Struct Config 

pub struct Config {
    pub server: ServerSection,
    pub security: SecuritySection,
    pub transport: TransportSection,
    pub logging: LoggingSection,
}

Application configuration.

Fields

server: ServerSection

Server configuration.

security: SecuritySection

Security configuration.

transport: TransportSection

How the server is made reachable.

logging: LoggingSection

Logging configuration.

Implementations

impl Config

pub fn from_file(path: &Path) -> Result<Self, ConfigError>

Load configuration from a JSON file.

pub fn apply_env(&mut self)

Apply environment variable overrides.

pub fn apply_args(&mut self, args: &Args)

Apply CLI argument overrides.

pub fn load(args: &Args) -> Result<Self, ConfigError>

Load configuration with full priority chain.

Priority: CLI args > env vars > config file > defaults

pub fn allowed_hosts(&self, args: &Args, published: bool) -> Option<Vec<String>>

Host names this server should answer to, or None to accept any.

Only a loopback-bound server that is not published gets a list. That is exactly where DNS rebinding applies: a browser resolves the attacker’s name to 127.0.0.1, so the request is same-origin and CORS never sees it, but the Host header still says whose name it was. A server reached through a tunnel or relay is deliberately published under a name we may not know, so checking would only refuse legitimate traffic.

pub fn tunnel_provider( &self, ) -> Result<Option<Box<dyn TunnelProvider>>, ConfigError>

Build the tunnel provider this configuration asks for, if any.

pub fn harden_for_public_exposure( &mut self, args: &Args, ) -> Result<PublicExposure, ConfigError>

Harden the configuration for a publicly reachable deployment.

Exposing the server through a tunnel turns every weak default into an internet-facing one, so this is enforced rather than advised: authentication is switched on, and a key is generated when none was supplied (the caller reports it — an unusable server would be worse). --no-auth is refused outright instead of being silently overridden.

The remaining risks are real but legitimate choices, so they are warned about rather than blocked: a full-control token on a public URL, rate limiting turned off, and binding a non-loopback address in addition to the tunnel.

pub fn to_server_config(&self) -> Result<ServerConfig, ConfigError>

Convert to ServerConfig for the API server.

pub fn log_filter(&self) -> &str

Get the log level filter string.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for Config

fn clone(&self) -> Config

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for Config

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Default for Config

fn default() -> Config

Returns the “default value” for a type.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for Config

where Config: Default,

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Serialize for Config

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.