Expand description
quietquic — a cloaked QUIC transport.
A server built on this crate emits zero bytes in response to any
packet that doesn’t prove possession of a valid pre-shared key, and its
traffic camouflages as ordinary QUIC v1. See README.md’s Threat Model
section (or docs/specs/2026-07-03-quietquic-design.md §3)
for the full, honest threat model before deploying. In particular: this
defeats internet-wide scanning and casual DPI, but does NOT defeat global
passive traffic analysis, sophisticated DPI that actively attempts
Initial decryption on every flow, or a resource side-channel via a
co-located service. Run it as the only service on its host. See
README.md’s Limitations section for boundaries not yet
production-hardened (single-threaded driver, compile-time rate limits, CID pruning only at
connection close).
Modules§
- client
- Cloaked QUIC client — a tokio pump over the sans-IO core.
- config
- Crate configuration: TOML-loaded server/client settings.
- conn
- Post-handshake connection and stream handles, shared by client and server.
- freshness
- Coarse-timestamp freshness check for the DCID authenticator.
- initial_
keys - PSK-derived QUIC Initial packet protection keys.
- ratelimit
- Rate limiting for the unauthenticated pre-filter path.
- replay
- Bounded anti-replay set over (nonce, freshness) within the acceptance window.
- selector
- Blinded DCID selector: embeds per-client key selection into the QUIC DCID.
- server
- Scanner-invisible cloaked QUIC server — a tokio pump over the sans-IO core.
- transport
- Cloaked QUIC transport plumbing shared by client and server.