Struct AuditEntry 

pub struct AuditEntry {

    pub timestamp: String,
    pub tool: String,
    pub command: String,
    pub result: AuditResult,
    pub duration_ms: u64,
    pub error_category: Option<String>,
    pub error_domain: Option<String>,
    pub error_phase: Option<String>,
    pub claim_source: Option<ClaimSource>,
    pub mcp_server_id: Option<String>,
    pub injection_flagged: bool,
    pub embedding_anomalous: bool,
    pub cross_boundary_mcp_to_acp: bool,
    pub adversarial_policy_decision: Option<String>,
}

Fields

timestamp: String

tool: String

command: String

result: AuditResult

duration_ms: u64

error_category: Option<String>

Fine-grained error category label from the taxonomy. None for successful executions.

error_domain: Option<String>

High-level error domain for recovery dispatch. None for successful executions.

error_phase: Option<String>

Invocation phase in which the error occurred per arXiv:2601.16280 taxonomy. None for successful executions.

claim_source: Option<ClaimSource>

Provenance of the tool result. None for non-executor audit entries (e.g. policy checks).

mcp_server_id: Option<String>

MCP server ID for tool calls routed through McpToolExecutor. None for native tools.

injection_flagged: bool

Tool output was flagged by regex injection detection.

embedding_anomalous: bool

Tool output was flagged as anomalous by the embedding guard. Raw cosine distance is NOT stored (prevents threshold reverse-engineering).

cross_boundary_mcp_to_acp: bool

Tool result crossed the MCP-to-ACP trust boundary (MCP tool result served to an ACP client).

adversarial_policy_decision: Option<String>

Decision recorded by the adversarial policy agent before execution.

Values: "allow", "deny:<reason>", "error:<message>". None when adversarial policy is disabled or not applicable.

Trait Implementations

impl Serialize for AuditEntry

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.