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"name": "Activate Firmware Update Mode",
"description": "Adversaries may activate firmware update mode on devices to prevent expected response functions from engaging in reaction to an emergency or process malfunction. For example, devices such as protection relays may have an operation mode designed for firmware installation. This mode may halt process monitoring and related functions to allow new firmware to be loaded. A device left in update mode may be placed in an inactive holding state if no firmware is provided to it. By entering and leaving a device in this mode, the adversary may deny its usual functionalities.",
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"description": "Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. \n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, the adversary suppressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)\n\nA Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) The method of suppression may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question:\n\n* An alarm raised by a protocol message\n* An alarm signaled with I/O\n* An alarm bit set in a flag (and read)\n\nIn ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code.",
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"description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
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"url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf"
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"description": "Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.",
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"description": "Adversaries may automate collection of industrial environment information using tools or scripts. This automated collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in the control systems environment. For example, the OPC protocol may be used to enumerate and gather information. Access to a system or interface with these native protocols may allow collection and enumeration of other attached, communicating servers and devices.",
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"description": "Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)\n\nIn the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, malicious firmware was used to render communication devices inoperable and effectively prevent them from receiving remote command messages. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)",
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"description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
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"url": "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258"
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"description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
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"description": "Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. Reporting messages relay the status of control system devices, which can include event log data and I/O values of the associated device. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator.\n\nBlocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)\n\nIn the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, malicious firmware was used to render communication devices inoperable and effectively block messages from being reported. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)",
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"description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
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"url": "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258"
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"description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
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"name": "Block Serial COM",
"description": "Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. \n\nA serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at <code>10.0.0.1</code> via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: <code>telnet 10.0.0.1 20001</code>.",
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"name": "Brute Force I/O",
"description": "Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and attempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a process function without having to target specific I/O interfaces. More than one process function manipulation and enumeration pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute force attempt.",
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"name": "Change Program State",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to change the state of the current program on a control device. Program state changes may be used to allow for another program to take over control or be loaded onto the device.",
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"description": "Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: EAttack Command-Line Interface) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.\n\nCLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context.\n\nMany controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.",
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"description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Command-Line Interface. Retrieved May 17, 2018.",
"source_name": "EAttack Command-Line Interface",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059"
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"name": "Commonly Used Port",
"description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n* TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3)\n* TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later)\n* TCP:23 (TELNET)\n* UDP:161 (SNMP)\n* TCP:502 (MODBUS)\n* TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP)\n* TCP:20000 (DNP3)\n* TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP)\n\nContributors: Matan Dobrushin - Otorio",
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T885",
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"name": "Connection Proxy",
"description": "Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications.\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy)\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
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"description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Connection Proxy. Retrieved May 17, 2018.",
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"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090"
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"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2014/2014-04-23-c2-report-birmingham.pdf"
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"name": "Control Device Identification",
"description": "Adversaries may perform control device identification to determine the make and model of a target device. Management software and device APIs may be utilized by the adversary to gain this information. By identifying and obtaining device specifics, the adversary may be able to determine device vulnerabilities. This device information can also be used to understand device functionality and inform the decision to target the environment.",
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"type": "attack-pattern",
"name": "Damage to Property",
"description": "Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in <span class=\"smw-format list-format \"><span class=\"smw-row\"><span class=\"smw-field\"><span class=\"smw-value\">Loss of Safety</span></span></span></span>. Operations that result in <span class=\"smw-format list-format \"><span class=\"smw-row\"><span class=\"smw-field\"><span class=\"smw-value\">Loss of Control</span></span></span></span> may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of <span class=\"smw-format list-format \"><span class=\"smw-row\"><span class=\"smw-field\"><span class=\"smw-value\">Loss of Productivity and Revenue</span></span></span></span>. \n\nThe German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace.\n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw sewage affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickening stench from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)\n\nA Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01)",
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{
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T879",
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"external_id": "T0879"
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{
"description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
"source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808",
"url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf"
},
{
"description": "John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.",
"source_name": "LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12",
"url": "https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/"
},
{
"description": "Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.",
"source_name": "LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02",
"url": "https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/"
},
{
"description": "Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.",
"source_name": "LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01",
"url": "https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html"
},
{
"description": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.",
"source_name": "German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014",
"url": "https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?%20blob=publicationFile&v=3"
}
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"type": "attack-pattern",
"name": "Data Destruction",
"description": "Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (Citation: EAttack File Deletion) \n\nData destruction may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital to recovery after an incident.\n\nStandard file deletion commands are available on most operating system and device interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and Active@ Killdisk.\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.",
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"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"external_id": "T0809"
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{
"description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). File Deletion. Retrieved May 17, 2018.",
"source_name": "EAttack File Deletion",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107"
}
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"name": "Data Historian Compromise",
"description": "Adversaries may compromise and gain control of a data historian to gain a foothold into the control system environment. Access to a data historian may be used to learn stored database archival and analysis information on the control system. A dual-homed data historian may provide adversaries an interface from the IT environment to the OT environment. \n\nDragos has released an updated analysis on CrashOverride that outlines the attack from the ICS network breach to payload delivery and execution. (Citation: Industroyer - Dragos - 201810) The report summarized that CrashOverride represents a new application of malware, but relied on standard intrusion techniques. In particular, new artifacts include references to a Microsoft Windows Server 2003 host, with a SQL Server. Within the ICS environment, such a database server can act as a data historian. Dragos noted a device with this role should be \"expected to have extensive connections\" within the ICS environment. Adversary activity leveraged database capabilities to perform reconnaissance, including directory queries and network connectivity checks.\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nContributors: Joe Slowik - Dragos",
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"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
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"description": "Dragos. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
"source_name": "Industroyer - Dragos - 201810",
"url": "https://dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf"
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"type": "attack-pattern",
"name": "Data from Information Repositories",
"description": "Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of target information repositories include reference databases and local machines on the process environment.",
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"name": "Default Credentials",
"description": "Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82)\n\nDefault credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled.",
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{
"description": "Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.",
"source_name": "Guidance - NIST SP800-82",
"url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf"
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"name": "Denial of Control",
"description": "Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)\n\nIn the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls.",
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T813",
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"external_id": "T0813"
},
{
"description": "Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.",
"source_name": "Reference - Corero",
"url": "https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.",
"source_name": "Reference - SANS - 201510",
"url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297"
},
{
"description": "Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.",
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"type": "attack-pattern",
"name": "Denial of Service",
"description": "Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment.\n\nSome ICS devices are particularly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also attempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) against certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot malware. (Citation: BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert)\n\nAdversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by taking advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to cause a or denial of service condition.\n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in the environment through <span class=\"smw-format list-format \"><span class=\"smw-row\"><span class=\"smw-field\"><span class=\"smw-value\">Control Device Identification</span></span></span></span>. There are examples of adversaries remotely causing a <span class=\"smw-format list-format \"><span class=\"smw-row\"><span class=\"smw-field\"><span class=\"smw-value\">Device Restart/Shutdown</span></span></span></span> by exploiting a vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. (Citation: Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV) (Citation: Industroyer - CWE-400) (Citation: Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374)\n\nIn the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an investigator out of the network. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T814",
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"external_id": "T0814"
},
{
"description": "ICS-CERT. (2017, April 18). CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack. Retrieved October 24, 2019.",
"source_name": "BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A"
},
{
"description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
"source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808",
"url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf"
},
{
"description": "ICS-CERT. (2018, August 27). Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"source_name": "Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01"
},
{
"description": "Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"source_name": "Industroyer - CWE-400",
"url": "http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html"
},
{
"description": "MITRE. (2018, March 22). CVE-2015-5374. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"source_name": "Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374"
}
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"modified": "2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z",
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"description": "Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) \n\nAn adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner.\n\nIn the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the state of the system.",
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"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
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"description": "Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.",
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"description": "Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.",
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"url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297"
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"description": "Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.",
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"name": "Detect Operating Mode",
"description": "Adversaries may gather information about the current operating state of a PLC. CPU operating modes are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC. Example states may be run, prog, stop, remote, and invalid. Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC.",
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"name": "Detect Program State",
"description": "Adversaries may seek to gather information about the current state of a program on a PLC. State information reveals information about the program, including whether it's running, halted, stopped, or has generated an exception. This information may be leveraged as a verification of malicious program execution or to determine if a PLC is ready to download a new program.",
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"description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
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"description": "Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software, such as <span class=\"smw-format list-format \"><span class=\"smw-row\"><span class=\"smw-field\"><span class=\"smw-value\">Change Program State</span></span></span></span> of a program on a PLC.",
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"description": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit public-facing applications to leverage weaknesses on Internet-facing computer systems, programs, or assets in order to cause unintended or unexpected behavior. These public-facing applications may include user interfaces, software, data, or commands. In particular, a public-facing application in the IT environment may provide adversaries an interface into the OT environment. \n\nICS-CERT analysis has identified the probable initial infection vector for systems running GE\u2019s Cimplicity HMI with a direct connection to the Internet. \n (Citation: ICS CERT 14-281)",
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"description": "ICS-CERT. (2014, December 10). ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01E) Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E). Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
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"description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Exploitation of Remote Services. Retrieved October 27, 2019.",
"source_name": "EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/"
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"description": "Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.",
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"description": "Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services. (Citation: EAttack External Remote Services)\n\nExternal remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. \n\nAs they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point\u2010to\u2010point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)\n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio.\n\nThe 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid showed the use of existing remote access tools within the environment to access the control system network. The adversary harvested worker credentials, some of them for VPNs the grid workers used to remotely log into the control system networks. (Citation: Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim) (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) (Citation: Ukraine15 - ICSCERT) (Citation: Ukraine15 - Fireeye) The VPNs into these networks appear to have lacked two\u2010factor authentication. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)",
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"description": "Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2018.",
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"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133"
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"description": "Zetter, Kim. (2016, March 03). INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID. Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"source_name": "Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/"
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"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01"
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"description": "Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.",
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"description": "John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.",
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"description": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.",
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"description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
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"description": "Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.",
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"url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297"
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"description": "Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.",
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"description": "Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes.\n\nIf an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a Impact could occur.\n\nIn ICS environments, the adversary may have to use <span class=\"smw-format list-format \"><span class=\"smw-row\"><span class=\"smw-field\"><span class=\"smw-value\">Alarm Suppression</span></span></span></span> or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code. \n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",
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"description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
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"description": "Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.",
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"description": "Ralph Langner. (2013, November). To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
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"description": "Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson. (2009, January 28). Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices. Retrieved December 19, 2017.",
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"description": "MITRE. (n.d.). System Network Connections Discovery. Retrieved May 31, 2018.",
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"description": "Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: EAttack Rootkit) \n\nFirmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for I/O that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable Impact.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.Reference - Rootkit",
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{
"description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Rootkit. Retrieved May 16, 2018.",
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"name": "Screen Capture",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.",
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{
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T852",
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
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{
"description": "ICS-CERT. (2017, October 21). Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 23, 2017.",
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"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A"
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"description": "Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. \n\nIn addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task.",
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"description": "Adversaries may perform serial connection enumeration to gather situational awareness after gaining access to devices in the OT network. Control systems devices often communicate to each other via various types of serial communication mediums. These serial communications are used to facilitate informational communication, as well as commands. Serial Connection Enumeration differs from I/O Module Discovery, as I/O modules are auxiliary systems to the main system, and devices that are connected via serial connection are normally discrete systems.\n\nWhile IT and OT networks may work in tandem, the exact structure of the OT network may not be discernible from the IT network alone. After gaining access to a device on the OT network, an adversary may be able to enumerate the serial connections. From this perspective, the adversary can see the specific physical devices to which the compromised device is connected to. This gives the adversary greater situational awareness and can influence the actions that the adversary can take in an attack.",
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"name": "Service Stop",
"description": "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop)\n\nServices may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop)",
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"description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Service Stop. Retrieved October 29, 2019.",
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"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/"
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"name": "Spearphishing Attachment",
"description": "Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment)",
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T865",
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"external_id": "T0865"
},
{
"description": "Enterprise ATT&CK. (2019, October 25). Spearphishing Attachment. Retrieved October 25, 2019.",
"source_name": "EAttack Spearphishing Attachment",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193/"
}
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"name": "Spoof Reporting Message",
"description": "Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control systems environments to achieve evasion and assist with impairment of process controls. Reporting messages are used in control systems so that operators and network defenders can understand the status of the network. Reporting messages show the status of devices and any important events that the devices control. \n\nIf an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, then they can impact the network in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the device is in normal working condition, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors were occurring, to distract them from the actual source of the problem. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)\n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",
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"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
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"description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"source_name": "Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA",
"url": "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258"
},
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"description": "Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
"source_name": "Maroochy - MITRE - 200808",
"url": "https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf"
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"type": "attack-pattern",
"name": "Standard Application Layer Protocol",
"description": "Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port.\n\nAdversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.",
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"id": "attack-pattern--e076cca8-2f08-45c9-aff7-ea5ac798b387"
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"type": "attack-pattern",
"name": "Supply Chain Compromise",
"description": "Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. \n\nSupply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. \n\nF-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).",
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T862",
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"external_id": "T0862"
},
{
"description": "F-Secure Labs. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved October 21, 2019.",
"source_name": "Havex - F-Secure - 201406",
"url": "https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html"
},
{
"description": "Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.",
"source_name": "Havex - F-Secure",
"url": "https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html"
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"type": "attack-pattern",
"name": "System Firmware",
"description": "System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.\n\nAn adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers. (Citation: Research - Firmware Modification)\n\nIn the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries gained access to the control networks of three different energy companies. The adversaries developed malicious firmware for the serial-to-ethernet devices which rendered them inoperable and severed connections between the control center and the substation. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)",
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"description": "Basnight, Zachry, et al.. (n.d.). Retrieved October 17, 2017.",
"source_name": "Research - Firmware Modification",
"url": "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1874548213000231"
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"description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
"source_name": "Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603",
"url": "https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf"
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"type": "attack-pattern",
"name": "Theft of Operational Information",
"description": "Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. \n\nIn the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)",
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"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
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{
"description": "Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.",
"source_name": "Bowman Dam - Times",
"url": "https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/"
},
{
"description": "Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.",
"source_name": "Bowman Dam - wall street journal",
"url": "https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559"
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"name": "Unauthorized Command Message",
"description": "Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control systems devices to perform actions outside their expected functionality for process control. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)\n\nIn the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)\n\nIn the 2015 attack on the Ukranian power grid, the adversaries gained access to the control networks of three different energy companies. The adversaries used valid credentials to seize control of operator workstations and access a distribution management system (DMS) client application via a VPN. The adversaries used these tools to issue unauthorized commands to breakers at substations which caused a loss of power to over 225,000 customers over various areas. (Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)",
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"description": "Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
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"url": "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258"
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"description": "Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
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"url": "https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf"
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"description": "Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
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"description": "Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.",
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"description": "Alexander Bolshev. (2014, March 11). S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector. Retrieved January 5, 2020.",
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"description": "Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.",
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"description": "John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.",
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"url": "https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/"
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"description": "Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.",
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"description": "When communicating over an untrusted network utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity, either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to prevent the transmission of spoofed network messages or unauthorized connections.",
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"external_references": [
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"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1053",
"external_id": "M1053"
}
],
"description": "Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
"modified": "2020-03-31T13:11:28.201Z",
"name": "Data Backup"
},
{
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0803",
"external_id": "M0803"
}
],
"description": "Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies can be used to help identify adversarial attempts to exfiltrate operational information, such as engineering plans, trade secrets, recipes, intellectual property, or process telemetry. DLP functionality may be built into other security products such as firewalls or stand alone suites running on the network and host-based agents. DLP may be configured to prevent the transfer of information through corporate resources such as email, web, and physical media such as USB for host-based solutions.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-09-17T13:55:21.233Z",
"name": "Data Loss Prevention"
},
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"created": "2019-06-11T16:45:19.740Z",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1042",
"external_id": "M1042"
}
],
"description": "Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
"modified": "2020-03-31T13:12:04.776Z",
"name": "Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
},
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"type": "course-of-action",
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"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0808",
"external_id": "M0808"
}
],
"description": "Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-09-17T13:55:21.233Z",
"name": "Encrypt Network Traffic"
},
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"type": "course-of-action",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1041",
"external_id": "M1041"
}
],
"description": "Protect sensitive information with strong encryption.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2019-06-11T16:43:44.834Z",
"name": "Encrypt Sensitive Information"
},
{
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"type": "course-of-action",
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"created": "2019-06-11T16:35:25.488Z",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1038",
"external_id": "M1038"
}
],
"description": "Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
"modified": "2020-06-20T20:11:42.195Z",
"name": "Execution Prevention"
},
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"id": "course-of-action--d2a24649-9694-4c97-9c62-ce7b270bf6a3",
"type": "course-of-action",
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"created": "2019-06-11T17:10:57.070Z",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1050",
"external_id": "M1050"
}
],
"description": "Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
"modified": "2020-06-20T20:22:55.938Z",
"name": "Exploit Protection"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--20f6a9df-37c4-4e20-9e47-025983b1b39d",
"type": "course-of-action",
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"created": "2019-06-11T16:33:55.337Z",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1037",
"external_id": "M1037"
}
],
"description": "Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
"modified": "2020-06-20T20:46:36.342Z",
"name": "Filter Network Traffic"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--66cfe23e-34b6-4583-b178-ed6a412db2b0",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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"created": "2020-09-11T16:32:21.854Z",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0804",
"external_id": "M0804"
}
],
"description": "The device should require that a user authenticates before they can remotely access it, or send a command to it. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferrable, it is not always feasible within this ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication (M1032), Account Use Policies (M1036), Password Policies (M1027), User Account Management (M1018), Privileged Account Management (M1026), and User Account Control (M1052).",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-09-17T13:55:21.233Z",
"name": "Human User Authentication"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--1dcaeb21-9348-42ea-950a-f842aaf1ae1f",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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"created": "2019-06-11T16:30:16.672Z",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1035",
"external_id": "M1035"
}
],
"description": "Prevent access to file shares, remote access to systems, unnecessary services. Mechanisms to limit access may include use of network concentrators, RDP gateways, etc.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-06-09T20:51:00.027Z",
"name": "Limit Access to Resource Over Network"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--2995bc22-2851-4345-ad19-4e7e295be264",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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"created": "2019-06-11T16:28:41.809Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1034",
"external_id": "M1034"
}
],
"description": "Block users or groups from installing or using unapproved hardware on systems, including USB devices.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-06-09T20:48:12.326Z",
"name": "Limit Hardware Installation"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--8bc4a54e-810c-4600-8b6c-08fa8413a401",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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"created": "2020-09-11T16:32:21.854Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0805",
"external_id": "M0805"
},
{
"description": "A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith. (2004). APPLYING THE LATEST STANDARD FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY — IEC 61511. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
"source_name": "IEC 61511",
"url": "https://www.icheme.org/media/9906/xviii-paper-23.pdf"
}
],
"description": "Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mechanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, equipment, human safety, or the environment. Preferably protection devices should have minimal digital components to prevent exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples of include interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. (Citation: IEC 61511)",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-09-17T13:55:21.233Z",
"name": "Mechanical Protection Layers"
},
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"id": "course-of-action--fce6866f-9a87-4d3e-a73c-f02d8937fe0e",
"type": "course-of-action",
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"external_references": [
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0806",
"external_id": "M0806"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2010, March). Securing Wireless Networks. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
"source_name": "CISA Mar 2010",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003"
},
{
"description": "DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory. (2019, April). Radio Frequency Detection, Spectrum Analysis, and Direction Finding Equipment. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
"source_name": "DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory Apr 2019",
"url": "https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/saver-msr-rf-detection_cod-508_10july2019.pdf"
}
],
"description": "Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizational boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless communication. (Citation: CISA Mar 2010) To minimize this threat, organizations should implement measures to detect, understand, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. (Citation: DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory Apr 2019) Techniques can include (i) reducing transmission power on wireless signals, (ii) adjust antenna gain to prevent extensions beyond organizational boundaries, and (iii) employ RF shielding techniques to block excessive signal propagation.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-09-17T13:55:21.233Z",
"name": "Minimize Wireless Signal Propagation"
},
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"type": "course-of-action",
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"created": "2020-09-11T16:32:21.854Z",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0816",
"external_id": "M0816"
}
],
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-09-17T13:55:21.233Z",
"name": "Mitigation Limited or Not Effective"
},
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"id": "course-of-action--b045d015-6bed-4490-bd38-56b41ece59a0",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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"created": "2019-06-10T20:53:36.319Z",
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"external_references": [
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"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1032",
"external_id": "M1032"
}
],
"description": "Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2019-06-10T20:53:36.319Z",
"name": "Multi-factor Authentication"
},
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"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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"created": "2019-06-10T20:53:36.319Z",
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"external_references": [
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"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0807",
"external_id": "M0807"
}
],
"description": "Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what external connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-09-22T20:53:36.319Z",
"name": "Network Allowlists"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--12241367-a8b7-49b4-b86e-2236901ba50c",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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"created": "2019-06-10T20:46:02.263Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1031",
"external_id": "M1031"
}
],
"description": "Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2019-06-10T20:46:02.263Z",
"name": "Network Intrusion Prevention"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--86598de0-b347-4928-9eb0-0acbfc21908c",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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"created": "2019-06-10T20:41:03.271Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1030",
"external_id": "M1030"
}
],
"description": "Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
"modified": "2020-05-14T13:05:39.500Z",
"name": "Network Segmentation"
},
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"type": "course-of-action",
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"created": "2019-06-06T21:16:18.709Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1028",
"external_id": "M1028"
}
],
"description": "Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
"modified": "2020-06-19T16:50:45.681Z",
"name": "Operating System Configuration"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--99c746d7-a08a-4169-94f9-b8c0dad716fa",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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"created": "2019-06-06T21:16:18.709Z",
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"external_references": [
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"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0809",
"external_id": "M0809"
}
],
"description": "Deploy mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of information related to operational processes, facility locations, device configurations, programs, or databases that may have information that can be used to infer organizational trade-secrets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP). Example mitigations could include restricting read privileges, encrypting data, and obfuscating the information (e.g., facility coverterms, codenames). In many cases this information may be necessary to support critical engineering, maintenance, or operational functions, therefore, it may not be feasible to implement.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-09-22T16:50:45.681Z",
"name": "Operational Information Confidentiality"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--b11cad63-ef30-4eb8-af0d-6cc46eef3f3e",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
"created": "2019-06-06T21:16:18.709Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0810",
"external_id": "M0810"
},
{
"description": "National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
"source_name": "NIST Apr 2013",
"url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. (n.d.). Rapid Attack Detection, Isolation and Characterization Systems (RADICS). Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
"source_name": "DARPA",
"url": "https://www.darpa.mil/program/rapid-attack-detection-isolation-and-characterization-systems"
}
],
"description": "Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage. (Citation: NIST Apr 2013)(Citation: DARPA) Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2020-09-22T16:50:45.681Z",
"name": "Out-of-Band Communications Channel"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--90c218c3-fbf8-4830-98a7-e8cfb7eaa485",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
"created": "2019-06-06T21:10:35.792Z",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1027",
"external_id": "M1027"
}
],
"description": "Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.0",
"modified": "2019-06-06T21:10:35.792Z",
"name": "Password Policies"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--9bb9e696-bff8-4ae1-9454-961fc7d91d5f",
"type": "course-of-action",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
"created": "2019-06-06T21:09:47.115Z",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026",
"external_id": "M1026"
}
],
"description": "Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.",
"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
"modified": "2020-03-31T13:08:36.655Z",
"name": "Privileged Account Management"
},
{
"id": "course-of-action--f0f5c87a-a58d-440a-b3b5-ca679d98c6dd",
"type": "course-of-action",
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"modified": "2020-03-31T13:11:09.471Z",
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],
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"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1019",
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"description": "A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities to mitigate risk.",
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"modified": "2019-06-06T19:55:50.927Z",
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"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017",
"external_id": "M1017"
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"external_id": "M0815"
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],
"description": "Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect whether a system is operational, unresponsive, or in a good state. System / process restarts should be performed when a timeout condition occurs.",
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"modified": "2020-09-22T16:50:45.681Z",
"name": "Watchdog Timers"
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"description": "[ALLANITE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0009) has been identified to collect and distribute screenshots of ICS systems such as HMIs.(Citation: Dragos Allanite)(Citation: CISA Alert (TA17-293A))",
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"description": "Jeff Jones. (2018, May 10). Dragos Releases Details on Suspected Russian Infrastructure Hacking Team ALLANITE. Retrieved January 3, 2020.",
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"description": "[APT33](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0003) sent spear phishing emails containing links to HTML application files, which were embedded with malicious code.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) APT33 has conducted targeted spear phishing campaigns against U.S. government agencies and private sector companies.(Citation: Wired Jun 2019)",
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"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html"
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"source_name": "Wired Jun 2019",
"description": "Andy Greenburg. (2019, June 20). Iranian Hackers Launch a New US-Targeted Campaign as Tensions Mount. Retrieved January 3, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/story/iran-hackers-us-phishing-tensions/"
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"description": "[APT33](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0003) utilized PowerShell scripts to establish command and control and install files for execution.(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019)(Citation: Dragos Magnallium)",
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},
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"description": "Eduard Kovacs. (2018, March 1). Five Threat Groups Target Industrial Systems: Dragos. Retrieved January 3, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.securityweek.com/five-threat-groups-target-industrial-systems-dragos"
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"description": "[OilRig](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0010) communicated with its command and control using HTTP requests.(Citation: PaloAlto OilRig May 2016)",
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"description": "Robert Falcone, Bryan Lee. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved November 19, 2019.",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/"
}
],
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"description": "[OilRig](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0010) has been seen utilizing watering hole attacks to collect credentials which could be used to gain access into ICS networks.(Citation: CyberViser May 21)",
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"description": "REduard Kovacs. (2018, May 21). Group linked to Shamoon attacks targeting ICS networks in Middle East and UK. Retrieved January 3, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.cyberviser.com/2018/05/group-linked-to-shamoon-attacks-targeting-ics-networks-in-middle-east-and-uk/"
}
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{
"source_name": "Dragos Chrysene",
"description": "Dragos. (n.d.). Chrysene. Retrieved October 27, 2019.",
"url": "Dragos. (n.d.). Chrysene. Retrieved October 27, 2019."
}
],
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"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B"
},
{
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"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-11-094-02B"
}
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"description": "[Sandworm](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0007) used valid accounts to laterally move through VPN connections and dual-homed systems.(Citation: Dragos Electrum)(Citation: Dragos CRASHOVERRIDE)",
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"description": "Dragos. (n.d.). Electrum. Retrieved October 27, 2019.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/resource/electrum/"
},
{
"source_name": "Dragos CRASHOVERRIDE",
"description": "Dragos. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf"
}
],
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"description": "[XENOTIME](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0001) utilizes watering hole websites to target industrial employees.(Citation: CyberScoop Xenotime May 2018)",
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{
"source_name": "CyberScoop Xenotime May 2018",
"description": "Chris Bing. (2018, May 24). Trisis masterminds have expanded operations to target U.S. industrial firms. Retrieved January 3, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.cyberscoop.com/xenotime-ics-cyber-attacks-trisis-dragos/"
}
],
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"description": "[XENOTIME](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0001) utilized remote desktop protocol (RDP) jump boxes to move into the ICS environment.(Citation: Dragos TRISIS Dec 2017)",
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{
"source_name": "Dragos TRISIS Dec 2017",
"description": "Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/blog/trisis/TRISIS-01.pdf"
}
],
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"description": "[XENOTIME](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0001) used valid credentials when laterally moving through RDP jump boxes into the ICS environment.(Citation: Dragos TRISIS Dec 2017)",
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}
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{
"source_name": "Dragos Aug 2019",
"description": "Dragos Threat Intelligence. (2019, August). Global Oil and Gas Cyber Threat Perspective. Retrieved January 3, 2020.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/Dragos-Oil-and-Gas-Threat-Perspective-2019.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
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{
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"description": "[ACAD/Medre.A](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0018) can collect AutoCad files with drawings. These drawings may contain operational information.",
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"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "relationship--228b9a13-0545-4ecf-99ff-be02addaf7fe",
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"description": "[ACAD/Medre.A](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0018) collects information related to the AutoCAD application. The worm collects AutoCAD (*.dwg) files with drawings from information repositories.",
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"created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z",
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"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-178-01"
},
{
"source_name": "F-Secure Labs Jun 2014",
"description": "Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html"
}
],
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{
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"description": "The [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0003) payload has the capability of enumerating OPC tags, in addition to more generic OPC server information. The server data and tag names can provide information about the names and function of control devices.(Citation: CISA Advisory (ICSA-14-178-01))(Citation: F-Secure Labs Jun 2014)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z",
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"source_name": "CISA Advisory (ICSA-14-178-01)",
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"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-178-01"
},
{
"source_name": "F-Secure Labs Jun 2014",
"description": "Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html"
}
],
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{
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"description": "The [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0003) ICS malware plugin relies on Windows networking (WNet) to discover all the servers, including OPC servers, that are reachable by the compromised machine over the network.(Citation: SemanticScholar Dec 2015)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z",
"id": "relationship--3f76d408-be8a-478e-8a5a-aab1d1f96572",
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{
"source_name": "SemanticScholar Dec 2015",
"description": "Julian Rrushi, Hassan Farhangi, Clay Howey, Kelly Carmichael, Joey Dabell. (2015, December 08). A Quantitative Evaluation of the Target Selection of Havex ICS Malware Plugin. Retrieved April 1, 2019.",
"url": "https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/18df/43ef1690b0fae15a36f770001160aefbc6c5.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
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{
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"description": "The [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0003) payload has the capability of enumerating OPC tags, in addition to more generic OPC server information. The tag names, depending on the naming convention, can provide information about facilities and locations.(Citation: CISA Advisory (ICSA-14-178-01))(Citation: F-Secure Labs Jun 2014)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z",
"id": "relationship--1c066ecf-c728-4002-8618-8167216d23cf",
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"source_name": "CISA Advisory (ICSA-14-178-01)",
"description": "ICS-CERT. (2018, August 22). Advisory (ICSA-14-178-01). Retrieved April 1, 2019.",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-178-01"
},
{
"source_name": "F-Secure Labs Jun 2014",
"description": "Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html"
}
],
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"description": "The [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0003) payload has caused multiple common OPC platforms to intermittently crash. This could cause a denial of service effect on applications reliant on OPC communications.(Citation: CISA Advisory (ICSA-14-178-01))",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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"description": "ICS-CERT. (2018, August 22). Advisory (ICSA-14-178-01). Retrieved April 1, 2019.",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-178-01"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"description": "The [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0003) RAT is distributed through trojanized installers planted on compromised vendor sites.(Citation: F-Secure Labs Jun 2014)",
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"url": "https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html"
}
],
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},
{
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"description": "The [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0003) RAT is distributed through a trojanized installer attached to emails.(Citation: F-Secure Labs Jun 2014)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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"description": "[BlackEnergy 3](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0004) utilizes valid user and administrator credentials, in addition to creating new administrator accounts to maintain presence.(Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton)",
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"description": "[BlackEnergy 3](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0004) targeted energy sector organizations in a wide reaching email spearphishing campaign. Adversaries utilized malicious Microsoft Word documents attachments.(Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton)",
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"url": "https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml"
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"description": "Symantec. (2015, June 30). Simple steps to protect yourself from the Conficker Worm. Retrieved December 5, 2019.",
"url": "https://support.symantec.com/us/en/article.tech93179.html"
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"url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_stuxnet.pdf"
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"description": "[Flame](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0015) can collect AutoCAD design data and visio diagrams as well as other documents that may contain operational information.(Citation: Symantec W32.Flamer)",
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"description": "Kevin Savage and Branko Spasojevic. (n.d.). W32.Flamer. Retrieved November 3, 2019.",
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}
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"description": "[Flame](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0015) has built-in modules to gather information from compromised computers.(Citation: Symantec W32.Flamer)",
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}
],
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{
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"description": "Dragos. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf"
}
],
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"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
}
],
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"description": "In [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001), the first COM port from the configuration file is used for the actual communication and the two other COM ports are just opened to prevent other processes accessing them. Thus, the IEC 101 payload component is able to take over and maintain control of the RTU device.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)",
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{
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"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
}
],
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"description": "[Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001), has a destructive wiper that 'overwrites all ICS configuration files across the hard drives and all mapped network drives specifically targeting ABB PCM600 configuration files'.(Citation: Dragos Industroyer Jun 2017)",
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"description": "Dragos Inc.. (2017, June 13). Industroyer - Dragos - 201706: Analysis of the Threat to Electic Grid Operations. Retrieved September 18, 2017.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf"
}
],
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"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
}
],
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{
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"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
}
],
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"description": "The [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001), IEC 61850 payload enumerates all possible IP addresses for each of the subnet masks for the interfaces on the infected machine, and tries to connect to port 102 on each of those addresses. Therefore, this component has the ability to discover relevant devices in the network automatically.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)",
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{
"source_name": "ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017",
"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
}
],
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},
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"description": "[Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001), contains an OPC DA module that enumerates all OPC servers using the ICatInformation::EnumClassesOfCategories method with CATID_OPCDAServer20 category identifier and IOPCServer::GetStatus to identify the ones running. The OPC DA module also uses IOPCBrowseServerAddressSpace to look for items with the following strings: 'ctlSelOn', 'ctlOperOn', 'ctlSelOff', ctlOperOff', 'Pos and stVal'.\n\nIf the target device responds appropriately, the Industroyer IEC 61850 payload then sends an InitiateRequest packet using the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS). If the expected answer is received, it continues, sending an MMS getNameList request. Thereby, the component compiles a list of object names in a Virtual Manufacturing Device.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)",
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],
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{
"source_name": "ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017",
"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
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{
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"description": "[Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001), contains modules for IEC 101 and IEC 104 communications.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017) IEC 101 uses serial for the physical connection and IEC 104 uses Ethernet. Analysis of the malware by Dragos states that both of the modules have equivalent functionality.(Citation: Dragos Industroyer Jun 2017) The IEC 104 module uses Network Connection Enumeration to determine the Ethernet adapters on the device. Since functionality between the two modules are equivalent, this implies that the IEC 101 module is able to detect serial interfaces on the device.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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"object_marking_refs": [
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],
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{
"source_name": "ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017",
"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "Dragos Industroyer Jun 2017",
"description": "Dragos Inc.. (2017, June 13). Industroyer - Dragos - 201706: Analysis of the Threat to Electic Grid Operations. Retrieved September 18, 2017.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
"type": "relationship",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--23270e54-1d68-4c3b-b763-b25607bcef80",
"description": "The [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001), IEC 61850 component enumerates the objects discovered in the previous step and sends the domain-specific getNameList requests with each object name. This enumerates named variables in a specific domain.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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],
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{
"source_name": "ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017",
"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"description": "The [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001), SIPROTEC DoS module exploits the CVE-2015-5374 vulnerability in order to render a Siemens SIPROTEC device unresponsive. Once this vulnerability is successfully exploited, the target device stops responding to any commands until it is rebooted manually.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)Once the tool is executed it sends specifically crafted packets to port 50,000 of the target IP addresses using UDP. The UDP packet contains the following 18 byte payload: 0x11 49 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 9E.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)\n\nThe Industroyer SPIROTEC DoS module places the victim device into 'firmware update' mode. This is a legitimate use case under normal circumstances, but in this case is used the adversary to prevent the SPIROTEC from performing its designed protective functions. As a result the normal safeguards are disabled, leaving an unprotected link in the electric transmission.(Citation: Dragos CRASHOVERRIDE Aug 2019)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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],
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{
"source_name": "ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017",
"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "Dragos CRASHOVERRIDE Aug 2019",
"description": "Joe Slowik. (2019, August 15). CRASHOVERRIDE: Reassessing the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Event as a Protection-Focused Attack. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
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"description": "The [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001), IEC 101 module has the capability to communicate with devices (likely RTUs) via the IEC 101 protocol. The module will attempt to find all Information Object Addresses (IOAs) for the device and attempt to change their state in the following sequence: OFF, ON, OFF.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "relationship--9fb2a9b2-3b25-4f77-9f7a-e832b2e5071a",
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"modified": "2020-01-06T00:14:20.652Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
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{
"source_name": "ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017",
"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--8e7089d3-fba2-44f8-94a8-9a79c53920c4",
"description": "The [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001), IEC 104 module has 3 modes available to perform its attack. These modes are range, shift, and sequence. The range mode operates in 2 stages. The first stage of range mode gathers Information Object Addresses (IOA) and sends 'select and execute' packets to switch the state. The second stage of range mode has an infinite loop where it will switch the state of all of the previously discovered IOAs. Shift mode is similar to range mode, but instead of staying within the same range, it will add a shift value to the default range values.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
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"modified": "2020-01-06T00:14:20.652Z",
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],
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{
"source_name": "ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017",
"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"description": "The [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001), SIPROTEC DoS module exploits the CVE-2015-5374 vulnerability in order to render a Siemens SIPROTEC device unresponsive. Once this vulnerability is successfully exploited, the target device stops responding to any commands until it is rebooted manually.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)Once the tool is executed it sends specifically crafted packets to port 50,000 of the target IP addresses using UDP. The UDP packet contains the following 18 byte payload: 0x11 49 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 9E.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
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"modified": "2020-01-06T00:14:20.652Z",
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{
"source_name": "ESET Win32/Industroyer Jun 2017",
"description": "Anton Cherepanov, ESET. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems. Retrieved September 15, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
}
],
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{
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"description": "[NotPetya](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0006) disrupted manufacturing facilities supplying vaccines, resulting in a halt of production and the inability to meet demand for specific vaccines.(Citation: Bloomberg Dec 2019)",
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"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC-wp.pdf"
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"description": "[PLC-Blaster](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0009) may manipulate any outputs of the PLC. Using the POU POKE any value within the process image may be modified.(Citation: BlackHat Mar 2016)",
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"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC-wp.pdf"
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"description": "[PLC-Blaster](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0009) utilizes the PLC communication and management API to load executable Program Organization Units.(Citation: BlackHat Mar 2016)",
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"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC-wp.pdf"
}
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"description": "After [PLC-Blaster](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0009) is transferred to a PLC, the PLC begins execution of PLC-Blaster.(Citation: BlackHat Mar 2016)",
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"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC-wp.pdf"
}
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--1b22b676-9347-4c55-9a35-ef0dc653db5b",
"description": "The execution on the PLC can be stopped by violating the cycle time limit. The [PLC-Blaster](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0009) implements an endless loop triggering an error condition within the PLC with the impact of a DoS.(Citation: BlackHat Mar 2016)",
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"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC-wp.pdf"
}
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--63b6942d-8359-4506-bfb3-cf87aa8120ee",
"description": "An enterprise resource planning (ERP) manufacturing server was lost to the [Ryuk](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0011) attack. The manufacturing process had to rely on paper and existing orders to keep the shop floor open.(Citation: DarkReading)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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"source_name": "DarkReading",
"description": "Kelly Jackson Higgins. (n.d.). How a Manufacturing Firm Recovered from a Devastating Ransomware Attack. Retrieved November 3, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/how-a-manufacturing-firm-recovered-from-a-devastating-ransomware-attack/d/d-id/1334760"
}
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"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) scanned the network to identify the Siemens PLCs that it was targeting.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
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{
"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
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"description": "One of [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) 's rootkits is contained entirely in the fake s7otbxdx.dll. In order to continue existing undetected on the PLC it needs to account for at least the following situations: read requests for its own malicious code blocks, read requests for infected blocks (OB1, OB35, DP_RECV), and write requests that could overwrite Stuxnet’s own code. Stuxnet contains code to monitor and intercept these types of requests. The rootkit modifies these requests so that Stuxnet’s PLC code is not discovered or damaged.(Citation: Langer Nov 2013)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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{
"source_name": "Langner Nov 2013",
"description": "Ralph Langner. (2013, November). To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf"
}
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--36e9f5bc-ac13-4da4-a2f4-01f4877d9004",
"description": "When the peripheral output is written to, sequence C intercepts the output and ensures it is not written to the process image output. The output is the instructions the PLC sends to a device to change its operating behavior. By intercepting the peripheral output, [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) prevents an operator from noticing unauthorized commands sent to the peripheral.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--abb0a255-eb9c-48d0-8f5c-874bb84c0e45",
"description": "The Siemens s7otbxdx.dll is responsible for handling PLC block exchange between the programming device (i.e., a computer running a Simatic manager on Windows) and the PLC. s7db_open function is an export hook that is used to obtain information used to create handles to manage a PLC (such a handle is used by APIs that manipulate the PLC). [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) utilized this export hook to gain information about targeted PLCs such as model information.[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) was specifically targeting CPUs 6ES7-315-2 (Series 300) with special system data block characteristics for sequence A or B and 6ES7-315-2 for sequence C. The PLC type can also be checked using the s7ag_read_szl API.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
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"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) enumerates and parses the System Data Blocks (SDB). [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) must find an SDB with the DWORD at offset 50h equal to 0100CB2Ch. This specifies that the system uses the Profibus communications processor module CP 342-5. In addition, specific values are searched for and counted: 7050h and 9500h. 7050h is assigned to part number KFC750V3 which appears to be a frequency converter drive (also known as variable frequency drive) manufactured by Fararo Paya in Teheran, Iran. 9500h is assigned to Vacon NX frequency converter drives manufactured by Vacon based in Finland.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--38213338-1aab-479d-949b-c81b66ccca5c",
"description": "DP_RECV is the name of a standard function block used by network coprocessors. It is used to receive network frames on the Profibus – a standard industrial network bus used for distributed I/O. The original block is copied to FC1869, and then replaced by a malicious block. Each time the function is used to receive a packet, the malicious [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) block takes control: it will call the original DP_RECV in FC1869 and then perform postprocessing on the packet data. This secondary thread is used to monitor a data block DB890 of sequence A or B. Though constantly running and probing this block (every 5 minutes), this thread has no purpose if the PLC is not infected. The purpose of the thread is to monitor each S7-315 on the bus. The replaced DP_RECV block (later on referred to as the 'DP_RECV monitor') is meant to monitor data sent by the frequency converter drives to the 315-2 CPU via CP 342-5 Profibus communication modules.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--2d0d40ad-22fa-4cc8-b264-072557e1364b",
"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) examines fields recorded by the DP_RECV monitor to determine if the target system is in a particular state of operation.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"id": "relationship--2fd13fc0-e3f0-4099-ab20-d19ba6bcd4e0",
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"modified": "2020-01-03T00:14:20.652Z",
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{
"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--097924ce-a9a9-4039-8591-e0deedfb8722",
"description": "In states 3 and 4 [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) sends two network bursts (done through the DP_SEND primitive). The data in the frames are instructions for the frequency converter drives. For example one of the frames contains records that change the maximum frequency (the speed at which the motor will operate). The frequency converter drives consist of parameters, which can be remotely configured via Profibus. One can write new values to these parameters changing the behavior of the device.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
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{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--1af9e3fd-2bcc-414d-adbd-fe3b95c02ca1",
"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) can reprogram a PLC and change critical parameters in such a way that legitimate commands can be overridden or intercepted. In addition, [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010#scite-b3a32e169ec1545f620839e1471333e0) can apply inappropriate command sequences or parameters to cause damage to property.",
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},
{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--be69c571-d746-4b1f-bdd0-c0c9817e9068",
"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) infects PLCs with different code depending on the characteristics of the target system. An infection sequence consists of code blocks and data blocks that will be downloaded to the PLC to alter its behavior.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"id": "relationship--7c893581-c847-495a-aa93-9d98c516e1ae",
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"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
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{
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"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) infects PLCs with different code depending on the characteristics of the target system. An infection sequence consists of code blocks and data blocks that will be downloaded to the PLC to alter its behavior.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
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"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) copies itself into Step 7 projects in such a way that it automatically executes when the Step 7 project is loaded.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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{
"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
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"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) modifies the Import Address Tables DLLs to hook specific APIs that are used to open project files.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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{
"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
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},
{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--a8cfd474-9358-464f-a169-9c6f099a8e8a",
"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) halts the original PLC code and the malicious PLC code begins sending frames of data based on the recorded values during the DP_RECV monitor phase.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"id": "relationship--c6c28b76-7a31-4668-ad25-933a1b52f312",
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{
"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--53a48c74-0025-45f4-b04a-baa853df8204",
"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) copies the input area of an I/O image into data blocks with a one second interval between copies, forming a 21 second recording of the input area. The input area contains information being passed to the PLC from a peripheral. For example, the current state of a valve or the temperature of a device.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"id": "relationship--28afd84d-a53e-4b2f-9bee-133f7da6982a",
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"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
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{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--3b6b9246-43f8-4c69-ad7a-2b11cfe0a0d9",
"description": "When the peripheral output is written to, sequence C of[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) intercepts the output and ensures it is not written to the process image output. The output is the instructions the PLC sends to a device to change its operating behavior. By intercepting the peripheral output, Stuxnet prevents an operator from noticing unauthorized commands sent to the peripheral(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"id": "relationship--f130282b-f681-455f-966b-55829842be92",
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"modified": "2020-01-03T00:14:20.652Z",
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"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--ba203963-3182-41ac-af14-7e7ebc83cd61",
"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) renames a dll responsible for handling communications with a PLC. It replaces the original .dll file with its own version that allows it to intercept any calls that are made to access the PLC.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"id": "relationship--0e29f62d-4ffc-47ec-9623-72f874fbe905",
"source_ref": "malware--496bff4d-0700-4b28-b06f-f30a63002be7",
"modified": "2020-01-03T00:14:20.652Z",
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"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
],
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},
{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--5a2610f6-9fff-41e1-bc27-575ca20383d4",
"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) utilizes the PLC communication and management API to load executable [Program Organization Units](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T844).(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"id": "relationship--be532c78-daf5-431b-adae-ab11af395513",
"source_ref": "malware--496bff4d-0700-4b28-b06f-f30a63002be7",
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"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
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{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--e076cca8-2f08-45c9-aff7-ea5ac798b387",
"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) attempts to contact command and control servers over HTTP to send basic information about the computer it has compromised.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"id": "relationship--bc383819-2e40-49b4-bea9-95eb5d418877",
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"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
}
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{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--e6c31185-8040-4267-83d3-b217b8a92f07",
"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) attempts to contact command and control servers on port 80 to send basic information about the computer it has compromised.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
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"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) was able to self-replicate by being spread through removable drives. A willing insider or unknown third party, such as a contractor, may have brought the removable media into the target environment.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011) The earliest version of Stuxnet relied on physical installation, infecting target systems when an infected configuration file carried by a USB stick was opened.(Citation: Langner Nov 2013)",
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"description": "Ralph Langner. (2013, November). To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf"
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"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) de-couples all inputs and signals from the legitimate code on a PLC and chooses what is passed to the original code. STUXNET effectively creates a man in the middle attack with the input and output signals and control logic.",
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"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) replaces the DLL responsible for reading projects from a PLC to the step7 software. This allows Stuxnet the ability to upload a program from the PLC.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) utilized an engineering workstation as the initial access point for PLC devices.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Feb 2011)",
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"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) attacks were designed to over-pressure and damage centrifuge rotors by manipulating process pressure and rotor speeds over time. One focused on a routine to change centrifuge rotor speeds, while the other manipulated critical resonance speeds to over-pressure them.(Citation: Langner Nov 2013)",
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}
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"description": "[Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) is able to modify code if the Triconex SIS Controller is configured with the physical keyswitch in ‘program mode’ during operation. If the controller is placed in Run mode (program changes not permitted), arbitrary changes in logic are not possible substantially reducing the likelihood of manipulation. Once the Triton implant is installed on the SIS it is able to conduct any operation regardless of any future position of the keyswitch.(Citation: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)",
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"source_name": "FireEye TRITON Dec 2017",
"description": "Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html"
}
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"description": "Using [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013), an adversary can manipulate the process into an unsafe state from the DCS while preventing the SIS from functioning appropriately.(Citation: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)",
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"description": "Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html"
}
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"description": "The [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013), malware was configured to masquerade as trilog.exe, which is the Triconex software for analyzing SIS logs.(Citation: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)",
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"source_name": "FireEye TRITON Dec 2017",
"description": "Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html"
}
],
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{
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"description": "[Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013), can reprogram the SIS logic to cause it to trip and shutdown a process that is, in actuality, in a safe state. In other words, trigger a false positive. Triton also can reprogram the SIS logic to allow unsafe conditions to persist.(Citation: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)The Triton malware is able to add a malicious program to the execution table of the controller. This action leaves the legitimate programs in place. If the controller failed, Triton would attempt to return it to a running state. If the controller did not recover within a certain time window, the sample would overwrite the malicious program to cover its tracks.(Citation: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)",
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"source_name": "FireEye TRITON Dec 2017",
"description": "Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html"
}
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"description": "In the version of [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013)available at the time of publication, the component that programs the Triconex controllers is written entirely in Python. The modules that implement the communciation protocol and other supporting components are found in a separate file -- library.zip -- which the main script that employs this functionality is compiled into a standalone Windows executable -- trilog.exe -- that includes a Python environment.(Citation: DHS CISA MAR-17-351-01 HatMan Feb 2019)",
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{
"source_name": "DHS CISA MAR-17-351-01 HatMan Feb 2019",
"description": "DHS CISA. (2019, February 27). MAR-17-352-01 HatMan—Safety System Targeted Malware (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf"
}
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"description": "[Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) uses a Python script that is capable of detecting Triconex controllers on the network by sending a specific UDP broadcast packet over port 1502.(Citation: DHS CISA MAR-17-351-01 HatMan Feb 2019)",
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{
"source_name": "DHS CISA MAR-17-351-01 HatMan Feb 2019",
"description": "DHS CISA. (2019, February 27). MAR-17-352-01 HatMan—Safety System Targeted Malware (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
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{
"type": "relationship",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--b9160e77-ea9e-4ba9-b1c8-53a3c466b13d",
"description": "The malicious shellcode [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) uses is split into two separate pieces -- inject.bin and imain.bin. The former program is more generic code that handles injecting the payload into the running firmware, while the latter is the payload that actually performs the additional malicious functionality. The payload --imain.bin-- is designed to take a TriStation protocol get main processor diagnostic data command, look for a specially crafted packet body, and perform custom actions on demand. It is able to read and write memory on the safety controller and execute code at an arbitrary address within the firmware. In addition, if the memory address it writes to is within the firmware region, it disables address translation, writes the code at the provided address, flushes the instruction cache, and re-enables address translation. This allows the malware to make changes to the running firmware in memory. This allows Triton to change how the device operates and would allow for the modification of other actions that the Triton controller might make.(Citation: DHS CISA MAR-17-351-01 HatMan Feb 2019)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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"id": "relationship--93e24e03-6425-4ee8-99bb-c3a662c6cdce",
"source_ref": "malware--80099a91-4c86-4bea-9ccb-dac55d61960e",
"modified": "2020-01-12T18:23:46.229Z",
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{
"source_name": "DHS CISA MAR-17-351-01 HatMan Feb 2019",
"description": "DHS CISA. (2019, February 27). MAR-17-352-01 HatMan—Safety System Targeted Malware (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--2dc2b567-8821-49f9-9045-8740f3d0b958",
"description": "A Python script seen in [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) communicates using four Python modules—TsBase, TsLow, TsHi, and TS_cnames—that collectively implement the TriStation network protocol ('TS', via UDP 1502); this is the protocol that the TriStation TS1131 software uses to communicate with Triconex safety PLCs.(Citation: DHS CISA MAR-17-351-01 HatMan Feb 2019)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z",
"id": "relationship--709c4e40-c5c6-405b-bc3d-0adfea40ccd4",
"source_ref": "malware--80099a91-4c86-4bea-9ccb-dac55d61960e",
"modified": "2020-01-12T18:23:46.229Z",
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],
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{
"source_name": "DHS CISA MAR-17-351-01 HatMan Feb 2019",
"description": "DHS CISA. (2019, February 27). MAR-17-352-01 HatMan—Safety System Targeted Malware (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--9f947a1c-3860-48a8-8af0-a2dfa3efde03",
"description": "[Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) disables a firmware RAM/ROM consistency check, injects a payload (imain.bin) into the firmware memory region, and changes a jumptable entry to point to the added code(Citation: DHS CISA MAR-17-351-01 HatMan Feb 2019)(Citation: CISA Advisory (ICSA-18-107-02) Dec 2018)(Citation: Schneider Electric TRITON Jan 2018)In Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon MP model 3008 firmware versions 10.0-10.4, system calls read directly from memory addresses within the control program area without any verification. Manipulating this data could allow adversary data to be copied anywhere within memory.(Citation: MITRE CVE-2018-8872 May 2018)(Citation: CWE-119 Jan 2019)Triconex systems include continuous means of detection including checksums for firmware and program integrity, memory and memory reference integrity, and configuration.(Citation: NRC Triconex)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z",
"id": "relationship--ea50253a-3220-458b-b810-ad032f2b182f",
"source_ref": "malware--80099a91-4c86-4bea-9ccb-dac55d61960e",
"modified": "2020-01-12T18:23:46.229Z",
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"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "DHS CISA MAR-17-351-01 HatMan Feb 2019",
"description": "DHS CISA. (2019, February 27). MAR-17-352-01 HatMan—Safety System Targeted Malware (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "CISA Advisory (ICSA-18-107-02) Dec 2018",
"description": "ICS-CERT. (2018, December 18). Advisory (ICSA-18-107-02) - Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02"
},
{
"source_name": "Schneider Electric TRITON Jan 2018",
"description": "Schneider Electric. (2018, January 23). TRITON - Schneider Electric Analysis and Disclosure. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f09E75bWvkk&index=3&list=PL8OWO1qWXF4qYG19p7An4Vw3N2YZ86aRS&t=0s"
},
{
"source_name": "MITRE CVE-2018-8872 May 2018",
"description": "MITRE. (2018, May 04). CVE-2018-8872. Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8872"
},
{
"source_name": "CWE-119 Jan 2019",
"description": "Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer. Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html"
},
{
"source_name": "NRC Triconex",
"description": "The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. (n.d.). Triconex Topical Report 7286-545-1. Retrieved May 30, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1209/ML120900890.pdf"
}
],
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},
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"description": "The [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) Python script is also capable of autodetecting Triconex controllers on the network by sending a specific UDP broadcast packet over port 1502.(Citation: CISA Advisory (ICSA-18-107-02) Dec 2018)",
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"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02"
}
],
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"description": "The [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) malware gained remote access to an SIS engineering workstation.(Citation: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)",
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{
"source_name": "FireEye TRITON Dec 2017",
"description": "Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html"
}
],
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"source_name": "FireEye TRITON Dec 2017",
"description": "Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html"
}
],
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{
"source_name": "Midnight Blue Labs TRITON Jan 2018",
"description": "Jos Wetzels. (2018, January 16). Analyzing the TRITON industrial malware. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.midnightbluelabs.com/blog/2018/1/16/analyzing-the-triton-industrial-malware"
}
],
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"description": "[Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) would reset the controller to the previous state over TriStation and if this failed it would write a dummy program to memory in what was likely an attempt at anti-forensics.(Citation: Midnight Blue Labs TRITON Jan 2018)",
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{
"source_name": "Midnight Blue Labs TRITON Jan 2018",
"description": "Jos Wetzels. (2018, January 16). Analyzing the TRITON industrial malware. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.midnightbluelabs.com/blog/2018/1/16/analyzing-the-triton-industrial-malware"
}
],
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{
"source_name": "Midnight Blue Labs TRITON Jan 2018",
"description": "Jos Wetzels. (2018, January 16). Analyzing the TRITON industrial malware. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.midnightbluelabs.com/blog/2018/1/16/analyzing-the-triton-industrial-malware"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
"type": "relationship",
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"description": "[Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) leverages a reconstructed TriStation protocol within its framework to trigger APIs related to program download, program allocation, and program changes.(Citation: Midnight Blue Labs TRITON Jan 2018)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z",
"id": "relationship--d72e7d01-56be-4fbd-8957-3384533ba83b",
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"source_name": "Midnight Blue Labs TRITON Jan 2018",
"description": "Jos Wetzels. (2018, January 16). Analyzing the TRITON industrial malware. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.midnightbluelabs.com/blog/2018/1/16/analyzing-the-triton-industrial-malware"
}
],
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},
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"description": "[Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) contains a file named TS_cnames.py which contains default definitions for program state (TS_progstate). Program state is referenced in TsHi.py.(Citation: MDudek-ICS TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN)",
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{
"source_name": "MDudek-ICS TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN",
"description": "MDudek-ICS. (n.d.). TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN. Retrieved November 3, 2019.",
"url": "https://github.com/MDudek-ICS/TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN/tree/master/decompiled_code/library"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"description": "[Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) contains a file named TS_cnames.py which contains default definitions for key state (TS_keystate). Key state is referenced in TsHi.py.(Citation: MDudek-ICS TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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{
"source_name": "MDudek-ICS TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN",
"description": "MDudek-ICS. (n.d.). TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN. Retrieved November 3, 2019.",
"url": "https://github.com/MDudek-ICS/TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN/tree/master/decompiled_code/library"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--a8cfd474-9358-464f-a169-9c6f099a8e8a",
"description": "[Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) has the ability to halt or run a program through the TriStation protocol. TsHi.py contains instances of halt and run functions being executed.(Citation: MDudek-ICS TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z",
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],
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{
"source_name": "MDudek-ICS TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN",
"description": "MDudek-ICS. (n.d.). TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN. Retrieved November 3, 2019.",
"url": "https://github.com/MDudek-ICS/TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN/tree/master/decompiled_code/library"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "relationship--9b825e77-2b18-4bc8-8e1d-5f645d570dca",
"source_ref": "intrusion-set--9538b1a4-4120-4e2d-bf59-3b11fcab05a4",
"modified": "2020-01-12T19:15:45.694Z",
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--38213338-1aab-479d-949b-c81b66ccca5c",
"description": "The [VPNFilter](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0002) packet sniffer looks for basic authentication as well as monitors ICS traffic, and is specific to the TP-LINK R600-VPN. The malware uses a raw socket to look for connections to a pre-specified IP address, only looking at TCP packets that are 150 bytes or larger. Packets that are not on port 502, are scanned for BasicAuth, and that information is logged. This may have allowed credential harvesting from communications between devices accessing a modbus-enabled HMI.(Citation: Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018)(Citation: VPNFilter Deep Dive Mar 2019)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "relationship--cad91f87-7cc7-4771-8c7b-1599793ed3c1",
"source_ref": "malware--6108f800-10b8-4090-944e-be579f01263d",
"modified": "2020-01-03T00:14:20.652Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018",
"description": "William Largent. (2018, June 06). VPNFilter Update - VPNFilter exploits endpoints, targets new devices. Retrieved March 28, 2019.",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/06/vpnfilter-update.html"
},
{
"source_name": "VPNFilter Deep Dive Mar 2019",
"description": "Carl Hurd. (2019, March 26). VPNFilter Deep Dive. Retrieved March 28, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuZazP22rpI"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
"type": "relationship",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--abb0a255-eb9c-48d0-8f5c-874bb84c0e45",
"description": "The [VPNFilter](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0002) packet sniffer monitors ICS traffic, and is specific to the TP-LINK R600-VPN. The malware uses a raw socket to look for connections to a pre-specified IP address, only looking at TCP packets that are 150 bytes or larger. 'ps' identifies and logs on IPs and ports, but not the packet contents on port 502 (Modbus traffic). It does not validate the traffic as Modbus.(Citation: Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018)(Citation: VPNFilter Deep Dive Mar 2019)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "relationship--d2b3dc96-7adb-4d38-b3cf-b448535ffa60",
"source_ref": "malware--6108f800-10b8-4090-944e-be579f01263d",
"modified": "2020-01-03T00:14:20.652Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018",
"description": "William Largent. (2018, June 06). VPNFilter Update - VPNFilter exploits endpoints, targets new devices. Retrieved March 28, 2019.",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/06/vpnfilter-update.html"
},
{
"source_name": "VPNFilter Deep Dive Mar 2019",
"description": "Carl Hurd. (2019, March 26). VPNFilter Deep Dive. Retrieved March 28, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuZazP22rpI"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
"type": "relationship",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--85a45294-08f1-4539-bf00-7da08aa7b0ee",
"description": "[WannaCry](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0007) initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks.(Citation: Dragos Apr 2019)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2019-03-25T19:13:54.947Z",
"id": "relationship--c59a3d89-c8fa-4c5d-813e-f4495d892d1a",
"source_ref": "malware--75ecdbf1-c2bb-4afc-a3f9-c8da4de8c661",
"modified": "2020-01-02T11:43:33.397Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "Dragos Apr 2019",
"description": "Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
"type": "relationship",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--8d2f3bab-507c-4424-b58b-edc977bd215c",
"description": "[WannaCry](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0007) can utilize exposed SMB services to access industrial networks.(Citation: Dragos Apr 2019)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2019-03-25T19:13:54.947Z",
"id": "relationship--5445c04b-f792-4850-aaa7-d643998b240d",
"source_ref": "malware--75ecdbf1-c2bb-4afc-a3f9-c8da4de8c661",
"modified": "2020-01-02T11:43:33.397Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "Dragos Apr 2019",
"description": "Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
"type": "relationship",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--ead7bd34-186e-4c79-9a4d-b65bcce6ed9d",
"description": "[WannaCry](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0007) can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service.(Citation: Dragos Apr 2019)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2019-03-25T19:13:54.947Z",
"id": "relationship--d50a3d89-c8fa-4c5d-813e-f4495d892d1a",
"source_ref": "malware--75ecdbf1-c2bb-4afc-a3f9-c8da4de8c661",
"modified": "2020-01-02T11:43:33.397Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "Dragos Apr 2019",
"description": "Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/"
}
],
"relationship_type": "uses"
},
{
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"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "relationship--39c957e3-f89b-4b41-93af-bde08f00ce36",
"source_ref": "intrusion-set--c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a",
"modified": "2020-01-02T19:15:45.694Z",
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},
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"description": "Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization policies and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided capabilities to support user identification and authentication.1 These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials.",
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},
{
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
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"description": "Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, and password strength requirements as examples. Consider these features as they relate to assets which may impact safety and availability.",
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},
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},
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"description": "Consider configuration and use of a network-wide authentication service such as Active Directory, LDAP, or RADIUS capabilities which can be found in ICS devices.",
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},
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},
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},
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"description": "Built-in browser sandboxes and application isolation may be used in conjunction to contain malware before malicious actions occur.",
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},
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"description": "Application isolation will limit the other processes and system features an exploited target can access. Examples of built in features are software restriction policies, AppLocker for Windows, and SELinux or AppArmor for Linux.",
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"description": "Review the integrity of project files to verify they have not been modified by adversary behavior. Verify a cryptographic hash for the file with a known trusted version, or look for other indicators of modification (e.g., timestamps).",
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"description": "Perform integrity checks of firmware before uploading it on a device. Utilize cryptographic hashes to verify the firmware has not been tampered with by comparing it a trusted hash of the firmware. This could be from a trusted data sources (e.g., vendor site) or through a third-party verification service.",
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"description": "Routinely audit source code, application configuration files, open repositories, and public cloud storage for insecure use and storage of credentials.",
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"description": "Restrict configurations changes and firmware updating abilities to only authorized individuals.",
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"description": "All field controllers should restrict the modification of programs to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism.",
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},
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},
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"description": "All APIs used to perform execution, especially those hosted on embedded controllers (e.g., PLCs), should provide adequate authorization enforcement of user access. Minimize user's access to only required API calls.",
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},
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"description": "Systems and devices should restrict access to any data with confidentiality concerns, including location information.",
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]
},
{
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"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--6b5d2643-b399-43aa-8ab1-7557a0446b07",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Only authorized personnel should be able to change settings for alarms.",
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]
},
{
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"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--e6be2fb4-3815-4e52-8dec-2aed1dc3b7cf",
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"description": "All field controllers should restrict the modification of programs to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism.",
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]
},
{
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"id": "relationship--243ad7b2-546c-4bf2-a3c0-1438b13e197d",
"type": "relationship",
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"description": "Automation protocols (e.g., OPC, DNP3) can restrict access to certain 'points'/requests based on a user's or device's privilege, this can prevent an unauthorized user from identifying certain point or tag identifiers. For example, DNP3-SA requires challenge-response authentication for certain DNP3 requests, similar techniques could be extended more broadly to other points or tags.\n\nSystems and devices should restrict access to any data with potential confidentiality concerns, including point and tag information.",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
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"description": "All field controllers should restrict the modification of programs to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism.",
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]
},
{
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"id": "relationship--5ae1cf3a-2603-4bf9-ace3-5b1ee5d8d757",
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"description": "All field controllers should restrict program uploads to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism.",
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]
},
{
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"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--eeeff03f-7436-4f76-8591-42075e6647d4",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "All field controllers should restrict operating mode changes to only required authenticated users (e.g., engineers, field technicians), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism. Further, physical mechanisms (e.g., keys) can also be used to limit unauthorized operating mode changes.",
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]
},
{
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"id": "relationship--0c284ce0-0be2-4164-b686-7c383b246aec",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
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"description": "Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory. Technologies such as Intel Boot Guard can assist with this.",
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]
},
{
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"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
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"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory. Technologies such as Intel Boot Guard can assist with this.",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--3f1f4ccb-9be2-4ff8-8f69-dd972221169b",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--590777b3-b475-4c7c-aaf8-f4a73b140312",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--05ac3316-a770-4c5d-b164-3494590395dd",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Devices should verify that firmware has been properly signed by the vendor before allowing installation.",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
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"source_ref": "course-of-action--590777b3-b475-4c7c-aaf8-f4a73b140312",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--b9e82422-b072-494f-99c1-fcab07b90133",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Require signed binaries.",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
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"target_ref": "attack-pattern--efbf7888-f61b-4572-9c80-7e2965c60707",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--590777b3-b475-4c7c-aaf8-f4a73b140312",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--46332a77-2fd6-4033-96cf-6163172775ec",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
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"description": "Devices should verify that firmware has been properly signed by the vendor before allowing installation.",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--be69c571-d746-4b1f-bdd0-c0c9817e9068",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--590777b3-b475-4c7c-aaf8-f4a73b140312",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--cb30d507-edc6-4197-947c-7b3a6e395c0d",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Utilize code signatures to verify the integrity of the installed program on safety or control assets has not been changed.",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--e72425f8-9ae6-41d3-bfdb-e1b865e60722",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--590777b3-b475-4c7c-aaf8-f4a73b140312",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--f9c29dd4-1c5e-4f7e-b60a-862319a6d0a0",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Allow for code signing of any project files stored at rest to prevent unauthorized tampering. Ensure the signing keys are not easily accessible on the same system.",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--3b6b9246-43f8-4c69-ad7a-2b11cfe0a0d9",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--590777b3-b475-4c7c-aaf8-f4a73b140312",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--2971151c-0e8a-4567-84dc-01cf5dd35005",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Digital signatures may be used to ensure application DLLs are authentic prior to execution.",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--5e0f75da-e108-4688-a6de-a4f07cc2cbe3",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--590777b3-b475-4c7c-aaf8-f4a73b140312",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--d6a2a1a8-8f5b-4e94-8fce-8edd8a17627a",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "When available utilize hardware and software root-of-trust to verify the authenticity of a system. This may be achieved through cryptographic means, such as digital signatures or hashes, of critical software and firmware throughout the supply chain.",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--b9160e77-ea9e-4ba9-b1c8-53a3c466b13d",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--590777b3-b475-4c7c-aaf8-f4a73b140312",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--3be9d4d1-17e1-4f3e-b22a-edad8cf0c343",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Devices should verify that firmware has been properly signed by the vendor before allowing installation.",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--2736b752-4ec5-4421-a230-8977dea7649c",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--590777b3-b475-4c7c-aaf8-f4a73b140312",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--e09e253c-fd28-49ae-988e-1f80d769e8b8",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Prevent the use of unsigned executables, such as installers and scripts.",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--19a71d1e-6334-4233-8260-b749cae37953",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--c7257b6e-4159-4771-b1f3-2bb93adaecac",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--afd63145-6033-49e4-ad43-d0b35fa5ed88",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes.",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--a8cfd474-9358-464f-a169-9c6f099a8e8a",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--c7257b6e-4159-4771-b1f3-2bb93adaecac",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--e05d8fc1-fd50-4a78-ae2f-41fcba913fc1",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes.",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--2aa406ed-81c3-4c1d-ba83-cfbee5a2847a",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--c7257b6e-4159-4771-b1f3-2bb93adaecac",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--808c57e7-72ef-4860-b9ea-8ea072e2385a",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs).",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--94f042ae-3033-4a8d-9ec3-26396533a541",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--c7257b6e-4159-4771-b1f3-2bb93adaecac",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--ff5f3c74-f511-4112-beed-e7419342bc44",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs).",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--25dfc8ad-bd73-4dfd-84a9-3c3d383f76e9",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--c7257b6e-4159-4771-b1f3-2bb93adaecac",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--491455dc-f7c8-4e12-811b-b8c5c041b4c3",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs).",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--7374ab87-0782-41f8-b415-678c0950bb2a",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--c7257b6e-4159-4771-b1f3-2bb93adaecac",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--eaec9abc-730e-4dda-92db-e289f6bccf7b",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs).",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--9a505987-ab05-4f46-a9a6-6441442eec3b",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--c7257b6e-4159-4771-b1f3-2bb93adaecac",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--f6ff74c2-d088-4252-a8e0-189574863765",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Communication authenticity will ensure that any messages tampered with through MITM can be detected, but cannot prevent eavesdropping on these. In addition, providing communication authenticity around various discovery protocols, such as DNS, can be used to prevent various MITM procedures.",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--1af9e3fd-2bcc-414d-adbd-fe3b95c02ca1",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--c7257b6e-4159-4771-b1f3-2bb93adaecac",
"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--b628d878-4f35-4580-8d42-26984d13821e",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs).",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
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"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--41adaf0b-b7ae-4bdb-9a5b-567fd0911d7a",
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},
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},
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},
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"description": "Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs).",
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},
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},
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"description": "Do not inherently rely on the authenticity provided by the network/link layer (e.g., 802.11, LTE, 802.15.4), as link layer equipment may have long lifespans and protocol vulnerabilities may not be easily patched. Provide defense-in-depth by implementing authenticity within the associated application-layer protocol, or through a network-layer VPN. Furthermore, ensure communications schemes provide strong replay protection, employing techniques such as timestamps or cryptographic nonces.",
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},
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"description": "Utilize central storage servers for critical operations where possible (e.g., historians) and keep remote backups. For outstations, use local redundant storage for event recorders. Have backup control system platforms, preferably as hot-standbys to respond immediately to data destruction event.",
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},
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"description": "Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans, including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response to adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.",
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]
},
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},
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]
},
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},
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},
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]
},
{
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"description": "Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans, including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response to adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
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"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
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"description": "Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans, including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response to adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
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"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Apply DLP to protect the confidentiality of information related to operational processes, facility locations, device configurations, programs, or databases that may have information that can be used to infer organizational trade-secrets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP).",
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]
},
{
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"id": "relationship--7c2edd6c-5189-4ba9-af3d-bdaff4a699ca",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Consider removing or restricting features that are unnecessary to an asset's intended function within the control environment.",
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]
},
{
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"id": "relationship--ca64a927-f050-41b3-80d3-93d22cdef26a",
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"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent risk of discovery and potential exploitation.",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
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"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--6d36ad87-7dbd-47ec-9d5d-9e5f5c3df896",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Consider the disabling or removal of features or programs which are not required by that asset's function within the environment.",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
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"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--8ca2fe75-9bb3-4af5-8fee-accd33d6d2ec",
"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Ensure remote commands that enable device shutdown are disabled if they are not necessary. Examples including DNP3's 0x0D function code or unnecessary device management functions.",
"object_marking_refs": [
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]
},
{
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"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--4369da69-bb09-4cc8-8600-081a450f50e0",
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"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
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"description": "Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent risk of discovery and potential exploitation.",
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},
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"description": "Consider removal of remote services which are not regularly in use, or only enabling them when required (e.g. vendor remote access). Ensure all external remote access point (e.g., jump boxes, VPN concentrator) are configured with least functionality, especially the removal of unnecessary services.",
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"description": "Disable unnecessary legacy network protocols that may be used for MiTM if applicable.",
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},
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"description": "Consider the disabling of features such as AutoRun.",
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},
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"description": "Consider removal or disabling of programs and features which may be used to run malicious scripts (e.g., scripting language IDEs, PowerShell, visual studio).",
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"type": "relationship",
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"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware.",
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},
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"description": "Ensure that wired and/or wireless traffic is encrypted when feasible. Use best practices for authentication protocols, such as Kerberos, and ensure web traffic that may contain credentials is protected by SSL/TLS.",
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},
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"id": "relationship--43bdf580-b98f-49cf-92d5-3dac50450c86",
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"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware.",
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},
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"description": "Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications.",
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},
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"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
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"description": "Information which is sensitive to the operation and architecture of the process environment may be encrypted to ensure confidentiality and restrict access to only those who need to know.",
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},
{
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"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Consider implementing full disk encryption, especially if engineering workstations are transient assets that are more likely to be lost, stolen, or tampered with.",
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},
{
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"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
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"description": "Encrypt sensitive location data when feasible to prevent unauthorized access.",
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},
{
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"description": "The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware.",
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},
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"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
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"description": "When at rest, project files should be encrypted to prevent unauthorized changes.",
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},
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"description": "The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware.",
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},
{
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"description": "Encrypt any operational data with strong confidentiality requirements, including organizational trade-secrets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP).",
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},
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"description": "Execution prevention may block malicious software from accessing protected resources through the command line interface.",
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},
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"description": "Minimize the exposure of API calls that allow the execution of code.",
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},
{
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"id": "relationship--cca191a1-3c50-4d4f-8f79-4247e58af610",
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"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
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"description": "Use tools that restrict program execution via application control by attributes other than file name for common system and application utilities.",
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},
{
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"description": "Execution prevention may prevent malicious scripts from accessing protected resources.",
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},
{
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"description": "Application control may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.",
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},
{
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"description": "Utilize exploit protection to prevent activities which may be exploited through malicious web sites.",
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},
{
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"type": "relationship",
"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"description": "Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.",
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]
},
{
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"description": "Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted.",
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},
{
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"modified": "2020-09-29T18:58:17.429Z",
"id": "relationship--47f15a06-8675-4698-833d-bd141ed9e755",
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"description": "Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted.",
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},
{
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"description": "Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity.",
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},
{
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"created": "2020-09-21T17:59:24.739Z",
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"description": "Allow/denylists can be used to block access when excessive I/O connections are detected from a system or device during a specified time period.",
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},
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},
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},
{
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},
{
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"description": "Consider using IP allowlisting along with user account management to ensure that data access is restricted not only to valid users but only from expected IP ranges to mitigate the use of stolen credentials to access data.",
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},
{
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"description": "Devices that allow remote management of firmware should require authentication before allowing any changes. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management",
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},
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"description": "All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management.",
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},
{
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
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"description": "This technique may not be effectively mitigated against, consider controls for assets and processes that lead to the use of this technique.",
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},
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},
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"description": "Network connection enumeration is likely obtained by using common system tools (e.g., netstat, ipconfig).",
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"description": "Preventing screen capture on a device may require disabling various system calls supported by the operating systems (e.g., Microsoft WindowsGraphicsCaputer APIs), however, these may be needed for other critical applications.",
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},
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"description": "Serial connection enumeration can be accomplished using common system tools such as minicom, getty, stty, etc.",
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},
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"description": "Use strong multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials. Be aware of multi-factor authentication interception techniques for some implementations.",
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},
{
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"description": "Use multi-factor authentication wherever possible.",
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
{
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},
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},
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},
{
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},
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},
{
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"description": "Segment and control software movement between business and OT environments by way of one directional DMZs. Web access should be restricted from the OT environment. Engineering workstations, including transient cyber assets (TCAs) should have minimal connectivity to external networks, including Internet and email, further limit the extent to which these devices are dual-homed to multiple networks.",
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},
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},
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},
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"description": "Harden the system through operating system controls to prevent the known or unknown use of malicious removable media.",
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"description": "Protect information that may disclose locations of key physical assets.",
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},
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"description": "Example mitigations could include minimizing its distribution/storage or obfuscating the information (e.g., facility coverterms, codenames). In many cases this information may be necessary to support critical engineering, maintenance, or operational functions, therefore, it may not be feasible to implement.",
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"description": "Provide an alternative method for alarms to be reported in the event of a communication failure.",
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"description": "Provide an alternative method for sending critical commands message to outstations, this could include using radio/cell communication to send messages to a field technician that physically performs the control function.",
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"description": "Provide an alternative method for sending critical report messages to operators, this could include using radio/cell communication to obtain messages from field technicians that can locally obtain telemetry and status data.",
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},
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"description": "Ensure devices have an alternative method for communicating in the event that a valid COM port is unavailable.",
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"description": "Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data.",
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"aliases": [
"ALLANITE",
"Palmetto Fusion"
],
"type": "intrusion-set",
"name": "ALLANITE",
"description": "[ALLANITE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0009) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group, that has primarily targeted the electric utility sector within the United States and United Kingdom. The group's tactics and techniques are reportedly similar to [Dragonfly](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0002) / [Dragonfly 2.0](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0006), although ALLANITE’s technical capabilities have not exhibited disruptive or destructive abilities. It has been suggested that the group maintains a presence in ICS for the purpose of gaining understanding of processes and to maintain persistence. (Citation: Dragos ALLANITE)",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "G1000",
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0009"
},
{
"description": "(Citation: Dragos ALLANITE)",
"source_name": "ALLANITE"
},
{
"source_name": "Dragos ALLANITE",
"description": "Dragon. (n.d.). Allanite. Retrieved October 27, 2019",
"url": "https://www.dragos.com/threat/allanite/"
}
],
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"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:57.307Z",
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"modified": "2020-01-05T23:05:19.419Z",
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{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "G0064",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064"
},
{
"source_name": "APT33",
"description": "(Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)"
},
{
"source_name": "HOLMIUM",
"description": "(Citation: Microsoft Holmium June 2020)"
},
{
"source_name": "Elfin",
"description": "(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019)"
},
{
"source_name": "FireEye APT33 Sept 2017",
"description": "O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html"
},
{
"source_name": "FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017",
"description": "Davis, S. and Carr, N. (2017, September 21). APT33: New Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft Holmium June 2020",
"description": "Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/"
},
{
"source_name": "Symantec Elfin Mar 2019",
"description": "Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage"
}
],
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"name": "APT33",
"aliases": [
"APT33",
"HOLMIUM",
"Elfin"
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"created": "2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z",
"description": "[APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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},
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{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "G0035",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035"
},
{
"source_name": "Dragonfly",
"description": "(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)"
},
{
"source_name": "TG-4192",
"description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)"
},
{
"source_name": "Crouching Yeti",
"description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)"
},
{
"source_name": "IRON LIBERTY",
"description": "(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)"
},
{
"source_name": "Energetic Bear",
"description": "(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)"
},
{
"source_name": "Symantec Dragonfly",
"description": "Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.",
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019",
"description": "Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector"
},
{
"source_name": "Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017",
"description": "Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group"
},
{
"source_name": "Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017",
"description": "Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018.",
"url": "http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/"
},
{
"source_name": "Dragos DYMALLOY ",
"description": "Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/"
},
{
"source_name": "Secureworks MCMD July 2019",
"description": "Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis"
},
{
"source_name": "Secureworks Karagany July 2019",
"description": "Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector"
}
],
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"TG-4192",
"Crouching Yeti",
"IRON LIBERTY",
"Energetic Bear"
],
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"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:05.217Z",
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"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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},
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"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "G0074",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074"
},
{
"source_name": "Dragonfly 2.0",
"description": "(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)"
},
{
"source_name": "IRON LIBERTY",
"description": "(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY)"
},
{
"source_name": "DYMALLOY",
"description": "(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )"
},
{
"source_name": "Berserk Bear",
"description": "(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)"
},
{
"source_name": "US-CERT TA18-074A",
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"
},
{
"source_name": "Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017",
"description": "Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group"
},
{
"source_name": "Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017",
"description": "Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018.",
"url": "http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/"
},
{
"source_name": "Dragos DYMALLOY ",
"description": "Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/"
},
{
"source_name": "Secureworks MCMD July 2019",
"description": "Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis"
},
{
"source_name": "Secureworks IRON LIBERTY",
"description": "Secureworks. (n.d.). IRON LIBERTY. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-liberty"
}
],
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"description": "[Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"name": "Dragonfly 2.0"
},
{
"aliases": [
"HEXANE",
"Lyceum"
],
"type": "intrusion-set",
"name": "HEXANE",
"description": "[HEXANE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0005) is a threat group that has targeted ICS organization within the oil & gas, and telecommunications sectors. Many of the targeted organizations have been located in the Middle East including Kuwait. HEXANE's targeting of telecommunications has been speculated to be part of an effort to establish man-in-the-middle capabilities throughout the region. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0003) and [OilRig](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0010) but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity. (Citation: Dragos Hexane Oct 2019)",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "G1001",
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0005"
},
{
"description": "(Citation: Dragos Hexane Oct 2019)",
"source_name": "HEXANE"
},
{
"description": "(Citation: SecureWorks LYCEUM August 2019)",
"source_name": "Lyceum"
},
{
"description": "Dragos. (n.d.). Hexane. Retrieved October 27, 2019",
"source_name": "Dragos Hexane Oct 2019",
"url": "https://dragos.com/resource/hexane/"
},
{
"description": "SecureWorks. (2019, August 27). LYCEUM Takes Center Stage in Middle East Campaign. Retrieved November 19, 2019.",
"source_name": "SecureWorks LYCEUM Nov 2019",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/lyceum-takes-center-stage-in-middle-east-campaign"
}
],
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"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "intrusion-set--f29b7c5e-2439-42ad-a86f-9f8984fafae3",
"modified": "2020-01-05T20:13:49.069Z",
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],
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},
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{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "G0032",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032"
},
{
"source_name": "Lazarus Group",
"description": "(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)"
},
{
"source_name": "HIDDEN COBRA",
"description": "The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)"
},
{
"source_name": "Guardians of Peace",
"description": "(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)"
},
{
"source_name": "ZINC",
"description": "(Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017)"
},
{
"source_name": "NICKEL ACADEMY",
"description": "(Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017)"
},
{
"source_name": "US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017",
"description": "US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA \u2013 North Korea\u2019s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A"
},
{
"source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster",
"description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.",
"url": "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "Lazarus KillDisk",
"description": "K\u00e1lnai, P., Cherepanov A. (2018, April 03). Lazarus KillDisks Central American casino. Retrieved May 17, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/03/lazarus-killdisk-central-american-casino/"
},
{
"source_name": "Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017",
"description": "GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.",
"url": "https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/"
},
{
"source_name": "US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019",
"description": "US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 \u2013 North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017",
"description": "Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"url": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/"
},
{
"source_name": "Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017",
"description": "Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing"
}
],
"type": "intrusion-set",
"aliases": [
"Lazarus Group",
"HIDDEN COBRA",
"Guardians of Peace",
"ZINC",
"NICKEL ACADEMY"
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"modified": "2020-10-02T16:21:21.624Z",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:03.807Z",
"description": "[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"name": "Lazarus Group"
},
{
"aliases": [
"Leafminer",
"Raspite"
],
"type": "intrusion-set",
"name": "Leafminer",
"description": "[Leafminer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0004) is an Iranian threat group that has targeted government organizations and business entities in the Middle East since at least early 2017. (Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "G1002",
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0004"
},
{
"description": "(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)",
"source_name": "Leafminer"
},
{
"description": "(Citation: Dragos Raspite Aug 2018)",
"source_name": "Raspite"
},
{
"description": "Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018.",
"source_name": "Symantec Leafminer July 2018",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/leafminer-espionage-middle-east"
},
{
"description": "Dragos, Inc. (2018, August 2). RASPITE. Retrieved November 26, 2018.",
"source_name": "Dragos Raspite Aug 2018",
"url": "https://www.dragos.com/blog/20180802Raspite.html"
}
],
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"description": "Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017.",
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"source_name": "ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017",
"description": "ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017.",
"url": "http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/"
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"source_name": "Palo Alto OilRig May 2016",
"description": "Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.",
"url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/"
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"description": "Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.",
"url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/"
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"url": "https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/"
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"description": "Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html"
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"description": "Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018.",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/"
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"source_name": "Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018",
"description": "Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/"
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"description": "(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)"
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"description": "Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017.",
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"description": "Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike\u2019s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/"
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"source_name": "USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020",
"description": "Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020.",
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},
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"source_name": "InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014",
"description": "Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian \u2018Sandworm\u2019 Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/"
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"description": "Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/"
},
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"description": "Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020.",
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},
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"description": "Slowik, J.. (2019, April 12). A XENOTIME to Remember: Veles in the Wild. Retrieved April 16, 2019.",
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"description": "[ACAD/Medre.A](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0018) is a worm that steals operational information. The worm collects AutoCAD files with drawings. ACAD/Medre.A has the capability to be used for industrial espionage.",
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"description": "[BlackEnergy 3](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0004) is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It support various plug-ins including a variant of KillDisk. It is known to have been used against the Ukrainian power grid. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton)",
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"description": "Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
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"description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2016, April 26). Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
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},
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"source_name": "Flamer",
"description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Flame) (Citation: Symantec Beetlejuice)"
},
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"description": "(Citation: Kaspersky Flame) (Citation: Crysys Skywiper)"
},
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"source_name": "Kaspersky Flame",
"description": "Gostev, A. (2012, May 28). The Flame: Questions and Answers. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"url": "https://securelist.com/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/34344/"
},
{
"source_name": "Symantec Beetlejuice",
"description": "Symantec Security Response. (2012, May 31). Flamer: A Recipe for Bluetoothache. Retrieved February 25, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/flamer-recipe-bluetoothache"
},
{
"source_name": "Crysys Skywiper",
"description": "sKyWIper Analysis Team. (2012, May 31). sKyWIper (a.k.a. Flame a.k.a. Flamer): A complex malware for targeted attacks. Retrieved September 6, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.crysys.hu/publications/files/skywiper.pdf"
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"name": "Industroyer",
"description": "[Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001) is a sophisticated piece of malware designed to cause an [Impact](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Impact) to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically ICSs used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer) Industroyer was alleged to be used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride)(Citation: CISA Alert (TA17-163A))(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2019)",
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"description": "Dragos Inc.. (2017, June 13). Industroyer - Dragos - 201706: Analysis of the Threat to Electic Grid Operations. Retrieved September 18, 2017.",
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},
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"source_name": "Dragos Crashoverride 2019",
"description": "Joe Slowik. (2019, August 15). CRASHOVERRIDE: Reassessing the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Event as a Protection-Focused Attack. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
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},
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"name": "Killdisk",
"description": "In 2015 the BlackEnergy malware contained a component called KillDisk. KillDisk's main functionality is to overwrite files with random data, rendering the OS unbootable. (Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016)",
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0016"
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"source_name": "ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016",
"description": "Anton Cherepanov. (n.d.). BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric industry. Retrieved October 29, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/"
},
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"source_name": "Booz Allen Hamilton",
"description": "Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf"
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"created": "2019-04-16T19:00:49.435Z",
"description": "[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that has been tied to various attacks on European companies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)",
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"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372"
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},
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"source_name": "CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019",
"description": "CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification \u2013 LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.",
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"created": "2019-03-26T15:02:14.907Z",
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"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368"
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"source_name": "ExPetr",
"description": "(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)"
},
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"source_name": "Diskcoder.C",
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},
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"source_name": "GoldenEye",
"description": "(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)"
},
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"source_name": "Petrwrap",
"description": "(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)"
},
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"source_name": "Nyetya",
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},
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"description": "Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant \"Nyetya\" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.",
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},
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"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A"
},
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"source_name": "ESET Telebots June 2017",
"description": "Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/06/30/telebots-back-supply-chain-attacks-against-ukraine/"
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"name": "PLC-Blaster",
"description": "[PLC-Blaster](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0009) is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules.(Citation: BlackHat PLC-Blaster Mar 2016)(Citation: BlackHat PLC-Blaster 2016)",
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0009"
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"source_name": "BlackHat PLC-Blaster Mar 2016",
"description": "Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brüggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke. (2016, March 31). Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc.. Retrieved September 19, 2017.",
"url": "Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brüggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke. (2016, March 31). Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc.. Retrieved September 19, 2017."
},
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"description": "Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.",
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"name": "Ryuk",
"description": "[Ryuk](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0011) is ransomware that was first seen targeting large organizations for high-value ransoms in August of 2018. Ryuk temporarily disrupted operations at a manufacturing firm in 2018.(Citation: Crowdstrike Ryuk)",
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"modified": "2020-01-03T22:01:15.893Z",
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0011"
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"source_name": "Crowdstrike Ryuk",
"description": "Alexander Hanel. (n.d.). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved November 3, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/"
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"description": "Kelly Jackson Higgins. (n.d.). How a Manufacturing Firm Recovered from a Devastating Ransomware Attack. Retrieved November 3, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/how-a-manufacturing-firm-recovered-from-a-devastating-ransomware-attack/d/d-id/1334760"
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"name": "Stuxnet",
"description": "[Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different complex tactics including multiple zero-day vulnerabilites, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Dossier Feb 2011)(Citation: Symantec W32.Stuxnet Writeup)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-238-01B))(Citation: SCADAhacker Stuxnet Mitigation Jan 2014)",
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"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010"
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"source_name": "Wired W32.Stuxnet Dossier Feb 2011",
"description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
},
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"source_name": "Symantec W32.Stuxnet Writeup",
"description": "Jarrad Shearer. (n.d.). W32.Stuxnet Writeup. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2010-071400-3123-99"
},
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"source_name": "CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-238-01B)",
"description": "CISA. (2014, January 08). Stuxnet Malware Mitigation (Update B). Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-10-238-01B"
},
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"source_name": "SCADAhacker Stuxnet Mitigation Jan 2014",
"description": "Joel Langill. (2014, January 21). Stuxnet Mitigation. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
"url": "https://scadahacker.com/resources/stuxnet-mitigation.html"
},
{
"source_name": "Langer Stuxnet Analysis Nov 2013",
"description": "Ralph Langner. (2013, November). To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve. Retrieved March 27, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf"
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]
},
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"name": "Triton",
"description": "[Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers.(Citation: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)(Citation: Dragos TRISIS Dec 2017)(Citation: CISA MAR-17-352-01 HatMan)(Citation: Schneider Electric TRITON Jan 2018)(Citation: Triton - A Report From The Trenches Mar 2019)(Citation: Schneider Electric Dec 2018)(Citation: MidnightBlueLabs TRITON Jan 2018)",
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"external_id": "S1009",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013"
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{
"source_name": "FireEye TRITON Dec 2017",
"description": "Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html"
},
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"source_name": "Dragos TRISIS Dec 2017",
"description": "Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
"url": "https://dragos.com/blog/trisis/TRISIS-01.pdf"
},
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"source_name": "CISA MAR-17-352-01 HatMan",
"description": "DHS CISA. (2019, February 27). MAR-17-352-01 HatMan—Safety System Targeted Malware (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "Schneider Electric TRITON Jan 2018",
"description": "Schneider Electric. (2018, January 23). TRITON - Schneider Electric Analysis and Disclosure. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f09E75bWvkk&index=3&list=PL8OWO1qWXF4qYG19p7An4Vw3N2YZ86aRS&t=0s"
},
{
"source_name": "Triton - A Report From The Trenches Mar 2019",
"description": "Julian Gutmanis. (2019, March 11). Triton - A Report From The Trenches. Retrieved March 11, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwSJ8hloGvY"
},
{
"source_name": "Schneider Electric Dec 2018",
"description": "Schneider Electric. (2018, December 14). Security Notification - EcoStruxure Triconex Tricon V3. Retrieved August 26, 2019.",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_enDocType=Technical+leaflet&p_File_Name=SEVD-2017-347-01+Triconex+V3.pdf&p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2017-347-01"
},
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"source_name": "MidnightBlueLabs TRITON Jan 2018",
"description": "Jos Wetzels. (2018, January 16). Analyzing the TRITON industrial malware. Retrieved October 22, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.midnightbluelabs.com/blog/2018/1/16/analyzing-the-triton-industrial-malware"
},
{
"source_name": "CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-18-107-02)",
"description": "ICS-CERT. (2018, December 18). Advisory (ICSA-18-107-02) - Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02"
},
{
"source_name": "MITRE CVE-2018-8872",
"description": "MITRE. (2018, May 04). CVE-2018-8872. Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8872"
},
{
"source_name": "CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer",
"description": "Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer. Retrieved March 8, 2019.",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html"
},
{
"source_name": "The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation",
"description": "The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. (n.d.). Triconex Topical Report 7286-545-1. Retrieved May 30, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1209/ML120900890.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "MDudek-ICS Triton",
"description": "MDudek-ICS. (n.d.). TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN. Retrieved November 3, 2019.",
"url": "https://github.com/MDudek-ICS/TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN/tree/master/decompiled_code/library"
}
]
},
{
"name": "VPNFilter",
"description": "[VPNFilter](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0002) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. VPNFilter modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols.(Citation: Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018)(Citation: VPNFilter Deep Dive Mar 2019)",
"id": "malware--6108f800-10b8-4090-944e-be579f01263d",
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],
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"labels": [
"malware"
],
"created": "2019-03-26T15:02:14.907Z",
"modified": "2020-01-03T22:01:15.893Z",
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"external_id": "S1010",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0002"
},
{
"source_name": "Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018",
"description": "William Largent. (2018, June 06). VPNFilter Update - VPNFilter exploits endpoints, targets new devices. Retrieved March 28, 2019.",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/06/vpnfilter-update.html"
},
{
"source_name": "VPNFilter Deep Dive Mar 2019",
"description": "Carl Hurd. (2019, March 26). VPNFilter Deep Dive. Retrieved March 28, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuZazP22rpI"
}
]
},
{
"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
"type": "malware",
"labels": [
"malware"
],
"modified": "2020-05-13T22:59:51.283Z",
"created": "2019-03-25T17:30:17.004Z",
"description": "[WannaCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0366) is ransomware that was first seen in a global attack during May 2017, which affected more than 150 countries. It contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploit EternalBlue.(Citation: LogRhythm WannaCry)(Citation: US-CERT WannaCry 2017)(Citation: Washington Post WannaCry 2017)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)",
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "S0366",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0366"
},
{
"source_name": "WanaCry",
"description": "(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)"
},
{
"source_name": "WanaCrypt",
"description": "(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)"
},
{
"source_name": "WanaCrypt0r",
"description": "(Citation: LogRhythm WannaCry)"
},
{
"source_name": "WCry",
"description": "(Citation: LogRhythm WannaCry)(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)"
},
{
"source_name": "LogRhythm WannaCry",
"description": "Noerenberg, E., Costis, A., and Quist, N. (2017, May 16). A Technical Analysis of WannaCry Ransomware. Retrieved March 25, 2019.",
"url": "https://logrhythm.com/blog/a-technical-analysis-of-wannacry-ransomware/"
},
{
"source_name": "US-CERT WannaCry 2017",
"description": "US-CERT. (2017, May 12). Alert (TA17-132A): Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware. Retrieved March 25, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-132A"
},
{
"source_name": "Washington Post WannaCry 2017",
"description": "Dwoskin, E. and Adam, K. (2017, May 14). More than 150 countries affected by massive cyberattack, Europol says. Retrieved March 25, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/more-than-150-countries-affected-by-massive-cyberattack-europol-says/2017/05/14/5091465e-3899-11e7-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html?utm_term=.7fa16b41cad4"
},
{
"source_name": "FireEye WannaCry 2017",
"description": "Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html"
},
{
"source_name": "SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis",
"description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.",
"url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis"
}
],
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"id": "malware--75ecdbf1-c2bb-4afc-a3f9-c8da4de8c661",
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Jan Miller, CrowdStrike"
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_aliases": [
"WannaCry",
"WanaCry",
"WanaCrypt",
"WanaCrypt0r",
"WCry"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
],
"name": "WannaCry"
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Collection",
"description": "The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.\n\nCollection consists of techniques adversaries use to gather domain knowledge and obtain contextual feedback in an ICS environment. This tactic is often performed as part of [Discovery](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Discovery), to compile data on control systems and targets of interest that may be used to follow through on the adversary’s objective. Examples of these techniques include observing operation states, capturing screenshots, identifying unique device roles, and gathering system and diagram schematics. Collection of this data can play a key role in planning, executing, and even revising an ICS-targeted attack. Methods of collection depend on the categories of data being targeted, which can include protocol specific, device specific, and process specific configurations and functionality. Information collected may pertain to a combination of system, supervisory, device, and network related data, which conceptually fall under high, medium, and low levels of plan operations. For example, information repositories on plant data at a high level or device specific programs at a low level. Sensitive floor plans, vendor device manuals, and other references may also be at risk and exposed on the internet or otherwise publicly accessible.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--b2a67b1e-913c-46f6-b219-048a90560bb9",
"x_mitre_shortname": "collection-ics",
"modified": "2019-07-19T17:44:53.176Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Collection",
"external_id": "TA0100"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Command and Control",
"description": "The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.\n\nCommand and Control consists of techniques that adversaries use to communicate with and send commands to compromised systems, devices, controllers, and platforms with specialized applications used in ICS environments. Examples of these specialized communication devices include human machine interfaces (HMIs), data historians, SCADA servers, and engineering workstations (EWS). Adversaries often seek to use commonly available resources and mimic expected network traffic to avoid detection and suspicion. For instance, commonly used ports and protocols in ICS environments, and even expected IT resources, depending on the target network. Command and Control may be established to varying degrees of stealth, often depending on the victim’s network structure and defenses.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--97c8ff73-bd14-4b6c-ac32-3d91d2c41e3f",
"x_mitre_shortname": "command-and-control-ics",
"modified": "2019-07-19T17:45:30.644Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Command_and_Control",
"external_id": "TA0101"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Discovery",
"description": "The adversary is trying to figure out your ICS environment.\n\nDiscovery consists of techniques that adversaries use to survey your ICS environment and gain knowledge about the internal network, control system devices, and how their processes interact. These techniques help adversaries observe the environment and determine next steps for target selection and [Lateral Movement](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Lateral_Movement). They also allow adversaries to explore what they can control and gain insight on interactions between various control system processes. Discovery techniques are often an act of progression into the environment which enable the adversary to orient themselves before deciding how to act. Adversaries may use Discovery techniques that result in [Collection](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Collection), to help determine how available resources benefit their current objective. A combination of native device communications and functions, and custom tools are often used toward this post-compromise information-gathering objective.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--696af733-728e-49d7-8261-75fdc590f453",
"x_mitre_shortname": "discovery-ics",
"modified": "2019-07-19T17:44:13.228Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Discovery",
"external_id": "TA0102"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Evasion",
"description": "The adversary is trying to avoid being detected.\n\nEvasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection by both human operators and technical defenses throughout their compromise. Techniques used for evasion include removal of indicators of compromise, spoofing communications and reporting, and exploiting software vulnerabilities. Adversaries may also leverage and abuse trusted devices and processes to hide their activity, possibly by masquerading as master devices or native software. Methods of defense and operator evasion for this purpose are often more passive in nature, as opposed to [Inhibit Response Function](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Inhibit_Response_Function) techniques. They may also vary depending on whether the target of evasion is human or technological in nature, such as security controls. Techniques under other tactics are cross-listed to evasion when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting operators and defenses.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--ddf70682-f3ce-479c-a9a4-7eadf9bfead7",
"x_mitre_shortname": "evasion-ics",
"modified": "2019-07-19T17:43:23.473Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Evasion",
"external_id": "TA0103"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Execution",
"description": "The adversary is trying to run malicious code.\n\nExecution consists of techniques that result in adversary-controlled code running on a local or remote system, device, or other asset. This execution may also rely on unknowing end users or the manipulation of device operating modes to run. Adversaries may infect remote targets with programmed executables or malicious project files that operate according to specified behavior and may alter expected device behavior in subtle ways. Commands for execution may also be issued from command-line interfaces, APIs, GUIs, or other available interfaces. Techniques that run malicious code may also be paired with techniques from other tactics, particularly to aid network [Discovery](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Discovery) and [Collection](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Collection), impact operations, and inhibit response functions.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--93bf9a8e-b14c-4587-b6d5-9efc7c12eb45",
"x_mitre_shortname": "execution-ics",
"modified": "2019-07-19T17:42:06.909Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Execution",
"external_id": "TA0104"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Impact",
"description": "The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.\n\nImpact consists of techniques that adversaries use to disrupt, compromise, destroy, and manipulate the integrity and availability of control system operations, processes, devices, and data. These techniques encompass the influence and effects resulting from adversarial efforts to attack the ICS environment or that tangentially impact it. Impact techniques can result in more instantaneous disruption to control processes and the operator, or may result in more long term damage or loss to the ICS environment and related operations. The adversary may leverage [Impair Process Control](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Impair_Process_Control) techniques, which often manifest in more self-revealing impacts on operations, or [Inhibit Response Function](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Inhibit_Response_Function) techniques to hinder safeguards and alarms in order to follow through with and provide cover for Impact. In some scenarios, control system processes can appear to function as expected, but may have been altered to benefit the adversary’s goal over the course of a longer duration. These techniques might be used by adversaries to follow through on their end goal or to provide cover for a confidentiality breach.\n\n[Loss of Productivity and Revenue](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T828), [Theft of Operational Information](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T882), and [Damage to Property](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T879) are meant to encompass some of the more granular goals of adversaries in targeted and untargeted attacks. These techniques in and of themselves are not necessarily detectable, but the associated adversary behavior can potentially be mitigated and/or detected.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2019-03-14T18:44:44.639Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--77542f83-70d0-40c2-8a9d-ad2eb8b00279",
"x_mitre_shortname": "impact-ics",
"modified": "2019-07-25T18:42:23.222Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Impact",
"external_id": "TA0105"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Impair Process Control",
"description": "The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.\n\nImpair Process Control consists of techniques that adversaries use to disrupt control logic and cause determinantal effects to processes being controlled in the target environment. Targets of interest may include active procedures or parameters that manipulate the physical environment. These techniques can also include prevention or manipulation of reporting elements and control logic. If an adversary has modified process functionality, then they may also obfuscate the results, which are often self-revealing in their impact on the outcome of a product or the environment. The direct physical control these techniques exert may also threaten the safety of operators and downstream users, which can prompt response mechanisms. Adversaries may follow up with or use [Inhibit Response Function](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Inhibit_Response_Function) techniques in tandem, to assist with the successful abuse of control processes to result in [Impact](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Impact).",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--ff048b6c-b872-4218-b68c-3735ebd1f024",
"x_mitre_shortname": "impair-process-control",
"modified": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Impair_Process_Control",
"external_id": "TA0106"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Inhibit Response Function",
"description": "The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.\n\nInhibit Response Function consists of techniques that adversaries use to hinder the safeguards put in place for processes and products. This may involve the inhibition of safety, protection, quality assurance, or operator intervention functions to disrupt safeguards that aim to prevent the loss of life, destruction of equipment, and disruption of production. These techniques aim to actively deter and prevent expected alarms and responses that arise due to statuses in the ICS environment. Adversaries may modify or update system logic, or even outright prevent responses with a denial-of-service. They may result in the prevention, destruction, manipulation, or modification of programs, logic, devices, and communications. As prevention functions are generally dormant, reporting and processing functions can appear fine, but may have been altered to prevent failure responses in dangerous scenarios. Unlike [Evasion](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Evasion), Inhibit Response Function techniques may be more intrusive, such as actively preventing responses to a known dangerous scenario. Adversaries may use these techniques to follow through with or provide cover for [Impact](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Impact) techniques.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--298fe907-7931-4fd2-8131-2814dd493134",
"x_mitre_shortname": "inhibit-response-function",
"modified": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Inhibit_Response_Function",
"external_id": "TA0107"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Initial Access",
"description": "The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.\n\nInitial Access consists of techniques that adversaries may use as entry vectors to gain an initial foothold within an ICS environment. These techniques include compromising operational technology assets, IT resources in the OT network, and external remote services and websites. They may also target third party entities and users with privileged access. In particular, these initial access footholds may include devices and communication mechanisms with access to and privileges in both the IT and OT environments. IT resources in the OT environment are also potentially vulnerable to the same attacks as enterprise IT systems. Trusted third parties of concern may include vendors, maintenance personnel, engineers, external integrators, and other outside entities involved in expected ICS operations. Vendor maintained assets may include physical devices, software, and operational equipment. Initial access techniques may also leverage outside devices, such as radios, controllers, or removable media, to remotely interfere with and possibly infect OT operations.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--69da72d2-f550-41c5-ab9e-e8255707f28a",
"x_mitre_shortname": "initial-access-ics",
"modified": "2019-07-19T17:41:41.425Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Initial_Access",
"external_id": "TA0108"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Lateral Movement",
"description": "The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.\n\nLateral Movement consists of techniques that adversaries use to enter and control remote systems on a network. These techniques abuse default credentials, known accounts, and vulnerable services, and may also leverage dual-homed devices and systems that reside on both the IT and OT networks. The adversary uses these techniques to pivot to their next point in the environment, positioning themselves to where they want to be or think they should be. Following through on their primary objective often requires [Discovery](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Discovery) of the network and [Collection](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Collection) to develop awareness of unique ICS devices and processes, in order to find their target and subsequently gain access to it. Reaching this objective often involves pivoting through multiple systems, devices, and accounts. Adversaries may install their own remote tools to accomplish Lateral Movement or leverage default tools, programs, and manufacturer set or other legitimate credentials native to the network, which may be stealthier.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--51c25a9e-8615-40c0-8afd-1da578847924",
"x_mitre_shortname": "lateral-movement-ics",
"modified": "2019-07-19T17:44:36.953Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Lateral_Movement",
"external_id": "TA0109"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-tactic",
"name": "Persistence",
"description": "The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.\n\nPersistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to maintain access to ICS systems and devices across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Techniques used for persistence include any access, action, or configuration changes that allow them to secure their ongoing activity and keep their foothold on systems. This may include replacing or hijacking legitimate code, firmware, and other project files, or adding startup code and downloading programs onto devices.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-tactic--78f1d2ae-a579-44c4-8fc5-3e1775c73fac",
"x_mitre_shortname": "persistence-ics",
"modified": "2019-07-19T17:42:33.899Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Persistence",
"external_id": "TA0110"
}
]
},
{
"type": "x-mitre-matrix",
"name": "ATT&CK for ICS",
"description": "The full ATT&CK for ICS Matrix includes techniques spanning various ICS assets and can be used to navigate through the knowledge base.",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z",
"id": "x-mitre-matrix--575f48f4-8897-4468-897b-48bb364af6c7",
"modified": "2020-06-03T00:14:20.652Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-ics-attack",
"external_id": "MA0010",
"url": "https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Main_Page"
}
],
"tactic_refs": [
"x-mitre-tactic--69da72d2-f550-41c5-ab9e-e8255707f28a",
"x-mitre-tactic--93bf9a8e-b14c-4587-b6d5-9efc7c12eb45",
"x-mitre-tactic--78f1d2ae-a579-44c4-8fc5-3e1775c73fac",
"x-mitre-tactic--ddf70682-f3ce-479c-a9a4-7eadf9bfead7",
"x-mitre-tactic--696af733-728e-49d7-8261-75fdc590f453",
"x-mitre-tactic--51c25a9e-8615-40c0-8afd-1da578847924",
"x-mitre-tactic--b2a67b1e-913c-46f6-b219-048a90560bb9",
"x-mitre-tactic--97c8ff73-bd14-4b6c-ac32-3d91d2c41e3f",
"x-mitre-tactic--298fe907-7931-4fd2-8131-2814dd493134",
"x-mitre-tactic--ff048b6c-b872-4218-b68c-3735ebd1f024",
"x-mitre-tactic--77542f83-70d0-40c2-8a9d-ad2eb8b00279"
]
},
{
"id": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"name": "The MITRE Corporation",
"identity_class": "organization",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"type": "identity",
"modified": "2017-06-01T00:00:00.000Z",
"created": "2017-06-01T00:00:00.000Z"
},
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