Struct OcspTarget 

pub struct OcspTarget<'view, 'certificate, 'document> { /* private fields */ }

Actual target and issuing-key association. This does not bless the status, nonce, update window or configured responder policy. Delegation still needs original-root path constraints and any unresolved responder revocation.

Implementations

impl<'view, 'certificate, 'document> OcspTarget<'view, 'certificate, 'document>

pub fn bind_responder_path<'receipt, W: Work>( &'receipt self, path: &'receipt CheckedPath<'document>, utc: &LeapTable<'_>, execution: &W, ) -> Result<ResponderBinding<'receipt, 'view, 'certificate, 'document>, ResponderError>

Bind an actual delegated response to a full path under the target’s root. The shared RFC6960 §4.2.2.2 delegation check establishes the direct issuing-key relation and OCSP purpose; it does not resume the original root’s ancestor constraints. This separate binding requires those full path facts, the original signer/effective key and complete evaluation reading. It reuses the CRL association kernel without signature replay. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960#section-4.2.2.2

impl<'view, 'certificate, 'document> OcspTarget<'view, 'certificate, 'document>

pub fn path(&self) -> &'view CheckedPath<'document>

Same actual common-validator path, without a substituted issuer key.

pub fn member(&self) -> usize

Exact original target’s issuer-to-subject path ordinal.

pub fn evidence( &self, ) -> &'view BoundEvidence<'certificate, 'document, 'certificate, 'document>

Same original target/request/status source and temporal facts.

pub fn authority(&self) -> AuthoritySource

Original authorization branch. Configured trust remains explicit and does not fabricate an issuer-signature/delegation-key proof.