Struct HmacVerificationKey 

pub struct HmacVerificationKey { /* private fields */ }

Caller-owned HMAC verification key.

Policy-free VerifyingKey calls enforce crate::policy::HmacPolicy::default. super::VerifyContext supplies its immutable operation policy through the policy-aware hooks, so legacy truncation always requires an explicit opt-in. Owned secret bytes are zeroized when the key is dropped.

Implementations

impl HmacVerificationKey

pub fn new(secret: impl Into<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, KeyResolutionError>

Construct a key from non-empty secret bytes.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for HmacVerificationKey

fn clone(&self) -> Self

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for HmacVerificationKey

fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl VerifyingKey for HmacVerificationKey

fn validate_policy(&self, policy: &VerificationPolicy) -> Result<(), DsigError>

Validate this key against the operation’s immutable trust policy.

fn validate_signature_value( &self, algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm, signature_value: &[u8], ) -> Result<bool, DsigError>

Check that signature_value has the wire framing required by the declared algorithm and this key before provider dispatch.

fn validate_signature_value_with_policy( &self, policy: &VerificationPolicy, algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm, signature_value: &[u8], ) -> Result<bool, DsigError>

Validate wire framing under the operation’s immutable compatibility policy.

fn verify( &self, algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm, signed_data: &[u8], signature_value: &[u8], ) -> Result<bool, DsigError>

Verify signature_value over signed_data with the declared algorithm.

fn verify_with_policy( &self, policy: &VerificationPolicy, algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm, signed_data: &[u8], signature_value: &[u8], ) -> Result<bool, DsigError>

Verify after applying operation-scoped compatibility semantics.

fn association_spki(&self, _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm) -> Option<&[u8]>

Borrow public SPKI describing this exact key after successful verification. This is evidence only, never authorization for native verification or private-key export. Composite handles expose their leaves instead. This hook only borrows cached public metadata; it must not allocate, parse, perform I/O or manufacture a different key after the decision.

fn provider_binding(&self) -> Option<&ProviderBinding>

Exact external execution domain; a key cannot be moved between token sessions.

fn verify_candidate_keys( &self, _verify: &mut dyn FnMut(&dyn VerifyingKey) -> Result<bool, DsigError>, ) -> Result<Option<bool>, DsigError>

Composite resolvers may try individual keys through the selected engine. None identifies a leaf handle. Wrappers must preserve per-key policy when forwarding the visitor; no public/private key copy is required.

fn verification_spki( &self, _algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm, ) -> Result<Option<&[u8]>, DsigError>

Borrow public SPKI for native verification, validating method/key binding. Opaque external keys may return None; native providers then fail closed.

fn ecdsa_encoding(&self) -> EcdsaSignatureValueEncoding

Wire encoding already selected by the immutable verification policy.

fn verify_with_context( &self, algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm, context: &SignatureContext, data: &[u8], signature: &[u8], ) -> Result<bool, DsigError>

Verify with validated domain separation, rejecting unsupported contexts.