Struct PrivateKeyDecryptor 

pub struct PrivateKeyDecryptor { /* private fields */ }

Resolver backed by an RSA private key for OAEP-wrapped session keys.

Implementations

impl PrivateKeyDecryptor

pub fn new(key: RsaPrivateKey) -> Self

Create a resolver from an already-parsed RSA private key.

pub fn provider_key(key: Arc<dyn KeyRecoveryKey>) -> Self

Create a resolver from an opaque provider-owned recovery key.

impl PrivateKeyDecryptor

pub fn resolve_key_with_policy( &self, provider: &dyn CryptoProvider, algorithm: DataEncryptionAlgorithm, encrypted_key: Option<&EncryptedKey>, policy: &DecryptionPolicy, ) -> Result<RecoveredContentKey, XmlEncError>

Recover one session key using the exact operation policy. This avoids a temporary candidate collection when composing ordered RSA key rings.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for PrivateKeyDecryptor

fn clone(&self) -> Self

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl DecryptionKeyResolver for PrivateKeyDecryptor

fn resolve_key_encryption_keys_with_policy( &self, provider: &dyn CryptoProvider, algorithm: KeyWrapAlgorithm, source: KeyEncryptionKeySource<'_>, policy: &DecryptionPolicy, budget: &mut KeyCandidateBudget, ) -> Result<Vec<RecoveredContentKey>, XmlEncError>

Resolve an actual KEK purpose; default refusal prevents incorrectly adapting a content algorithm merely because its key width happens to fit.

fn resolve_content_keys_with_policy( &self, provider: &dyn CryptoProvider, algorithm: DataEncryptionAlgorithm, encrypted_key: Option<&EncryptedKey>, policy: &DecryptionPolicy, budget: &mut KeyCandidateBudget, ) -> Result<Vec<RecoveredContentKey>, XmlEncError>

Resolve operation candidates without dropping implicit-rejection state. Wrappers around recipient resolvers must forward this method; converting recovered candidates to raw bytes loses the final content acceptance gate.

fn resolve_key_candidates_with_policy( &self, provider: &dyn CryptoProvider, algorithm: DataEncryptionAlgorithm, encrypted_key: Option<&EncryptedKey>, policy: &DecryptionPolicy, budget: &mut KeyCandidateBudget, ) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, XmlEncError>

Resolve under the operation’s immutable snapshot. RSA resolvers enforce rsa_keys before provider recovery; wrappers must forward this snapshot.

fn resolve_key( &self, provider: &dyn CryptoProvider, algorithm: DataEncryptionAlgorithm, encrypted_key: Option<&EncryptedKey>, ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, XmlEncError>

Resolve the symmetric key for algorithm, optionally unwrapping encrypted_key.

fn resolve_encapsulation_content_keys_with_policy( &self, _provider: &dyn CryptoProvider, _algorithm: DataEncryptionAlgorithm, _descriptor: &EncapsulationMechanism, _policy: &DecryptionPolicy, _budget: &mut KeyCandidateBudget, ) -> Result<Vec<RecoveredContentKey>, XmlEncError>

Resolve an experimental KEM source under the operation snapshot. Raw content-key resolvers refuse by default rather than bypassing the KEM.

fn resolve_agreement_content_keys_with_policy( &self, _provider: &dyn CryptoProvider, _algorithm: DataEncryptionAlgorithm, _descriptor: &AgreementMethod, _policy: &DecryptionPolicy, _budget: &mut KeyCandidateBudget, ) -> Result<Vec<RecoveredContentKey>, XmlEncError>

Resolve an agreement under the operation snapshot and shared allowance. Default refusal prevents a raw content key from bypassing AgreementMethod.

fn resolve_derived_content_keys_with_policy( &self, _provider: &dyn CryptoProvider, _algorithm: DataEncryptionAlgorithm, _descriptor: &DerivedKey, _policy: &DecryptionPolicy, _budget: &mut KeyCandidateBudget, ) -> Result<Vec<RecoveredContentKey>, XmlEncError>

Resolve a transported derivation descriptor using the same immutable operation policy and cumulative candidate/KDF allowance. The default refuses it; a raw content-key resolver must not bypass derivation.

fn resolve_key_candidates( &self, provider: &dyn CryptoProvider, algorithm: DataEncryptionAlgorithm, encrypted_key: Option<&EncryptedKey>, budget: &mut KeyCandidateBudget, ) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, XmlEncError>

Resolve ordered candidate keys for one prepared decryption operation.