bacnet-server 0.15.0

use super::{BipServerBuilder, ServerBuilder, TransportPort};
use bacnet_encoding::npdu::NpduAddress;
use bacnet_services::device_mgmt::{MAX_PASSWORD_CHARS, password_fits};
use bacnet_types::constructed::BACnetAddress;
use bacnet_types::error::Error;

/// A source address length a DCC or time-sync restriction entry can hold and
/// match: 1 to [`BACnetAddress::MAX_MAC_LEN`] octets. Every routed source and
/// every built-in transport's MAC fits that bound (#1141), so a longer entry
/// could never match anything (#1157, #1266).
pub(super) fn address_length_fits(length: usize) -> bool {
    (1..=BACnetAddress::MAX_MAC_LEN).contains(&length)
}

/// Whether a routed DCC or time-sync allowlist entry for `network` and
/// `address` names the node that sent a request from link MAC `mac` with no
/// SNET (#1458): true only when `local_network`, this network's own number,
/// is known and is `network`, and `mac` is `address`. The entry is taken as
/// the local route [`RecipientRoute::localize`] makes of it, as a send to
/// that address would be (#1358). While the number is unknown, or for any
/// other network, the entry names only the routed source it spells out.
///
/// Only this direction widens. A Device binding also takes a request relayed
/// with this network's number as its direct station (#1404); an allowlist
/// does not. A direct entry still matches no routed source: any node on the
/// link can claim this network's number and a MAC as SNET and SADR, while a
/// direct entry names the link source itself.
///
/// [`RecipientRoute::localize`]: super::event_recipient_route::RecipientRoute::localize
pub(super) fn routed_entry_names_direct_source(
    network: u16,
    address: &[u8],
    mac: &[u8],
    local_network: Option<u16>,
) -> bool {
    use super::event_recipient_route::RecipientRoute;
    let route = RecipientRoute::RemoteUnicast {
        network,
        mac: bacnet_types::MacAddr::from_slice(address),
    };
    // A source MAC is never a link broadcast, so none is assumed here.
    matches!(route.localize(local_network, |_| false, |_| false),
        RecipientRoute::LocalUnicast(station) if station.as_slice() == mac)
}

/// Exact claimed DCC source, not an authenticated principal (including SC VMAC).
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub enum DccSource {
    /// Full link source MAC bytes, used only when no routed source is present.
    Direct(Vec<u8>),
    /// Full routed source network and address, independent of the immediate router.
    /// Once the server knows its own network's number, an entry on that
    /// network also matches the station's direct requests from `address`
    /// with no routed source (#1458).
    Routed {
        /// Claimed source network (1..=65534).
        network: u16,
        /// Complete claimed source address (1 to
        /// [`BACnetAddress::MAX_MAC_LEN`] octets).
        address: Vec<u8>,
    },
}

/// Validated static exact-source restriction. An empty list denies every source.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub struct DccSourceRestriction(Vec<DccSource>);

impl DccSourceRestriction {
    /// Accept at most 256 entries, each with 1 to
    /// [`BACnetAddress::MAX_MAC_LEN`] (18) address octets, the longest source
    /// address the network layer delivers (#1157). Routed networks must be
    /// 1..=65534. These are local configuration limits.
    pub fn new(sources: Vec<DccSource>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
        if sources.len() > 256 {
            return Err(Error::Encoding(
                "DCC source restriction allows at most 256 entries".into(),
            ));
        }
        for source in &sources {
            let address = match source {
                DccSource::Direct(address) => address,
                DccSource::Routed { network, address } => {
                    if !(1..=65534).contains(network) {
                        return Err(Error::Encoding(
                            "DCC routed source network must be 1..=65534".into(),
                        ));
                    }
                    address
                }
            };
            if !address_length_fits(address.len()) {
                return Err(Error::Encoding(format!(
                    "DCC source address must contain 1..={} octets",
                    BACnetAddress::MAX_MAC_LEN
                )));
            }
        }
        Ok(Self(sources))
    }

    /// Reject a configured restriction unless password-required policy is explicit.
    pub fn validate_policy(&self, policy: DccPolicy) -> Result<(), Error> {
        if policy != DccPolicy::RequirePassword {
            return Err(Error::Encoding(
                "DCC source restriction requires RequirePassword policy".into(),
            ));
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Whether a request from link MAC `mac`, with `routed` as its SNET and
    /// SADR when a router relayed it, comes from a listed source.
    /// `local_network` is this network's own number, once known: a routed
    /// entry on it also lists the station's direct requests
    /// ([`routed_entry_names_direct_source`], #1458).
    pub(super) fn allows(
        &self,
        mac: &[u8],
        routed: Option<&NpduAddress>,
        local_network: Option<u16>,
    ) -> bool {
        // Never use the admission canonicalizer: its malformed routed fallback
        // is not an authorization identity. Compare all bytes, not telemetry.
        match routed {
            Some(source) => {
                (1..=65534).contains(&source.network)
                    && address_length_fits(source.mac_address.len())
                    && self.0.iter().any(|entry| matches!(entry,
                        DccSource::Routed { network, address }
                        if *network == source.network && address.as_slice() == source.mac_address.as_slice()))
            }
            None => {
                address_length_fits(mac.len())
                    && self.0.iter().any(|entry| match entry {
                        DccSource::Direct(address) => address.as_slice() == mac,
                        DccSource::Routed { network, address } => {
                            routed_entry_names_direct_source(*network, address, mac, local_network)
                        }
                    })
            }
        }
    }
}

impl super::ServerConfig {
    pub(super) fn validate_dcc_config(&self) -> Result<(), Error> {
        // RequirePassword names the missing password itself, empty included.
        self.dcc_policy.validate(&self.dcc_password)?;
        // A configured password past the 20-character limit could never be
        // sent, so it would refuse every request (#2060). An empty one could
        // never match either: a request's empty password decodes as none
        // (#2094). Leave the password unset instead.
        for (name, password) in [
            ("dcc_password", &self.dcc_password),
            ("reinit_password", &self.reinit_password),
        ] {
            if password.as_deref() == Some("") {
                return Err(Error::Encoding(format!(
                    "{name} is empty; leave it unset for no password"
                )));
            }
            if password.as_deref().is_some_and(|p| !password_fits(p)) {
                return Err(Error::Encoding(format!(
                    "{name} exceeds the {MAX_PASSWORD_CHARS}-character limit"
                )));
            }
        }
        if let Some(restriction) = &self.dcc_source_restriction {
            restriction.validate_policy(self.dcc_policy)?;
        }
        if let Some(limit) = self.dcc_disable_rate_limit {
            limit.validate()?;
        }
        Ok(())
    }
}

/// Local DeviceCommunicationControl authorization, not source authentication.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub enum DccPolicy {
    /// Deny all valid DCC modes, even with a correct configured password.
    #[default]
    DenyAll,
    /// Allow supported modes only with a configured nonempty password.
    RequirePassword,
    /// INSECURE compatibility mode: preserve optional-password authorization.
    /// A configured password is still checked; absence permits any requester.
    LegacyPermissive,
}

impl DccPolicy {
    /// Validate operator configuration before transport startup or dialing.
    pub fn validate(self, password: &Option<String>) -> Result<(), Error> {
        if self == Self::RequirePassword && password.as_ref().is_none_or(String::is_empty) {
            return Err(Error::Encoding(
                "RequirePassword DCC policy requires a nonempty dcc_password".into(),
            ));
        }
        Ok(())
    }
}

impl<T: TransportPort + 'static> ServerBuilder<T> {
    /// Set the password required for DeviceCommunicationControl requests.
    pub fn dcc_password(mut self, password: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        self.config.dcc_password = Some(password.into());
        self
    }

    /// Restrict claimed DCC sources; None preserves unrestricted policy behavior.
    pub fn dcc_source_restriction(mut self, restriction: Option<DccSourceRestriction>) -> Self {
        self.config.dcc_source_restriction = restriction;
        self
    }
    /// Select explicit local DCC authorization (default: deny all).
    pub fn dcc_policy(mut self, policy: DccPolicy) -> Self {
        self.config.dcc_policy = policy;
        self
    }
}

impl BipServerBuilder {
    /// Set the password required for DeviceCommunicationControl requests.
    pub fn dcc_password(mut self, password: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        self.config.dcc_password = Some(password.into());
        self
    }

    /// Restrict claimed DCC sources; requires explicit RequirePassword policy.
    pub fn dcc_source_restriction(mut self, restriction: Option<DccSourceRestriction>) -> Self {
        self.config.dcc_source_restriction = restriction;
        self
    }
    /// Select explicit local DCC authorization (default: deny all).
    pub fn dcc_policy(mut self, policy: DccPolicy) -> Self {
        self.config.dcc_policy = policy;
        self
    }
}