Struct A2aClientConfig 

pub struct A2aClientConfig {
    pub require_tls: bool,
    pub ssrf_protection: bool,
    pub card_trust_policy: CardTrustPolicy,
    pub trusted_agent_keys: Vec<TrustedAgentKey>,
}

Client-side security policy for outbound A2A connections made by zeph --connect <URL> (the remote-TUI-over-A2A-SSE attach feature), nested under [a2a_client] in TOML.

Deliberately separate from A2aServerConfig’s [a2a] section: the two configure different roles (this process attaching to a remote daemon vs. this process’s own A2A server accepting inbound connections) and must not share one config subtree — a default/fresh config previously made every --connect http://... attempt fail with “TLS required”, even against 127.0.0.1 loopback, because [a2a]’s server-oriented require_tls = true default was being reused for the client path (#5878).

Loopback targets (127.0.0.1, ::1, localhost — see is_loopback_host) are always permitted over plain HTTP with SSRF protection skipped, regardless of these settings: connecting to your own local daemon is definitionally not an SSRF risk, and the CLI’s documented --connect http://127.0.0.1:8080/a2a/stream usage example must work out of the box. Non-loopback targets are governed by require_tls/ssrf_protection below, which default to the same hardened posture as the server config.

Fields

require_tls: bool

Reject non-loopback endpoints that do not start with https://. Default: true.

ssrf_protection: bool

Resolve non-loopback endpoint hostnames via DNS and reject private/link-local ranges. Default: true.

card_trust_policy: CardTrustPolicy

Trust policy applied to peer AgentCard signatures and URL-origin consistency during discovery (A2A 1.0.0 §8.4, #5928). Default: ignore — byte-identical to pre-#5928 discovery behavior. See CardTrustPolicy doc comments for the prefer/require semantics, and Config::validate for the require-without-the- card-signing-feature fail-fast check.

trusted_agent_keys: Vec<TrustedAgentKey>

Public keys trusted to sign peer AgentCards, keyed by kid. Empty by default — prefer/require with no entries treats every peer as unverifiable (see SignatureVerification::Unverifiable in zeph-a2a).

These are public verification keys, not secrets, so (unlike A2aServerConfig::ibct_signing_key_vault_ref) they are stored inline rather than via a vault reference.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for A2aClientConfig

fn clone(&self) -> A2aClientConfig

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for A2aClientConfig

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), Error>

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Default for A2aClientConfig

fn default() -> A2aClientConfig

Returns the “default value” for a type.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for A2aClientConfig

where A2aClientConfig: Default,

fn deserialize<__D>( __deserializer: __D, ) -> Result<A2aClientConfig, <__D as Deserializer<'de>>::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Eq for A2aClientConfig

impl PartialEq for A2aClientConfig

fn eq(&self, other: &A2aClientConfig) -> bool

Equality operator ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Inequality operator !=.

impl Serialize for A2aClientConfig

fn serialize<__S>( &self, __serializer: __S, ) -> Result<<__S as Serializer>::Ok, <__S as Serializer>::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.

impl StructuralPartialEq for A2aClientConfig