Struct AllowedHosts 

pub struct AllowedHosts { /* private fields */ }

Reject requests whose Host header is not one of your names

Absolute links, password-reset mails and redirects built from the Host header are an injection point when anybody can choose it (“host header poisoning”). AllowedHosts answers 421 Misdirected Request for any other name, before your handlers see it. Entries are host names without port; *.example.com matches subdomains (not example.com itself); the port in the header is ignored. IP-address probes of an orchestrator need except_paths.

use ullun::secure::AllowedHosts;

let hosts = AllowedHosts::new(["example.com", "*.example.com"]).except_paths(["/livez", "/readyz"]);

Implementations

impl AllowedHosts

pub fn new<I, S>(hosts: I) -> Self

where I: IntoIterator<Item = S>, S: Into<String>,

pub fn except_paths<I, S>(self, paths: I) -> Self

where I: IntoIterator<Item = S>, S: Into<String>,

Paths that are served whatever the Host is (health probes addressed by pod IP)

Trait Implementations

impl Middleware for AllowedHosts

fn handle<'life0, 'async_trait>( &'life0 self, req: Request, next: Next, ) -> Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = Result<Response>> + Send + 'async_trait>>

where Self: 'async_trait, 'life0: 'async_trait,