Struct Dynamic

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pub struct Dynamic<T: ?Sized + Zeroize> { /* private fields */ }

Expand description

Heap-allocated secret wrapper with explicit access and automatic zeroization on drop.

Requires alloc feature. Inner type must implement Zeroize. Zero-cost heap-allocated wrapper for variable-length secrets.

Requires alloc. Inner type must implement Zeroize for automatic zeroization on drop (including spare capacity in Vec/String).

No Deref, AsRef, or Copy by default. Debug always prints [REDACTED].

Implementations§

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pub fn try_from_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Self, HexError>

Decodes a lowercase hex string into Dynamic<Vec<u8>>.

The decoded buffer is kept inside a Zeroizing wrapper until after the Box allocation completes, guaranteeing zeroization even on OOM panic.

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impl Dynamic<Vec<u8>>

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pub fn try_from_base64url(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Base64Error>

Decodes a Base64url (unpadded) string into Dynamic<Vec<u8>>.

The decoded buffer is kept inside a Zeroizing wrapper until after the Box allocation completes, guaranteeing zeroization even on OOM panic.

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impl Dynamic<Vec<u8>>

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pub fn try_from_bech32_unchecked(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Bech32Error>

Decodes a Bech32 (BIP-173) string into Dynamic<Vec<u8>>.

The decoded buffer is kept inside a Zeroizing wrapper until after the Box allocation completes, guaranteeing zeroization even on OOM panic.

§Warning

The HRP is not validated — any HRP will be accepted as long as the checksum is valid. For security-critical code where cross-protocol confusion must be prevented, use try_from_bech32.

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pub fn try_from_bech32(s: &str, expected_hrp: &str) -> Result<Self, Bech32Error>

Decodes a Bech32 (BIP-173) string into Dynamic<Vec<u8>>, validating that the HRP matches expected_hrp (case-insensitive).

The decoded buffer is kept inside a Zeroizing wrapper until after the Box allocation completes, guaranteeing zeroization even on OOM panic.

Prefer this over try_from_bech32_unchecked in security-critical code to prevent cross-protocol confusion attacks.

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impl Dynamic<Vec<u8>>

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pub fn try_from_bech32m_unchecked(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Bech32Error>

Decodes a Bech32m (BIP-350) string into Dynamic<Vec<u8>>.

The decoded buffer is kept inside a Zeroizing wrapper until after the Box allocation completes, guaranteeing zeroization even on OOM panic.

§Warning

The HRP is not validated — any HRP will be accepted as long as the checksum is valid. For security-critical code where cross-protocol confusion must be prevented, use try_from_bech32m.

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pub fn try_from_bech32m( s: &str, expected_hrp: &str, ) -> Result<Self, Bech32Error>

Decodes a Bech32m (BIP-350) string into Dynamic<Vec<u8>>, validating that the HRP matches expected_hrp (case-insensitive).

The decoded buffer is kept inside a Zeroizing wrapper until after the Box allocation completes, guaranteeing zeroization even on OOM panic.

Prefer this over try_from_bech32m_unchecked in security-critical code to prevent cross-protocol confusion attacks.

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impl Dynamic<Vec<u8>>

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pub fn deserialize_with_limit<'de, D>( deserializer: D, limit: usize, ) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserializes into Dynamic<Vec<u8>>, rejecting payloads larger than limit bytes.

The standard serde::Deserialize impl calls this with MAX_DESERIALIZE_BYTES. Use this method directly when you need a tighter or looser ceiling.

The intermediate buffer is kept inside a Zeroizing wrapper until after the Box allocation completes, guaranteeing zeroization even on OOM panic. Oversized buffers are also zeroized before the error is returned.

Important: this limit is enforced after the upstream deserializer has fully materialized the payload. It is a result-length acceptance bound, not a pre-allocation DoS guard. For untrusted input, enforce size limits at the transport or parser layer upstream.

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impl Dynamic<String>

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pub fn deserialize_with_limit<'de, D>( deserializer: D, limit: usize, ) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserializes into Dynamic<String>, rejecting payloads larger than limit bytes.

The standard serde::Deserialize impl calls this with MAX_DESERIALIZE_BYTES. Use this method directly when you need a tighter or looser ceiling.

The intermediate buffer is kept inside a Zeroizing wrapper until after the Box allocation completes, guaranteeing zeroization even on OOM panic. Oversized buffers are also zeroized before the error is returned.

Important: this limit is enforced after the upstream deserializer has fully materialized the payload. It is a result-length acceptance bound, not a pre-allocation DoS guard. For untrusted input, enforce size limits at the transport or parser layer upstream.