Struct NetworkPolicy 

pub struct NetworkPolicy { /* private fields */ }

Outbound-address policy. The default (enforce == false) permits every address — the interpreter library and submilli run stay unrestricted. The submilli-server binary opts into NetworkPolicy::deny_private.

Implementations

impl NetworkPolicy

pub fn with_denial_observer( self, observer: Arc<dyn Fn(&str) + Send + Sync>, ) -> Self

Observe refused destinations without changing the network policy.

pub fn allow_all() -> Self

Permit every address. The library/CLI default.

pub fn client_builder(self: &Arc<Self>) -> ClientBuilder

A reqwest client builder whose DNS resolution is filtered by this policy: a name resolving only to forbidden addresses fails to resolve. Every outbound client the runtime builds — submilli:http, model providers, MCP servers — starts from this, so one policy governs them all. Literal IP hosts never reach a resolver; refuse those with Self::check_literal_host before sending.

pub fn check_literal_host(&self, url: &str) -> Result<(), String>

Refuse a URL whose host is a literal IP the policy forbids. Host names pass here and are judged at resolution.

pub fn deny_private() -> Self

Block private, loopback, link-local and other special-purpose IP space. The secure base the server layers opt-outs onto.

pub fn allow_localhost(self, yes: bool) -> Self

Allow IPv4 + IPv6 loopback (127.0.0.0/8, ::1).

pub fn allow_private(self, yes: bool) -> Self

Allow all RFC1918 / CGNAT / IPv6-ULA private ranges.

pub fn allow_cidr(self, net: IpNet) -> Self

Allow a specific address or CIDR range, overriding every block.

pub fn permits(&self, ip: IpAddr) -> bool

Whether a request may connect to ip.

impl NetworkPolicy

pub async fn resolve_permitted( &self, host: &str, ) -> Result<Vec<SocketAddr>, ResolveFailure>

Resolve host and keep the addresses the policy permits. The resolver installed on every outbound client runs this; a caller whose transport hides the resolver’s error (rmcp wraps it as text) runs it first via Self::check_url so the refusal is reported in its own words.

pub async fn check_url(&self, url: &str) -> Result<(), String>

Refuse a URL the policy forbids, whether its host is a literal IP or a name that resolves only to forbidden addresses. A name that fails to resolve at all passes: that failure belongs to the connection attempt, which reports it in its own terms. Skips DNS entirely when the policy permits everything.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for NetworkPolicy

fn clone(&self) -> Self

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for NetworkPolicy

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Default for NetworkPolicy

fn default() -> Self

Returns the “default value” for a type.