Skip to main content

FindingCategory

Enum FindingCategory 

Source
pub enum FindingCategory {
Show 37 variants AuthorityPropagation, OverPrivilegedIdentity, UnpinnedAction, UntrustedWithAuthority, ArtifactBoundaryCrossing, FloatingImage, LongLivedCredential, PersistedCredential, TriggerContextMismatch, CrossWorkflowAuthorityChain, AuthorityCycle, UpliftWithoutAttestation, SelfMutatingPipeline, CheckoutSelfPrExposure, VariableGroupInPrJob, SelfHostedPoolPrHijack, ServiceConnectionScopeMismatch, TemplateExtendsUnpinnedBranch, TemplateRepoRefIsFeatureBranch, VmRemoteExecViaPipelineSecret, ShortLivedSasInCommandLine, SecretToInlineScriptEnvExport, SecretMaterialisedToWorkspaceFile, KeyVaultSecretToPlaintext, TerraformAutoApproveInProd, AddSpnWithInlineScript, ParameterInterpolationIntoShell, RuntimeScriptFetchedFromFloatingUrl, PrTriggerWithFloatingActionRef, UntrustedApiResponseToEnvSink, PrBuildPushesImageWithFloatingCredentials, SecretViaEnvGateToUntrustedConsumer, NoWorkflowLevelPermissionsBlock, ProdDeployJobNoEnvironmentGate, LongLivedSecretWithoutOidcRecommendation, PullRequestWorkflowInconsistentForkCheck, GitlabDeployJobMissingProtectedBranchOnly, // some variants omitted
}
Expand description

MVP categories (1-5) are derivable from pipeline YAML alone. Stretch categories (6-9) need heuristics or metadata enrichment.

Variants§

§

AuthorityPropagation

§

OverPrivilegedIdentity

§

UnpinnedAction

§

UntrustedWithAuthority

§

ArtifactBoundaryCrossing

§

FloatingImage

§

LongLivedCredential

§

PersistedCredential

Credential written to disk by a step (e.g. persistCredentials: true on a checkout). Disk-persisted credentials are accessible to all subsequent steps and any process with filesystem access, unlike runtime-only HasAccessTo authority.

§

TriggerContextMismatch

Dangerous trigger type (pull_request_target / pr) combined with secret/identity access.

§

CrossWorkflowAuthorityChain

Authority (secret/identity) flows into an opaque external workflow via DelegatesTo.

§

AuthorityCycle

Circular DelegatesTo chain — workflow calls itself transitively.

§

UpliftWithoutAttestation

Privileged workflow (OIDC/broad identity) with no provenance attestation step.

§

SelfMutatingPipeline

Step writes to the environment gate ($GITHUB_ENV, pipeline variables) — authority can propagate.

§

CheckoutSelfPrExposure

PR-triggered pipeline checks out the repository — attacker-controlled fork code lands on the runner.

§

VariableGroupInPrJob

ADO variable group consumed by a PR-triggered job, crossing trust boundary.

§

SelfHostedPoolPrHijack

Self-hosted agent pool used in a PR-triggered job that also checks out the repository.

§

ServiceConnectionScopeMismatch

Broad-scope ADO service connection reachable from a PR-triggered job without OIDC.

§

TemplateExtendsUnpinnedBranch

ADO resources.repositories[] entry referenced by an extends:, template: x@alias, or checkout: alias consumer resolves with no ref: (default branch) or a mutable branch ref (refs/heads/<name>). Whoever owns that branch can inject steps into the consuming pipeline.

§

TemplateRepoRefIsFeatureBranch

ADO resources.repositories[] entry pinned to a feature-class branch (anything outside the main / master / release/* / hotfix/* platform set). Feature branches typically have weaker push protection than the trunk, so any developer with write access to that branch can inject pipeline YAML that runs with the consumer’s authority. Strictly stronger signal than template_extends_unpinned_branch — co-fires.

§

VmRemoteExecViaPipelineSecret

Pipeline step uses an Azure VM remote-exec primitive (Set-AzVMExtension / CustomScriptExtension, Invoke-AzVMRunCommand, az vm run-command, az vm extension set) where the executed command line interpolates a pipeline secret or a SAS token — pipeline-to-VM lateral movement primitive logged in plaintext to the VM and ARM.

§

ShortLivedSasInCommandLine

A SAS token freshly minted in-pipeline is interpolated into a CLI argument (commandToExecute / scriptArguments / –arguments / -ArgumentList) instead of passed via env var or stdin — argv ends up in /proc/*/cmdline, ETW, ARM status.

§

SecretToInlineScriptEnvExport

Pipeline secret value assigned to a shell variable inside an inline script (export VAR=$(SECRET), $X = "$(SECRET)"). Once the value transits a shell variable, ADO’s $(SECRET) log mask no longer applies — transcripts (Start-Transcript, bash -x, terraform debug logs) print the cleartext.

§

SecretMaterialisedToWorkspaceFile

Pipeline secret value written to a file under the agent workspace ($(System.DefaultWorkingDirectory), $(Build.SourcesDirectory), or relative paths) without secureFile task or chmod 600. The file persists in the agent workspace and is uploaded by PublishPipelineArtifact and crawlable by later steps.

§

KeyVaultSecretToPlaintext

PowerShell pulls a Key Vault secret with -AsPlainText (or ConvertFrom-SecureString -AsPlainText, or older .SecretValueText syntax) into a non-SecureString variable. The value never traverses the ADO variable-group boundary, so verbose Az/PS logging and error stack traces print the credential.

Rule id is keyvault_secret_to_plaintext (single token “keyvault”) rather than the snake_case derivation key_vault_… — matches the docs filename and the convention used in the corpus evidence.

§

TerraformAutoApproveInProd

terraform apply -auto-approve against a production-named service connection without an environment approval gate.

§

AddSpnWithInlineScript

AzureCLI@2 task with addSpnToEnvironment: true AND an inline script — the script can launder federated SPN/OIDC tokens into pipeline variables.

§

ParameterInterpolationIntoShell

A type: string pipeline parameter (no values: allowlist) is interpolated via ${{ parameters.X }} into an inline shell/PowerShell script body — shell injection vector for anyone with “queue build”.

§

RuntimeScriptFetchedFromFloatingUrl

A run: block fetches a remote script from a mutable URL (refs/heads/, /main/, /master/) and pipes it directly to a shell interpreter (curl … | bash, wget … | sh, bash <(curl …), deno run https://…). Whoever controls that URL’s content controls execution on the runner.

§

PrTriggerWithFloatingActionRef

Workflow trigger combines high-authority PR events (pull_request_target, issue_comment, or workflow_run) with a step whose uses: ref is a mutable branch/tag (not a 40-char SHA). Compromise of the action’s default branch yields full repo write on the target repo.

§

UntrustedApiResponseToEnvSink

A workflow_run-triggered workflow captures a value from an external API response (gh pr view, gh api, curl api.github.com) and writes it into $GITHUB_ENV/$GITHUB_OUTPUT/$GITHUB_PATH without sanitisation. A poisoned API field (branch name, title) injects environment variables into every subsequent step in the same job.

§

PrBuildPushesImageWithFloatingCredentials

A pull_request-triggered workflow logs into a container registry via a floating (non-SHA-pinned) login action. The compromised action receives OIDC tokens or registry credentials, and the workflow then pushes a PR-controlled image to a shared registry.

§

SecretViaEnvGateToUntrustedConsumer

First-party step writes a Secret/Identity-derived value into the $GITHUB_ENV gate (or pipeline-variable equivalent) and a later step in the same job that runs in Untrusted or ThirdParty trust zone reads from the runner-managed env (${{ env.X }}). The two component rules — self_mutating_pipeline (writer) and untrusted_with_authority (consumer) — each see only half the chain and emit no finding for the laundered consumer; this rule closes the composition gap that R2 attack #3 exploited.

§

NoWorkflowLevelPermissionsBlock

Positive-invariant rule (GHA): the workflow declares neither a top-level nor a per-job permissions: block, leaving GITHUB_TOKEN at its broad platform default. Fires once per workflow file.

§

ProdDeployJobNoEnvironmentGate

Positive-invariant rule (ADO): a job referencing a production-named service connection has no environment: binding, so it bypasses the only ADO-side approval gate regardless of whether -auto-approve is present. Strictly broader than terraform_auto_approve_in_prod.

§

LongLivedSecretWithoutOidcRecommendation

Positive-invariant rule (cross-platform): a long-lived static credential is in scope but the workflow does not currently use any OIDC identity even though the target cloud supports federation. Advisory uplift on top of long_lived_credential that wires the existing Recommendation::FederateIdentity variant.

§

PullRequestWorkflowInconsistentForkCheck

Positive-invariant rule (GHA): a PR-triggered workflow has multiple privileged jobs where SOME have the standard fork-check if: and OTHERS do not. Detects an intra-file inconsistency in defensive posture — the org has the right instinct but applied it unevenly.

§

GitlabDeployJobMissingProtectedBranchOnly

Positive-invariant rule (GitLab): a job with a production-named environment: binding has no rules: / only: clause restricting it to protected branches. Deploy job runs (or attempts to run) on every pipeline trigger.

Trait Implementations§

Source§

impl Clone for FindingCategory

Source§

fn clone(&self) -> FindingCategory

Returns a duplicate of the value. Read more
1.0.0 · Source§

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source. Read more
Source§

impl Debug for FindingCategory

Source§

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter. Read more
Source§

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for FindingCategory

Source§

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>
where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer. Read more
Source§

impl Hash for FindingCategory

Source§

fn hash<__H: Hasher>(&self, state: &mut __H)

Feeds this value into the given Hasher. Read more
1.3.0 · Source§

fn hash_slice<H>(data: &[Self], state: &mut H)
where H: Hasher, Self: Sized,

Feeds a slice of this type into the given Hasher. Read more
Source§

impl PartialEq for FindingCategory

Source§

fn eq(&self, other: &FindingCategory) -> bool

Tests for self and other values to be equal, and is used by ==.
1.0.0 · Source§

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Tests for !=. The default implementation is almost always sufficient, and should not be overridden without very good reason.
Source§

impl Serialize for FindingCategory

Source§

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>
where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer. Read more
Source§

impl Copy for FindingCategory

Source§

impl Eq for FindingCategory

Source§

impl StructuralPartialEq for FindingCategory

Auto Trait Implementations§

Blanket Implementations§

Source§

impl<T> Any for T
where T: 'static + ?Sized,

Source§

fn type_id(&self) -> TypeId

Gets the TypeId of self. Read more
Source§

impl<T> Borrow<T> for T
where T: ?Sized,

Source§

fn borrow(&self) -> &T

Immutably borrows from an owned value. Read more
Source§

impl<T> BorrowMut<T> for T
where T: ?Sized,

Source§

fn borrow_mut(&mut self) -> &mut T

Mutably borrows from an owned value. Read more
Source§

impl<T> CloneToUninit for T
where T: Clone,

Source§

unsafe fn clone_to_uninit(&self, dest: *mut u8)

🔬This is a nightly-only experimental API. (clone_to_uninit)
Performs copy-assignment from self to dest. Read more
Source§

impl<Q, K> Equivalent<K> for Q
where Q: Eq + ?Sized, K: Borrow<Q> + ?Sized,

Source§

fn equivalent(&self, key: &K) -> bool

Checks if this value is equivalent to the given key. Read more
Source§

impl<Q, K> Equivalent<K> for Q
where Q: Eq + ?Sized, K: Borrow<Q> + ?Sized,

Source§

fn equivalent(&self, key: &K) -> bool

Compare self to key and return true if they are equal.
Source§

impl<T> From<T> for T

Source§

fn from(t: T) -> T

Returns the argument unchanged.

Source§

impl<T, U> Into<U> for T
where U: From<T>,

Source§

fn into(self) -> U

Calls U::from(self).

That is, this conversion is whatever the implementation of From<T> for U chooses to do.

Source§

impl<T> Same for T

Source§

type Output = T

Should always be Self
Source§

impl<T> ToOwned for T
where T: Clone,

Source§

type Owned = T

The resulting type after obtaining ownership.
Source§

fn to_owned(&self) -> T

Creates owned data from borrowed data, usually by cloning. Read more
Source§

fn clone_into(&self, target: &mut T)

Uses borrowed data to replace owned data, usually by cloning. Read more
Source§

impl<T, U> TryFrom<U> for T
where U: Into<T>,

Source§

type Error = Infallible

The type returned in the event of a conversion error.
Source§

fn try_from(value: U) -> Result<T, <T as TryFrom<U>>::Error>

Performs the conversion.
Source§

impl<T, U> TryInto<U> for T
where U: TryFrom<T>,

Source§

type Error = <U as TryFrom<T>>::Error

The type returned in the event of a conversion error.
Source§

fn try_into(self) -> Result<U, <U as TryFrom<T>>::Error>

Performs the conversion.
Source§

impl<T> DeserializeOwned for T
where T: for<'de> Deserialize<'de>,