Module _03_howto

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This section collects together goal-oriented documentation.

§Customising private key usage

By default rustls supports PKCS#8-format1 RSA or ECDSA keys, plus PKCS#1-format RSA keys.

However, if your private key resides in a HSM, or in another process, or perhaps another machine, rustls has some extension points to support this:

The main trait you must implement is sign::SigningKey. The primary method here is choose_scheme() where you are given a set of SignatureSchemes the client says it supports: you must choose one (or return None – this aborts the handshake). Having done that, you return an implementation of the sign::Signer trait. The sign() performs the signature and returns it.

(Unfortunately this is currently designed for keys with low latency access, like in a PKCS#11 provider, Microsoft CryptoAPI, etc. so is blocking rather than asynchronous. It’s a TODO to make these and other extension points async.)

Once you have these two pieces, configuring a server to use them involves, briefly:

For a complete example of implementing a custom sign::SigningKey and sign::Signer see the signer module in the rustls-cng crate.

§Unexpected EOF

TLS has a close_notify mechanism to prevent truncation attacks2. According to the TLS RFCs, each party is required to send a close_notify message before closing the write side of the connection. However, some implementations don’t send it. So long as the application layer protocol (for instance HTTP/2) has message length framing and can reject truncated messages, this is not a security problem.

Rustls treats an EOF without close_notify as an error of type std::io::Error with ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof. In some situations it’s appropriate for the application to handle this error the same way it would handle a normal EOF (a read returning Ok(0)). In particular if UnexpectedEof occurs on an idle connection it is appropriate to treat it the same way as a clean shutdown. And if an application always uses messages with length framing (in other words, messages are never delimited by the close of the TCP connection), it can unconditionally ignore UnexpectedEof errors from rustls.

§Debugging

If you encounter a bug with Rustls it can be helpful to collect up as much diagnostic information as possible.

§Collecting logs

If your bug reproduces with one of the Rustls examples you can use the RUST_LOG environment variable to increase the log verbosity. If you’re using your own application, you may need to configure it with a logging backend like env_logger.

Consider reproducing your bug with RUST_LOG=rustls=trace and sharing the result in a GitHub gist.

§Taking a packet capture

When logs aren’t enough taking a packet capture (“pcap”) is another helpful tool. The details of how to accomplish this vary by operating system/context.

§tcpdump

As one example, on Linux using tcpdump is often easiest.

If you know the IP address of the remote server your bug demonstrates with you could take a short packet capture with this command (after replacing XX.XX.XX.XX with the correct IP address):

sudo tcpdump -i any tcp and dst host XX.XX.XX.XX -C5 -w rustls.pcap

The -i any captures on any network interface. The tcp and dst host XX.XX.XX.XX portion target the capture to TCP traffic to the specified IP address. The -C5 argument limits the capture to at most 5MB. Lastly the -w argument writes the capture to rustls.pcap.

Another approach is to use tcp and port XXXX instead of tcp and dst host XX.XX.XX.XX to capture all traffic to a specific port instead of a specific host server.

§SSLKEYLOGFILE

If the bug you are reporting happens after data is encrypted you may also wish to share the secret keys required to decrypt the post-handshake traffic.

If you’re using one of the Rustls examples you can set the SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable to a path where secrets will be written. E.g. SSLKEYLOGFILE=rustls.pcap.keys.

If you’re using your own application you may need to customize the Rustls ClientConfig or ServerConfig’s key_log setting like the example applications do.

With the file from SSLKEYLOGFILE it is possible to use Wireshark or another tool to decrypt the post-handshake messages, following these instructions.

Remember this allows plaintext decryption and should only be done in testing contexts where no sensitive data (API keys, etc) are being shared.


  1. For PKCS#8 it does not support password encryption – there’s not a meaningful threat model addressed by this, and the encryption supported is typically extremely poor. 

  2. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-6.1