Struct PolicyConfig 

pub struct PolicyConfig {
    pub fs: FsPolicy,
    pub shell: ShellPolicy,
}

Combined L1 policy configuration.

A default-constructed PolicyConfig has no restrictions. Use PolicyConfig::default_restrictive for a safe baseline.

Fields

fs: FsPolicy

shell: ShellPolicy

Implementations

impl PolicyConfig

pub fn default_restrictive() -> Self

A baseline restrictive policy that blocks the most dangerous shell patterns. Filesystem access is unrestricted (the workspace path check in tools::resolve_within already handles escapes at a lower level).

Security note: substring matching is a best-effort heuristic and cannot prevent all destructive commands. A determined adversary can bypass these patterns with whitespace variations, Unicode, or indirect execution (e.g. `bash -c “$(curl …)”``). The primary security boundary is OS-level sandboxing (Docker / E2B). These patterns exist as a secondary defence-in-depth layer only.

pub fn check_shell(&self, command: &str) -> Result<()>

Returns Ok(()) when command is permitted, Err(PermissionDenied) when it matches a deny pattern.

pub fn check_fs_path(&self, path: &str, write: bool) -> Result<()>

Returns Ok(()) when path may be accessed, Err(PermissionDenied) otherwise.

• write — true for write operations, false for reads.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for PolicyConfig

fn clone(&self) -> Self

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for PolicyConfig

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Default for PolicyConfig

fn default() -> Self

Returns the “default value” for a type.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for PolicyConfig

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.