Struct AuditEnvelope 

pub struct AuditEnvelope {
    pub event_id: Uuid,
    pub event_version: u32,
    pub schema_version: u32,
    pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
    pub audit_key_id: KeyId,
    pub actor_did_hash: [u8; 32],
    pub actor_did_plain: Option<String>,
    pub target_did_hash: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    pub target_did_plain: Option<String>,
    pub prev_hash: [u8; 32],
    pub entry_hash: [u8; 32],
    pub event: AuditEvent,
}

A persisted audit-log entry.

Fields

event_id: Uuid

Stable identifier for this specific event. Becomes the secondary-key component for cursor-based queries.

event_version: u32

Variant-specific schema version. Bumped on a breaking change to a particular variant’s payload; the envelope’s SCHEMA_VERSION tracks the wrapper-shape version independently.

schema_version: u32

Envelope-shape version. See SCHEMA_VERSION for the semantics.

timestamp: DateTime<Utc>

Wall-clock at write time. Drives the primary <timestamp>:<event_id> audit-keyspace ordering.

audit_key_id: KeyId

Identifier of the audit_key used to compute the hashes below. Verifiers walk the key history newest-first; this lets them skip the search when they already know the right key.

actor_did_hash: [u8; 32]

HMAC-SHA256 of the actor DID under Self::audit_key_id. Always present so RTBF can null the plaintext without losing the correlation handle.

actor_did_plain: Option<String>

Plaintext actor DID. None after an RTBF override has redacted this row.

target_did_hash: Option<[u8; 32]>

HMAC-SHA256 of the target DID, if the event has one. None for events whose target is the community itself (e.g. CommunityProfileUpdated).

target_did_plain: Option<String>

Plaintext target DID. Same null-on-RTBF semantics as Self::actor_did_plain.

prev_hash: [u8; 32]

Tamper-evidence chain: the Self::entry_hash of the immediately-preceding envelope, or GENESIS_HASH for the first one. Linking each entry to its predecessor makes a reorder/drop/duplicate of any envelope detectable by verify_chain. default keeps pre-v2 rows deserializable.

entry_hash: [u8; 32]

Tamper-evidence chain: SHA-256 commitment to this envelope’s immutable content (see Self::chain_digest). Stamped at write time; the next envelope’s Self::prev_hash points here. default keeps pre-v2 rows deserializable (they come back as GENESIS_HASH, i.e. unchained).

event: AuditEvent

The tagged event payload.

Implementations

impl AuditEnvelope

pub fn chain_digest(&self) -> [u8; 32]

SHA-256 commitment over this envelope’s immutable content, used to stamp Self::entry_hash at write time and to re-derive it during verify_chain.

Deliberately covers prev_hash (so the link is part of the commitment) but excludes:

• entry_hash itself (it is this digest — self-reference),
• actor_did_plain / target_did_plain, which RTBF nulls after the fact. The HMAC hashes are covered, so attribution stays chained while a redaction of the plaintext does not break the chain.

The event payload is hashed via its serde_json encoding, which is canonical in this workspace (maps serialize sorted, and the store round-trips through the same encoder).

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for AuditEnvelope

fn clone(&self) -> AuditEnvelope

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for AuditEnvelope

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for AuditEnvelope

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Eq for AuditEnvelope

impl PartialEq for AuditEnvelope

fn eq(&self, other: &AuditEnvelope) -> bool

Equality operator ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Inequality operator !=.

impl Serialize for AuditEnvelope

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.

impl StructuralPartialEq for AuditEnvelope