Struct ProofVerifier 

pub struct ProofVerifier<const N: usize> { /* private fields */ }

Three-layer proof verifier.

Encapsulates the epoch and nonce tracker needed for P1/P2/P3 verification.

Implementations

impl<const N: usize> ProofVerifier<N>

pub const fn new(epoch: u32) -> Self

Creates a new proof verifier with the given epoch.

By default, nonce == 0 is rejected (no zero-nonce bypass). Use set_allow_zero_nonce to enable the sentinel behaviour for boot-time contexts.

pub fn set_allow_zero_nonce(&mut self, allow: bool)

Set whether nonce == 0 is allowed to bypass replay checks.

pub fn set_epoch(&mut self, epoch: u32)

Updates the current epoch.

pub fn verify_p1( &self, table: &CapabilityTable<N>, cap_index: u32, cap_generation: u32, required_rights: CapRights, ) -> Result<(), ProofError>

P1: Capability existence + rights check.

Budget: < 1 us. No allocation. All checks execute regardless of intermediate failures to prevent timing side-channel leakage. The final error returned is deliberately the most generic (InvalidHandle) to avoid leaking which check failed.

Errors

Returns ProofError::InvalidHandle if the handle is invalid. Returns ProofError::StaleCapability if the epoch does not match. Returns ProofError::InsufficientRights if the rights are insufficient.

pub fn verify_p2( &mut self, table: &CapabilityTable<N>, tree: &DerivationTree<N>, cap_index: u32, cap_generation: u32, ctx: &PolicyContext, ) -> Result<(), ProofError>

P2: Structural invariant validation (constant-time).

Budget: < 100 us. All checks execute regardless of intermediate failures to prevent timing side-channel leakage (ADR-135).

Checks: ownership chain, region bounds, lease expiry, delegation depth, nonce replay.

Errors

Returns ProofError::PolicyViolation if any structural check fails.

pub fn verify_p3( &self, table: &CapabilityTable<N>, tree: &DerivationTree<N>, cap_index: u32, cap_generation: u32, max_depth: u8, ) -> Result<(), ProofError>

P3: Deep proof — derivation chain integrity verification.

Walks the derivation tree from the given capability back to its root and verifies:

1. Every ancestor is valid (not revoked).
2. Depth decreases monotonically toward the root.
3. Epoch values are non-decreasing from root to leaf.
4. The chain terminates at a root node (depth 0).
5. The chain length does not exceed max_depth.

Budget: < 10 us for depth <= 8 (typical). Worst-case O(depth).

Errors

Returns ProofError::DerivationChainBroken if the chain is invalid, tampered, or does not reach a root.