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Crate quietquic_proto

Crate quietquic_proto 

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Sans-IO core for quietquic.

This crate performs no I/O, spawns no tasks, requires no async runtime, and never blocks or parks. The caller owns the socket and the clock and drives the state machine directly, which makes quietquic embeddable in a hand-rolled event loop — including the classic Unix reactor that calls select() with a zero timeout and has other work to do between passes. See examples/poll_loop.rs for the reference shape.

The quietquic crate is a thin tokio wrapper over this core; applications that want async/await should use that instead.

§Threat model

A server built on this core emits zero bytes in response to any packet that does not prove possession of a valid pre-shared key. Stated precisely:

A datagram that fails the cloaking pre-filter queues nothing to send.

That is structural rather than a property of the caller’s control flow. endpoint::Endpoint::handle_datagram runs the whole pre-filter — rate limiter, long-header parse, selector length, PSK selector match, freshness, anti-replay — and returns before a failing packet reaches quinn-proto at all, so there is nothing for endpoint::Endpoint::poll_transmit to hand back and an embedder cannot reply to an unauthorized peer even by mistake.

Note what the invariant is not keyed on: it is not “outcome::DatagramOutcome::Dropped implies nothing was queued”. A peer that has already proved PSK possession can be answered — the reachable case is a Version Negotiation reply to an authorized peer asking for a QUIC version we do not speak, which yields Dropped and a queued transmit. See outcome::DatagramOutcome::Dropped.

See the repository’s README.md (Threat Model) for the full, honest boundaries — this defeats internet-wide scanning and casual DPI, but does NOT defeat global passive traffic analysis, sophisticated DPI that actively attempts Initial decryption on every flow, or a resource side-channel via a co-located service.

Modules§

config
Configuration types and their parsing.
conn
Per-connection state: one quinn_proto::Connection plus the stream bookkeeping needed to serve non-blocking stream operations.
crypto
Endpoint keying material and connection-ID generation.
endpoint
The sans-IO endpoint: a cloaked QUIC state machine the caller drives.
freshness
Coarse-timestamp freshness check for the DCID authenticator.
initial_keys
PSK-derived QUIC Initial packet protection keys.
outcome
Non-blocking outcome types for the sans-IO core.
ratelimit
Rate limiting for the unauthenticated pre-filter path.
replay
Bounded anti-replay set over (nonce, freshness) within the acceptance window.
selector
Blinded DCID selector: embeds per-client key selection into the QUIC DCID.
testing
In-memory scaffolding for driving a cloaked client/server pair with no sockets, no runtime, and no threads.
transport
Cloaked QUIC transport plumbing shared by client and server.