pub struct Verified<N, D, G, I> { /* private fields */ }Expand description
Successfully checked token covering the input its format layer selected.
Only the holder of issuer I constructs it, from its own complete token
check over that input (see crate on issuers); this is not a TSA trust
decision or a level.
Implementations§
Source§impl<N, D, G, I> Verified<N, D, G, I>
impl<N, D, G, I> Verified<N, D, G, I>
Sourcepub fn new(
_issuer: I,
token: Location<N, D, G>,
signature: N,
property: N,
purpose: Purpose,
evidence: Evidence,
) -> Self
pub fn new( _issuer: I, token: Location<N, D, G>, signature: N, property: N, purpose: Purpose, evidence: Evidence, ) -> Self
Retains a complete token check with the original identity of its input.
token is the original token enclosure, signature the signature whose
input was covered, property the timestamp property or attribute and
purpose the kind of input selected for the check. Requiring the
issuer value keeps a caller of the format from relabeling evidence.
Source§impl<N: Copy, D: Copy, G: Copy, I> Verified<N, D, G, I>
impl<N: Copy, D: Copy, G: Copy, I> Verified<N, D, G, I>
Sourcepub fn token(&self) -> Location<N, D, G>
pub fn token(&self) -> Location<N, D, G>
Original token enclosure, not an offset in its decoded ASN.1 source.
Sourcepub fn property(&self) -> N
pub fn property(&self) -> N
Original timestamp property, independently of its encapsulated token.
Sourcepub fn evidence(&self) -> &Evidence
pub fn evidence(&self) -> &Evidence
Independently retained token facts and original ASN.1 source projection.
Sourcepub fn into_evidence(self) -> Evidence
pub fn into_evidence(self) -> Evidence
Moves retained evidence without a second allocation or deep copy.
Sourcepub fn interval<W: Work>(
&self,
utc: &LeapTable<'_>,
execution: &W,
) -> Result<Interval, TemporalError>
pub fn interval<W: Work>( &self, utc: &LeapTable<'_>, execution: &W, ) -> Result<Interval, TemporalError>
Derives the complete authority generation interval using the existing RFC3161/UTC arithmetic, funded by the current operation. Missing accuracy remains uncertainty, never an implicitly exact time. Caller policy is responsible for authenticating the supplied leap table.
EN319132-1 §6.3(o) requires the signature timestamp to precede signer revocation/expiry; its bare genTime is insufficient when accuracy is stated. This helper supplies endpoints, not path/status acceptance. https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/319100_319199/31913201/01.03.01_60/en_31913201v010301p.pdf
Sourcepub fn relation<W: Work>(
&self,
boundary: Instant,
utc: &LeapTable<'_>,
execution: &W,
) -> Result<BoundaryRelation, TemporalError>
pub fn relation<W: Work>( &self, boundary: Instant, utc: &LeapTable<'_>, execution: &W, ) -> Result<BoundaryRelation, TemporalError>
Compares the complete generation interval to an explicit event label.
This never substitutes the bare genTime or a claimed signing time for the interval, nor decides certificate/status/trust policy. Missing accuracy, invalid leap labels and absent UTC coverage remain uncertainty; all table work is admitted through current execution.