Struct RdapResponse 

pub struct RdapResponse {

    pub object_class_name: Option<String>,
    pub handle: Option<String>,
    pub ldh_name: Option<String>,
    pub unicode_name: Option<String>,
    pub status: Vec<String>,
    pub events: Vec<RdapEvent>,
    pub entities: Vec<RdapEntity>,
    pub nameservers: Vec<RdapNameserver>,
    pub secure_dns: Option<SecureDns>,
    pub links: Vec<RdapLink>,
    pub remarks: Vec<RdapRemark>,
    pub notices: Vec<RdapNotice>,
    pub port43: Option<String>,
    pub start_address: Option<String>,
    pub end_address: Option<String>,
    pub ip_version: Option<String>,
    pub name: Option<String>,
    pub network_type: Option<String>,
    pub country: Option<String>,
    pub parent_handle: Option<String>,
    pub start_autnum: Option<u32>,
    pub end_autnum: Option<u32>,
    pub extra: Map<String, Value>,
}

RDAP response for domain, IP, or ASN lookups. Follows RFC 7483 (JSON Responses for RDAP).

Fields

object_class_name: Option<String>

handle: Option<String>

ldh_name: Option<String>

unicode_name: Option<String>

status: Vec<String>

events: Vec<RdapEvent>

entities: Vec<RdapEntity>

nameservers: Vec<RdapNameserver>

secure_dns: Option<SecureDns>

links: Vec<RdapLink>

remarks: Vec<RdapRemark>

notices: Vec<RdapNotice>

port43: Option<String>

start_address: Option<String>

end_address: Option<String>

ip_version: Option<String>

name: Option<String>

network_type: Option<String>

country: Option<String>

parent_handle: Option<String>

start_autnum: Option<u32>

end_autnum: Option<u32>

extra: Map<String, Value>

Implementations

impl RdapResponse

pub fn validate_size(&self) -> Result<()>

Bound attacker-controlled data in extra (the #[serde(flatten)] catch-all field) after deserialization.

Even with the 10MB body cap applied during streaming, a malicious RDAP server can pack the body with millions of unknown keys or deeply- nested serde_json::Value trees, causing heap exhaustion in the resulting serde_json::Map. This guard rejects such responses before they propagate further into the application.

pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()>

Full post-deserialization validation of a RdapResponse. Wraps the existing validate_size size/width check with a recursive entity-nesting depth check to prevent adversarial responses from driving recursion to a stack-overflow abort.

pub fn domain_name(&self) -> Option<&str>

pub fn get_registrar(&self) -> Option<String>

pub fn get_registrant(&self) -> Option<String>

pub fn get_registrant_organization(&self) -> Option<String>

pub fn creation_date(&self) -> Option<DateTime<Utc>>

pub fn expiration_date(&self) -> Option<DateTime<Utc>>

pub fn last_updated(&self) -> Option<DateTime<Utc>>

pub fn nameserver_names(&self) -> Vec<String>

pub fn is_dnssec_signed(&self) -> bool

pub fn get_entity_by_role(&self, role: &str) -> Option<&RdapEntity>

Returns an entity by its role.

pub fn get_contact_info(&self, role: &str) -> Option<ContactInfo>

Returns all contact information for a specific role.

pub fn get_admin_contact(&self) -> Option<ContactInfo>

pub fn get_tech_contact(&self) -> Option<ContactInfo>

pub fn get_billing_contact(&self) -> Option<ContactInfo>

pub fn get_registrant_contact(&self) -> Option<ContactInfo>

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for RdapResponse

fn clone(&self) -> RdapResponse

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for RdapResponse

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Default for RdapResponse

fn default() -> RdapResponse

Returns the “default value” for a type.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for RdapResponse

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Serialize for RdapResponse

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.