting out --timeout, and says the event may
already have reached the page: the one thing not to do there is send it again. Pointer actions
also bring their page to the foreground first, because a background tab answers them on a fixed
five-second timer — with several pages open in one browser, clicking on one makes it the active
one, which is what clicking means.
Macros
A macro is a path that already worked once, kept under a name with the postconditions observed
on that success. macro record distils a recorded session — the exploration and the dead ends
do not survive — and macro run replays it, checking every step's guards and stopping at the
first that does not hold.
What becomes a guard is the whole point: delivery: target_hit, the verdict WORD (never the
reason), value.verbatim, and a url_matches built from the path. Never the changed counters,
never a uid, never a duration — a macro that pins those breaks on a page that still works. A step
aimed by a uid is recorded by role and accessible name or refused outright; a secret field becomes
a declared parameter and is never written to the file. A guard that does not hold stops the run
and reports the step, the guard, what was observed and the action's own next. There is no
repair and no retry: that line is deliberate.
Two blind spots, both stated rather than papered over: the read-back window is a fixed 60 ms
(reported as observed_after_ms, so a validator firing at 400 ms is outside it — wait then
assert value), and canvas, WebGL and CSS-only effects are invisible to the accessibility tree.
--verdict off restores the older behaviour: the action is reported, the page is not read
back. Faster, quieter, and you find out what happened on your next call — the response says
not_checked so you know that is what happened.
Content extraction
From least to most tokens:
# Articles (Readability, like Firefox Reader Mode)
# Repeating data -- products, search results, feeds. No selectors.
# Uses MDR/DEPTA heuristics. Finds the pattern automatically.
# React SPAs (X.com, etc.) -- uses a11y tree instead of DOM
# Scoped visible text
# API responses -- skip the DOM
Forms: dropdowns, checkboxes, file uploads
# Select dropdown by value or visible text
# Idempotent checkbox control
# File upload
# Double-click (text selection, special controls)
Device emulation
Metrics are attached to one named page. Chrome reverts every override the moment the CDP session
that set it detaches, so the configuration is persisted and reapplied at the start of each
connection — which also means that between commands on a headed or --connect browser the page
briefly shows its real metrics. Sibling pages keep their own metrics, with one visibility caveat:
Chromium exposes an orientation override only for its active target, so commands on an emulated
page activate that tab first, backgrounding its siblings the way switching tabs does. Closing or
restarting Chrome discards the configuration. Values are explicit because device preset catalogs
belong to the DevTools frontend, not CDP; the binary does not ship a copy that can drift from
Chromium. Under --touch, click and check dispatch touch taps instead of mouse events
(dblclick, hover and drag stay mouse — pages that only listen to touch will not see them);
Chrome's own mouse-to-touch conversion was measured to leave Input.dispatchMouseEvent
unanswered, which is why the taps are synthesized. screenshot --max-width counts CSS pixels, so
a --dpr 2.625 capture is that factor larger. If Chromium rejects one of the override calls, the
command attempts every cleanup call and does not persist the incomplete configuration.
Iframes
The frame switch binds eval and inspect to the iframe, but only within one process, so drive it through pipe (or batch), never as separate CLI calls:
|
- Target the intended iframe precisely (e.g.
iframe[src*="checkout"]); a bareiframematches the first one in DOM order, often an adabout:blankslot. framescopeseval/inspect; it does not scope--selectortargeting. Runinspectafter the switch to get iframe uids, then act by uid (uids resolve across frames).- Each standalone
chrome-agent <cmd>opens a fresh connection, sochrome-agent frame …followed by a separatechrome-agent inspectloses the switch. Usepipe/batch.
WebMCP tools
Pages can register tools on document.modelContext (W3C WICG WebMCP). webmcp list discovers
them; webmcp call calls one and reports what it declared next to what the page measurably
did — because the protocol defines no outputSchema. A tool's return is a freeform string with
no contract to check it against, so {"success":true} and nothing having moved is not a
protocol violation, it looks exactly like a correct call:
# tool=add_to_cart "Add a product to the cart."
# note: no tool here carries an outputSchema — the protocol defines none...
# declared_result: {"success":true,"item":"Espresso Blend","price":"$18.00"}
# verdict: changed (tree_delta) — added=3 removed=2 changed=1: a real cart line appeared
# declared_result: {"success":true,"item":"Espresso Blend","price":"$18.00"} <- byte-identical
# verdict: unchanged (identical_tree) — nothing moved. Not "no effect": a canvas
# repaint, a CSS-only change, or a handler that runs after the window all look like this too.
webmcp call is reported exactly like any other action command — verdict, delta, next —
because that machinery is the only corroboration the protocol leaves available. It never invents
a stronger claim than the tree can support: a call that declares success and moves nothing reads
as unchanged, not as a lie, for the same reason no_effect elsewhere requires proof of
delivery before it is used.
Two of the spec's own sharp edges are handled rather than surfaced: executeTool requires the
actual RegisteredTool object from getTools() (a bare name throws
TypeError: The provided value is not of type 'RegisteredTool'.) and a JSON string second
argument (an object throws Failed to parse input arguments) — webmcp call <name> resolves the
tool and validates --args as JSON before either can happen.
Under a frame binding, webmcp hits the same isolated-world blindness eval already has: a
tool a frame's own main-world script registered is invisible from there (measured, not assumed —
see tests/fixtures/webmcp_iframe_host.html). The response carries frame_scoped: true so an
empty list reads as unproven, not as "this frame has none".
Most installed Chrome builds have no native WebMCP yet. Test against the real API with
--chrome-arg --enable-features=WebMCP,WebMCPTesting (see --chrome-arg above), or against a
page that ships its own polyfill.
Batch mode
Execute a sequence of commands from stdin without per-command process startup:
|
Each command produces one JSON line. About 10x faster than spawning a process per command.
Stealth
--stealth patches 7 automation fingerprints via CDP:
navigator.webdriverset toundefinedchrome.runtimemocked- Permissions API fixed
- WebGL renderer masked
- User-Agent cleaned
- Input coordinate leak patched
Runtime.enablenever called
These are CDP-level patches (Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument), not Chrome flags.
For sites with heavier protection (DataDome, Kasada) that fingerprint the Chromium binary itself, connect to your real Chrome:
&
| Protection | Solution | Measured |
|---|---|---|
| None | chrome-agent goto ... |
— |
| Cloudflare JS challenge ("Just a moment…") | chrome-agent --stealth goto ... |
shop.app: 403 and 6 nodes without it, 200 and the real page with it |
| Cloudflare managed Turnstile | --stealth does not help |
nowsecure.nl: 10 nodes with it and without it, no difference |
| Logged-in sites | chrome-agent --stealth --copy-cookies goto ... |
— |
| DataDome/Kasada | chrome-agent --connect to real Chrome |
leboncoin.fr: 403 with --stealth and without |
The two Cloudflare rows are not the same product. The interstitial that says "Just a moment…"
runs a JS challenge that the seven patches satisfy; a managed Turnstile widget fingerprints
the browser itself, and no in-binary patch moves it. --connect to a real Chrome is the only
route this tool has for the second row and for DataDome. Each measurement above was taken
three times, with and without the flag, on the dates in the commit.
Logged-in sites
--copy-cookies copies the cookie database from your Chrome profile. Both Chrome instances use the same macOS Keychain, so encrypted cookies just work.
# Your timeline. Your DMs. No login flow.
Your real Chrome is not affected.
Network capture and blocking
# Resources already loaded (stealth-safe, uses Performance API)
# Live traffic with response bodies
# Block tracking/ads (uses Fetch domain interception)
# Console output
Console capture uses an injected interceptor, not Runtime.enable.
Downloads, PDF, and token-safe screenshots
Files are written under ~/.chrome-agent/tmp (or your --out path) with 0600 perms; the path is printed on stdout. Binary bytes never hit stdout.
# Download a file, fetched inside the page so cookies/auth carry over.
# Ideal for login-gated exports (invoices, CSVs, PDFs behind an auth wall).
# {"ok":true,"path":"./2024.csv","bytes":48213,"mime":"text/csv"}
# Print the current page to PDF.
# Screenshots that don't blow up your context window.
# Click-triggered downloads: an "Export CSV" button that builds the file in the page has no
# URL to fetch, so the only way to the bytes is to click it.
# {"ok":true,"downloaded":true,"via":"click","path":"./export.csv","bytes":48213,
# "suggested_filename":"report.csv","delivery":"target_hit","uid":"n42"}
# The click landed and nothing downloaded. Exit 0, because the click is not undoable and an
# error here invites a second real one.
# {"ok":true,"downloaded":false,"observed_after_ms":5002,
# "message":"Clicked selector '#maybe' and no download began in the 5s that followed…",
# "hint":"…Do not click again: the first click reached the page…"}
Two mechanisms, one verb, one contract: a file at a named path, 0600, with its size and the
name the server proposed. download <url> uses an in-page fetch with credentials:'include',
so the request inherits the page's session. download --uid/--selector runs the same click as
click — same hit test, same --on-intercept, so a covered button reports its receiver — and
arms Browser.setDownloadBehavior around it.
Read downloaded, not ok. A click that was delivered is never an error, whatever it
failed to produce, for the reason a lost connection is never a retry: the page cannot tell a
second click from a second deliberate action. --timeout bounds the whole window (the transfer
must begin and finish inside it) and --max-bytes cancels a transfer that goes past it,
removing the partial file.
The arming lives on the connection that clicks because Chrome's download override does not
outlive the CDP session that set it — measured: a fresh connection clicking the same link with
nothing armed produces no file. That is why this is a flag on download and not a separate
wait --download verb, which would work in pipe mode and silently capture nothing from the CLI.
Waiting for the network to settle
# Resolve once no requests are in flight for 500ms (tunable), bounded by --timeout.
# Replaces fragile fixed sleeps on SPAs / XHR-heavy pages.
Opt-in (enables the Network domain), so it stays off the stealth hot path.
Pipe mode
For agents that send many commands in sequence, pipe mode keeps a single connection open:
|
One JSON line per response. About 10x faster than spawning a process per command.
JSON mode
# {"ok":true,"url":"...","title":"...","landed":{"requested":"...","final":"...","redirected":false,"http_status":200,"serving":"page"},"snapshot":"uid=n1 heading..."}
# `landed` is where you aimed vs where you ended up. An expired session redirecting to a
# login wall used to be indistinguishable from a successful load:
# {"ok":true,"url":"https://app.example.com/login?next=/orders","title":"Sign in",
# "landed":{"requested":"https://app.example.com/orders",
# "final":"https://app.example.com/login?next=/orders",
# "redirected":true,"http_status":200,"serving":"page"},
# "hint":"The redirect landed on a path containing 'login', which often means the session expired. ..."}
# A fragment-only or trailing-slash change is not a redirect. `http_status` is the final
# hop's status (a followed 302 reports 200), read from the Navigation Timing API so
# --stealth is untouched, and absent — never 0 — when the page reports none.
# `serving` is what answered. `ok:true` only says the navigation happened — a WAF refusal
# served with a 200, a captcha interstitial and a 403 all used to look like a load:
# {"ok":true,"title":"leboncoin",
# "landed":{...,"http_status":403,"serving":"challenge",
# "challenge_from":"geo.captcha-delivery.com"},
# "hint":"A challenge frame from geo.captcha-delivery.com is the only thing here to act on..."}
#
# page nothing measured contradicts the load — an absence of evidence,
# not a certificate (a paywall reads as `page` too)
# challenge an anti-bot vendor's frame or script, and no form of the site's own;
# `challenge_from` names the host. Use --connect, not --stealth
# error the server answered 4xx/5xx — `http_status` says which
# nothing_actionable no link, no form control, no script, almost no text. What an
# edge-served refusal looks like, and what a page that had not
# rendered yet looks like. Run `inspect` before giving up
# unreadable the shape probe did not run
# {"ok":true,"result":2}
# Errors exit 1 but JSON is still on stdout (parseable):
# {"ok":false,"error":"Element uid=n99 not found.","hint":"Run 'chrome-agent inspect'"}
# An assertion that did not hold exits 2 — a page fact, not a tool failure:
# {"ok":false,"assertion":{"kind":"value","expected":"SAVE10","actual":"","held":false},"hint":"..."}
Exit codes: 0 success · 1 error (including a bad flag) · 2 an assertion did not hold · 130 Ctrl+C.
Inspect with link URLs
When deciding which link to click, the agent often needs the URL, not just the text:
# uid=n82 link "Pricing" url="https://example.com/pricing"
# uid=n97 link "Docs" url="https://docs.example.com"
Multi-tab and parallel agents
# Multiple tabs in one browser
# Multiple agents, each with their own Chrome
Using with AI agents
# Install the skill (Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot, etc.)
# Or tell your agent to run:
# The help output includes a full LLM usage guide.
Claude Code permissions:
Comparison
| chrome-agent | agent-browser (Vercel) | Playwright MCP | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Language | Rust | Rust | TypeScript |
| Binary | 3 MB, zero runtime | 3 MB CLI + dashboard + cloud providers | Node + Playwright |
| Startup | ~10ms (session reuse) | daemon (fast after first) | cold start |
| Page cost, HN front page | 5,652 tokens (inspect), 1,571 (extract, all 30 records) |
not measured here | not measured here |
| UID stability | backendNodeId (stable across inspects) |
sequential @e1, @e2 (reassigned per snapshot) |
N/A (selectors) |
| Action + observe | --inspect flag (1 call) |
separate snapshot call | separate call |
| Stealth | 7 native CDP patches | delegated to cloud providers | none |
| Reader mode | read (Readability.js) |
none | none |
| Data extraction | extract (auto-detect repeating data) |
none | none |
| Link URL resolution | inspect --urls |
snapshot -u |
N/A |
| Dropdowns | select |
select |
via selectors |
| Checkboxes | check/uncheck (idempotent) |
check/uncheck |
via selectors |
| File upload | upload |
upload |
via selectors |
| Drag and drop | drag |
drag |
via selectors |
| Annotated screenshots | not yet | screenshot --annotate |
not yet |
| Element/token-safe screenshots | screenshot --uid/--selector, --format jpeg, --max-width |
via options | via options |
| PDF export | pdf (Page.printToPDF) |
none | none |
| File download | download <url> (in-page fetch, auth-preserving) and download --uid/--selector (click-triggered) |
download |
via events |
| Extra request headers | goto --header |
yes | via context |
| Network-idle wait | wait network-idle |
yes | browser_wait_for |
| JS dialog handling | auto (--dialog accept/dismiss/manual) |
yes | browser_handle_dialog |
| Live dashboard | no (lean) | yes (Next.js) | no |
| Cloud providers | no (--connect to anything) |
5 built-in | no |
| iOS/Safari | no | yes (WebDriver) | no |
| Network blocking | network --abort |
network route --abort |
no |
| Iframe switching | frame |
frame |
via selectors |
| Batch execution | batch (JSON stdin) |
batch (JSON or quoted) |
N/A |
| AI chat built-in | no (the agent IS the LLM) | yes (AI Gateway) | N/A |
| Codebase | ~10.2K lines | ~40K lines | Playwright |
| Design goal | minimal tokens, maximal autonomy | feature-complete platform | browser testing |
License
MIT