polyc_crypto/

signing_role.rs

//! Compile-time separated platform signing roles and public identities.
//!
//! Domain prefixes keep signatures for two artifact shapes from verifying as
//! one another. They do not limit what a stolen private key can mint. These
//! role types close that larger blast radius: approval, browser-session,
//! turn-read, web-session-grant, journal-attestation, handoff, and sub-agent
//! keys are different types loaded from different custody references.
//!
//! A role alone does not separate two artifact shapes that share it. The
//! signer must also frame the artifact kind into the signed bytes. See
//! [`RoleSigner::sign_handoff`] and its three siblings for that frame.

use std::{marker::PhantomData, sync::Arc};

use sha2::{Digest as _, Sha256};

use crate::{Signer, verify};

mod private {
    pub trait Sealed {}
}

/// A stable signing-role identity.
pub trait SigningRole: private::Sealed + Send + Sync + 'static {
    /// Stable issuer string recorded beside this role's trust history.
    const ISSUER: &'static str;
}

macro_rules! role {
    ($(#[$meta:meta])* $name:ident, $issuer:literal) => {
        $(#[$meta])*
        #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
        pub struct $name;
        impl private::Sealed for $name {}
        impl SigningRole for $name {
            const ISSUER: &'static str = $issuer;
        }
    };
}

role!(
    /// Human and policy approval decisions and their durable markers.
    ApprovalRole,
    "polychrome.control.approval"
);
role!(
    /// State-authorized browser-session bearer tokens.
    SessionRole,
    "polychrome.control.session"
);
role!(
    /// Conversation-scoped query capability grants.
    TurnReadRole,
    "polychrome.control.turn-read"
);
role!(
    /// Deterministic web-session-family rotation grants.
    WebSessionGrantRole,
    "polychrome.control.web-session-grant"
);
role!(
    /// Tamper-evident journal-root attestations.
    JournalAttestationRole,
    "polychrome.state.journal-attestation"
);
role!(
    /// Parent-to-child conversation handoff provenance.
    HandoffRole,
    "polychrome.control.handoff"
);
role!(
    /// Sub-agent delegation spawn and result provenance.
    SubagentRole,
    "polychrome.control.subagent"
);

/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's approval-role private key.
pub const CONTROL_APPROVAL_KEY_REF: &str = "control-plane/approval-signer";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's approval public history.
pub const CONTROL_APPROVAL_HISTORY_REF: &str = "control-plane/approval-signer-history";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's session-role private key.
pub const CONTROL_SESSION_KEY_REF: &str = "control-plane/session-signer";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's session public history.
pub const CONTROL_SESSION_HISTORY_REF: &str = "control-plane/session-signer-history";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's turn-read private key.
pub const CONTROL_TURN_READ_KEY_REF: &str = "control-plane/turn-read-signer";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's turn-read public history.
pub const CONTROL_TURN_READ_HISTORY_REF: &str = "control-plane/turn-read-signer-history";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's web-session-grant private key.
pub const CONTROL_WEB_SESSION_GRANT_KEY_REF: &str = "control-plane/web-session-grant-signer";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's web-session-grant history.
pub const CONTROL_WEB_SESSION_GRANT_HISTORY_REF: &str =
    "control-plane/web-session-grant-signer-history";
/// Stable reference for Control's temporary memory-journal private key.
pub const CONTROL_MEMORY_JOURNAL_KEY_REF: &str = "control-plane/memory-journal-attestation-signer";
/// Stable reference for Control's temporary memory-journal public history.
pub const CONTROL_MEMORY_JOURNAL_HISTORY_REF: &str =
    "control-plane/memory-journal-attestation-signer-history";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's handoff-role private key.
pub const CONTROL_HANDOFF_KEY_REF: &str = "control-plane/handoff-signer";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's handoff public history.
pub const CONTROL_HANDOFF_HISTORY_REF: &str = "control-plane/handoff-signer-history";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's subagent-role private key.
pub const CONTROL_SUBAGENT_KEY_REF: &str = "control-plane/subagent-signer";
/// Stable secret-manager reference for Control's subagent public history.
pub const CONTROL_SUBAGENT_HISTORY_REF: &str = "control-plane/subagent-signer-history";

/// Public identity of one signing key within one role.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct SigningKeyIdentity {
    issuer: String,
    key_id: String,
    public_key: Vec<u8>,
}

impl SigningKeyIdentity {
    /// Derives the canonical identity for a trusted role public key.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Refuses a value that is not an encoded ed25519 public key.
    pub fn for_public_key<R: SigningRole>(
        public_key: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Result<Self, SigningIdentityError> {
        if public_key.len() != 32 {
            return Err(SigningIdentityError::InvalidPublicKey);
        }
        Ok(Self {
            issuer: R::ISSUER.to_owned(),
            key_id: key_id(R::ISSUER, &public_key),
            public_key,
        })
    }

    /// Reconstructs a public identity read from trusted custody metadata.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Refuses an issuer mismatch, malformed key, or key id not derived from
    /// the exact issuer and public key.
    pub fn checked<R: SigningRole>(
        issuer: impl Into<String>,
        claimed_key_id: impl Into<String>,
        public_key: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Result<Self, SigningIdentityError> {
        let identity = Self {
            issuer: issuer.into(),
            key_id: claimed_key_id.into(),
            public_key,
        };
        if identity.issuer != R::ISSUER {
            return Err(SigningIdentityError::WrongIssuer);
        }
        if identity.public_key.len() != 32 {
            return Err(SigningIdentityError::InvalidPublicKey);
        }
        if identity.key_id != key_id(R::ISSUER, &identity.public_key) {
            return Err(SigningIdentityError::WrongKeyId);
        }
        Ok(identity)
    }

    /// Stable role issuer.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn issuer(&self) -> &str {
        &self.issuer
    }

    /// Deterministic identifier for this issuer/public-key pair.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn key_id(&self) -> &str {
        &self.key_id
    }

    /// Encoded ed25519 public key.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn public_key(&self) -> &[u8] {
        &self.public_key
    }
}

/// Invalid public signing-key identity.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SigningIdentityError {
    /// The record belongs to another signing role.
    #[error("signing-key issuer does not match its role")]
    WrongIssuer,
    /// The ed25519 public key is not 32 bytes.
    #[error("signing public key is not an encoded ed25519 key")]
    InvalidPublicKey,
    /// The claimed key id does not cover the issuer and public key.
    #[error("signing key id does not match its issuer and public key")]
    WrongKeyId,
}

/// Deployment-pinned verdict for one signed platform artifact.
///
/// A verdict answers two questions in one value. The signature must check out
/// against the public key the artifact carries. That key must also belong to
/// the deployment trust set for the artifact's signing role.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum SignatureVerdict {
    /// The signature checks out and its key is in the deployment trust set.
    Verified,
    /// The signature does not check out against the embedded public key.
    Invalid,
    /// The signature checks out, but the deployment does not trust the key.
    Untrusted,
}

impl SignatureVerdict {
    /// Stable lowercase name for projections, read surfaces, and logs.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::Verified => "verified",
            Self::Invalid => "invalid",
            Self::Untrusted => "untrusted",
        }
    }
}

impl std::fmt::Display for SignatureVerdict {
    fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        formatter.write_str(self.as_str())
    }
}

/// One role's private signer.
pub struct RoleSigner<R: SigningRole> {
    inner: Arc<Signer>,
    role: PhantomData<R>,
}

impl<R: SigningRole> Clone for RoleSigner<R> {
    fn clone(&self) -> Self {
        Self {
            inner: Arc::clone(&self.inner),
            role: PhantomData,
        }
    }
}

impl<R: SigningRole> std::fmt::Debug for RoleSigner<R> {
    fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        formatter
            .debug_struct("RoleSigner")
            .field("identity", &self.identity())
            .finish_non_exhaustive()
    }
}

impl<R: SigningRole> RoleSigner<R> {
    /// Builds a signer from an insecure deterministic test seed.
    #[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-util"))]
    #[must_use]
    pub fn from_seed(seed: u64) -> Self {
        Self {
            inner: Arc::new(Signer::from_seed(seed)),
            role: PhantomData,
        }
    }

    /// Builds this role from raw ed25519 private-key bytes held by custody.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Returns [`crate::SignerError`] for malformed private-key material.
    pub fn from_key_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, crate::SignerError> {
        Ok(Self {
            inner: Arc::new(Signer::from_key_bytes(bytes)?),
            role: PhantomData,
        })
    }

    /// Encoded public key.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn public_key_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
        self.inner.public_key_bytes()
    }

    /// Explicit issuer and deterministic key identity.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn identity(&self) -> SigningKeyIdentity {
        let public_key = self.public_key_bytes();
        SigningKeyIdentity {
            issuer: R::ISSUER.to_owned(),
            key_id: key_id(R::ISSUER, &public_key),
            public_key,
        }
    }

    /// Signs bytes inside this crate's role-specific protocol builders.
    ///
    /// Kept crate-private so holding one role never exposes a generic signing
    /// oracle that can manufacture another role's canonical artifact.
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn sign(&self, canonical_bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        self.inner.sign(canonical_bytes)
    }

    /// Borrows the primitive for this crate's role-specific envelope builders.
    ///
    /// Kept crate-private so an external caller holding one role cannot erase
    /// its type and pass the same private key to another signing protocol.
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn as_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
        &self.inner
    }

    /// Re-labels deterministic fixture material for a different role.
    ///
    /// Production builds cannot convert one signing role into another;
    /// callers must load independent custody records instead.
    #[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-util"))]
    #[must_use]
    pub fn relabel_for_test<S: SigningRole>(&self) -> RoleSigner<S> {
        RoleSigner {
            inner: Arc::clone(&self.inner),
            role: PhantomData,
        }
    }
}

impl RoleSigner<TurnReadRole> {
    /// Signs a canonical conversation-scoped turn-read capability.
    ///
    /// This named role operation avoids exposing the underlying signer or a
    /// generic cross-protocol signing method to query-layer callers.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn sign_turn_read_capability(&self, canonical_bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        self.inner
            .sign(&role_scoped_message::<TurnReadRole>(canonical_bytes))
    }
}

impl RoleSigner<JournalAttestationRole> {
    /// Signs a canonical Merkle Mountain Range journal-root attestation.
    ///
    /// This named role operation avoids exposing the underlying signer or a
    /// generic cross-protocol signing method to journal callers.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn sign_journal_root(&self, canonical_bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        self.inner
            .sign(&role_scoped_message::<JournalAttestationRole>(
                canonical_bytes,
            ))
    }
}

impl RoleSigner<HandoffRole> {
    /// Signs the canonical bytes of an accepted conversation handoff.
    ///
    /// The signature covers the handoff artifact domain, so it never verifies
    /// as a refusal or as a sub-agent artifact.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn sign_handoff(&self, canonical_bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        self.inner.sign(&artifact_scoped_message::<HandoffRole>(
            HANDOFF_ARTIFACT,
            canonical_bytes,
        ))
    }

    /// Signs the canonical bytes of a refused conversation handoff.
    ///
    /// The signature covers the refusal artifact domain, so it never verifies
    /// as an accepted handoff or as a sub-agent artifact.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn sign_handoff_denied(&self, canonical_bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        self.inner.sign(&artifact_scoped_message::<HandoffRole>(
            HANDOFF_DENIED_ARTIFACT,
            canonical_bytes,
        ))
    }
}

impl RoleSigner<SubagentRole> {
    /// Signs the canonical bytes of a sub-agent spawn.
    ///
    /// The signature covers the spawn artifact domain, so it never verifies as
    /// a sub-agent result or as a handoff artifact.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn sign_subagent_spawn(&self, canonical_bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        self.inner.sign(&artifact_scoped_message::<SubagentRole>(
            SUBAGENT_SPAWN_ARTIFACT,
            canonical_bytes,
        ))
    }

    /// Signs the canonical bytes of a sub-agent result.
    ///
    /// The signature covers the result artifact domain, so it never verifies as
    /// a sub-agent spawn or as a handoff artifact.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn sign_subagent_result(&self, canonical_bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
        self.inner.sign(&artifact_scoped_message::<SubagentRole>(
            SUBAGENT_RESULT_ARTIFACT,
            canonical_bytes,
        ))
    }
}

/// Public trust set for exactly one signing role.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RoleTrustSet<R: SigningRole> {
    keys: Vec<SigningKeyIdentity>,
    role: PhantomData<R>,
}

/// Append-only public-key history for one signing role.
///
/// The record contains public identities only. Custody persists the current
/// private key under a separate secret reference and stores this record as the
/// durable verification history.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct SigningKeyHistory {
    current: SigningKeyIdentity,
    retired: Vec<SigningKeyIdentity>,
}

impl SigningKeyHistory {
    /// Starts a history at one role's current signer.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn current<R: SigningRole>(signer: &RoleSigner<R>) -> Self {
        Self {
            current: signer.identity(),
            retired: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    /// Public identity recorded as current.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn current_identity(&self) -> &SigningKeyIdentity {
        &self.current
    }

    /// Append-only public identities recorded as retired.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn retired_identities(&self) -> &[SigningKeyIdentity] {
        &self.retired
    }

    /// Reconciles a stored history with the current signer identity.
    ///
    /// A rotation appends the previous current identity to `retired`. Cycling
    /// back to an earlier key never removes it from the stored retired set,
    /// while the returned trust set lists each identity once with current
    /// first.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Refuses a malformed identity, an identity from another role, or a
    /// duplicate retired identity.
    pub fn reconcile<R: SigningRole>(
        &mut self,
        current: &SigningKeyIdentity,
    ) -> Result<(RoleTrustSet<R>, bool), SigningIdentityError> {
        let current = SigningKeyIdentity::checked::<R>(
            current.issuer.clone(),
            current.key_id.clone(),
            current.public_key.clone(),
        )?;
        let prior_current = SigningKeyIdentity::checked::<R>(
            self.current.issuer.clone(),
            self.current.key_id.clone(),
            self.current.public_key.clone(),
        )?;
        let mut retired = self
            .retired
            .iter()
            .map(|identity| {
                SigningKeyIdentity::checked::<R>(
                    identity.issuer.clone(),
                    identity.key_id.clone(),
                    identity.public_key.clone(),
                )
            })
            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
        for (index, identity) in retired.iter().enumerate() {
            if retired[..index]
                .iter()
                .any(|prior| prior.key_id == identity.key_id)
            {
                return Err(SigningIdentityError::WrongKeyId);
            }
        }

        let rotated = prior_current != current;
        if rotated
            && !retired
                .iter()
                .any(|identity| identity.key_id == prior_current.key_id)
        {
            retired.push(prior_current);
        }
        self.current = current.clone();
        self.retired.clone_from(&retired);

        let mut identities = vec![current.clone()];
        identities.extend(
            retired
                .into_iter()
                .filter(|identity| identity.key_id != current.key_id),
        );
        Ok((RoleTrustSet::checked(identities)?, rotated))
    }
}

impl<R: SigningRole> RoleTrustSet<R> {
    /// Derives canonical identities for a non-empty list of trusted keys.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Refuses empty, duplicate, or malformed public keys.
    pub fn from_public_keys(keys: Vec<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, SigningIdentityError> {
        let identities = keys
            .into_iter()
            .map(SigningKeyIdentity::for_public_key::<R>)
            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
        Self::checked(identities)
    }

    /// Validates and canonicalizes a non-empty role trust set.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Refuses empty, duplicate, malformed, or cross-role identities.
    pub fn checked(keys: Vec<SigningKeyIdentity>) -> Result<Self, SigningIdentityError> {
        if keys.is_empty() {
            return Err(SigningIdentityError::InvalidPublicKey);
        }
        let mut checked = Vec::with_capacity(keys.len());
        for key in keys {
            let key = SigningKeyIdentity::checked::<R>(key.issuer, key.key_id, key.public_key)?;
            if checked
                .iter()
                .any(|known: &SigningKeyIdentity| known.key_id == key.key_id)
            {
                return Err(SigningIdentityError::WrongKeyId);
            }
            checked.push(key);
        }
        Ok(Self {
            keys: checked,
            role: PhantomData,
        })
    }

    /// Trusts only the current signer.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn current(signer: &RoleSigner<R>) -> Self {
        Self {
            keys: vec![signer.identity()],
            role: PhantomData,
        }
    }

    /// Public identities, current first and retired afterward.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn keys(&self) -> &[SigningKeyIdentity] {
        &self.keys
    }

    /// Verifies against the explicitly named key in this role.
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn verify(&self, key_id: &str, message: &[u8], signature: &[u8]) -> bool {
        self.keys
            .iter()
            .find(|key| key.key_id == key_id)
            .is_some_and(|key| verify(&key.public_key, message, signature))
    }

    /// Classifies an artifact that carries the public key it was signed with.
    ///
    /// The check runs in two stages. Stage one verifies the signature against
    /// the embedded key inside this role and artifact domain. Stage two finds
    /// the corresponding trusted identity. It verifies again against the
    /// public key stored in that identity.
    fn classify(
        &self,
        kind: &str,
        signed_by: &[u8],
        canonical_bytes: &[u8],
        signature: &[u8],
    ) -> SignatureVerdict {
        let message = artifact_scoped_message::<R>(kind, canonical_bytes);
        if !verify(signed_by, &message, signature) {
            return SignatureVerdict::Invalid;
        }
        let Ok(identity) = SigningKeyIdentity::for_public_key::<R>(signed_by.to_vec()) else {
            return SignatureVerdict::Invalid;
        };
        if !self.keys.iter().any(|key| key.key_id == identity.key_id) {
            return SignatureVerdict::Untrusted;
        }
        if self.verify(&identity.key_id, &message, signature) {
            SignatureVerdict::Verified
        } else {
            SignatureVerdict::Invalid
        }
    }
}

impl RoleTrustSet<TurnReadRole> {
    /// Verifies a canonical conversation-scoped turn-read capability.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn verify_turn_read_capability(
        &self,
        key_id: &str,
        canonical_bytes: &[u8],
        signature: &[u8],
    ) -> bool {
        self.verify(
            key_id,
            &role_scoped_message::<TurnReadRole>(canonical_bytes),
            signature,
        )
    }
}

impl RoleTrustSet<JournalAttestationRole> {
    /// Verifies a canonical Merkle Mountain Range journal-root attestation.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn verify_journal_root(
        &self,
        key_id: &str,
        canonical_bytes: &[u8],
        signature: &[u8],
    ) -> bool {
        self.verify(
            key_id,
            &role_scoped_message::<JournalAttestationRole>(canonical_bytes),
            signature,
        )
    }
}

impl RoleTrustSet<HandoffRole> {
    /// Classifies the signature on an accepted conversation handoff.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn classify_handoff(
        &self,
        signed_by: &[u8],
        canonical_bytes: &[u8],
        signature: &[u8],
    ) -> SignatureVerdict {
        self.classify(HANDOFF_ARTIFACT, signed_by, canonical_bytes, signature)
    }

    /// Classifies the signature on a refused conversation handoff.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn classify_handoff_denied(
        &self,
        signed_by: &[u8],
        canonical_bytes: &[u8],
        signature: &[u8],
    ) -> SignatureVerdict {
        self.classify(
            HANDOFF_DENIED_ARTIFACT,
            signed_by,
            canonical_bytes,
            signature,
        )
    }
}

impl RoleTrustSet<SubagentRole> {
    /// Classifies the signature on a sub-agent spawn.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn classify_subagent_spawn(
        &self,
        signed_by: &[u8],
        canonical_bytes: &[u8],
        signature: &[u8],
    ) -> SignatureVerdict {
        self.classify(
            SUBAGENT_SPAWN_ARTIFACT,
            signed_by,
            canonical_bytes,
            signature,
        )
    }

    /// Classifies the signature on a sub-agent result.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn classify_subagent_result(
        &self,
        signed_by: &[u8],
        canonical_bytes: &[u8],
        signature: &[u8],
    ) -> SignatureVerdict {
        self.classify(
            SUBAGENT_RESULT_ARTIFACT,
            signed_by,
            canonical_bytes,
            signature,
        )
    }
}

/// Approval signer type retained at its established public path.
pub type ApprovalSigner = RoleSigner<ApprovalRole>;
/// Browser-session signer.
pub type SessionSigner = RoleSigner<SessionRole>;
/// Conversation turn-read capability signer.
pub type TurnReadSigner = RoleSigner<TurnReadRole>;
/// Web-session-family grant signer.
pub type WebSessionGrantSigner = RoleSigner<WebSessionGrantRole>;
/// Journal-root attestation signer.
pub type JournalAttestationSigner = RoleSigner<JournalAttestationRole>;
/// Conversation handoff provenance signer.
pub type HandoffSigner = RoleSigner<HandoffRole>;
/// Sub-agent delegation provenance signer.
pub type SubagentSigner = RoleSigner<SubagentRole>;

/// Artifact domain name for an accepted conversation handoff.
const HANDOFF_ARTIFACT: &str = "handoff";
/// Artifact domain name for a refused conversation handoff.
const HANDOFF_DENIED_ARTIFACT: &str = "handoff-denied";
/// Artifact domain name for a sub-agent spawn.
const SUBAGENT_SPAWN_ARTIFACT: &str = "subagent-spawn";
/// Artifact domain name for a sub-agent result.
const SUBAGENT_RESULT_ARTIFACT: &str = "subagent-result";

fn key_id(issuer: &str, public_key: &[u8]) -> String {
    let mut hash = Sha256::new();
    hash.update(b"polychrome.signing-key-id.v1\0");
    hash.update(
        u64::try_from(issuer.len())
            .unwrap_or(u64::MAX)
            .to_be_bytes(),
    );
    hash.update(issuer.as_bytes());
    hash.update(public_key);
    crate::hex::lower(&hash.finalize())
}

fn role_scoped_message<R: SigningRole>(canonical_bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
    let mut message = Vec::with_capacity(40 + R::ISSUER.len() + canonical_bytes.len());
    message.extend_from_slice(b"polychrome.signing-role.v1\0");
    message.extend_from_slice(
        &u64::try_from(R::ISSUER.len())
            .unwrap_or(u64::MAX)
            .to_be_bytes(),
    );
    message.extend_from_slice(R::ISSUER.as_bytes());
    message.extend_from_slice(canonical_bytes);
    message
}

/// Frames canonical bytes inside one signing role and one artifact kind.
///
/// The frame is injective. Every variable-length field before the trailing
/// canonical bytes carries its own big-endian length. Two different (role,
/// kind) pairs therefore never produce the same signed message.
fn artifact_scoped_message<R: SigningRole>(kind: &str, canonical_bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
    let mut message = Vec::with_capacity(48 + R::ISSUER.len() + kind.len() + canonical_bytes.len());
    message.extend_from_slice(b"polychrome.signed-artifact.v1\0");
    message.extend_from_slice(&length_prefix(R::ISSUER.len()));
    message.extend_from_slice(R::ISSUER.as_bytes());
    message.extend_from_slice(&length_prefix(kind.len()));
    message.extend_from_slice(kind.as_bytes());
    message.extend_from_slice(canonical_bytes);
    message
}

fn length_prefix(length: usize) -> [u8; 8] {
    u64::try_from(length).unwrap_or(u64::MAX).to_be_bytes()
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn roles_have_distinct_issuers_and_key_ids() {
        let approval = ApprovalSigner::from_seed(7);
        let session = SessionSigner::from_seed(7);
        assert_ne!(approval.identity().issuer(), session.identity().issuer());
        assert_ne!(approval.identity().key_id(), session.identity().key_id());
        assert_eq!(approval.public_key_bytes(), session.public_key_bytes());
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_cross_role_identity_is_refused() {
        let identity = ApprovalSigner::from_seed(7).identity();
        assert_eq!(
            SigningKeyIdentity::checked::<SessionRole>(
                identity.issuer,
                identity.key_id,
                identity.public_key,
            ),
            Err(SigningIdentityError::WrongIssuer)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn role_trust_requires_the_named_key() {
        let current = SessionSigner::from_seed(7);
        let retired = SessionSigner::from_seed(8);
        let trust =
            RoleTrustSet::<SessionRole>::checked(vec![current.identity(), retired.identity()])
                .expect("valid role history");
        let message = b"session";
        assert!(trust.verify(current.identity().key_id(), message, &current.sign(message)));
        assert!(trust.verify(retired.identity().key_id(), message, &retired.sign(message)));
        assert!(!trust.verify("unknown", message, &current.sign(message)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn role_trust_survives_key_cycling_without_cross_role_acceptance() {
        let first = SessionSigner::from_seed(7);
        let second = SessionSigner::from_seed(8);
        let third = SessionSigner::from_seed(9);
        let trust = RoleTrustSet::<SessionRole>::checked(vec![
            third.identity(),
            second.identity(),
            first.identity(),
        ])
        .expect("valid cycled history");
        let message = b"session";

        for signer in [&first, &second, &third] {
            assert!(trust.verify(signer.identity().key_id(), message, &signer.sign(message)));
        }

        let approval = ApprovalSigner::from_seed(7);
        assert!(!trust.verify(
            approval.identity().key_id(),
            message,
            &approval.sign(message),
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn history_rotation_and_cycling_preserve_each_public_identity_once() {
        let first = SessionSigner::from_seed(7);
        let second = SessionSigner::from_seed(8);
        let mut history = SigningKeyHistory::current(&first);

        let (trust, rotated) = history
            .reconcile::<SessionRole>(&second.identity())
            .expect("first rotation is valid");
        assert!(rotated);
        assert_eq!(trust.keys(), &[second.identity(), first.identity()]);

        let (trust, rotated) = history
            .reconcile::<SessionRole>(&first.identity())
            .expect("cycling back is valid");
        assert!(rotated);
        assert_eq!(trust.keys(), &[first.identity(), second.identity()]);

        let (trust, rotated) = history
            .reconcile::<SessionRole>(&second.identity())
            .expect("cycling forward is valid");
        assert!(rotated);
        assert_eq!(trust.keys(), &[second.identity(), first.identity()]);
        assert_eq!(
            history.retired_identities(),
            &[first.identity(), second.identity()]
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn history_rejects_duplicate_retired_identity() {
        let first = SessionSigner::from_seed(7);
        let second = SessionSigner::from_seed(8);
        let mut history = SigningKeyHistory {
            current: second.identity(),
            retired: vec![first.identity(), first.identity()],
        };

        assert!(matches!(
            history.reconcile::<SessionRole>(&second.identity()),
            Err(SigningIdentityError::WrongKeyId)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn history_schema_rejects_unrecognized_fields() {
        let signer = SessionSigner::from_seed(7);
        let mut value =
            serde_json::to_value(SigningKeyHistory::current(&signer)).expect("history serializes");
        value
            .as_object_mut()
            .expect("history is an object")
            .insert("private_key".to_owned(), serde_json::json!("must-not-pass"));

        assert!(serde_json::from_value::<SigningKeyHistory>(value).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn public_role_protocols_reject_the_same_key_under_the_wrong_role() {
        let turn_read = TurnReadSigner::from_seed(17);
        let journal: JournalAttestationSigner = turn_read.relabel_for_test();
        let turn_read_trust = RoleTrustSet::<TurnReadRole>::current(&turn_read);
        let journal_trust = RoleTrustSet::<JournalAttestationRole>::current(&journal);
        let canonical = b"same canonical bytes";
        let turn_read_signature = turn_read.sign_turn_read_capability(canonical);
        let journal_signature = journal.sign_journal_root(canonical);

        assert!(turn_read_trust.verify_turn_read_capability(
            turn_read.identity().key_id(),
            canonical,
            &turn_read_signature,
        ));
        assert!(journal_trust.verify_journal_root(
            journal.identity().key_id(),
            canonical,
            &journal_signature,
        ));
        assert!(!turn_read_trust.verify_turn_read_capability(
            turn_read.identity().key_id(),
            canonical,
            &journal_signature,
        ));
        assert!(!journal_trust.verify_journal_root(
            journal.identity().key_id(),
            canonical,
            &turn_read_signature,
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn signer_debug_never_prints_private_material() {
        let signer = SessionSigner::from_key_bytes(&[0x0cu8; 32]).expect("valid seed");
        let debug = format!("{signer:?}");
        assert!(debug.contains(SessionRole::ISSUER));
        assert!(!debug.contains("0c0c0c0c"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn native_smoke_bootstrap_vectors_are_stable() {
        fn assert_identity<R: SigningRole>(
            seed: u8,
            expected_public_key: &str,
            expected_key_id: &str,
        ) {
            let signer = RoleSigner::<R>::from_key_bytes(&[seed; 32]).expect("valid seed");
            assert_eq!(
                crate::hex::lower(&signer.public_key_bytes()),
                expected_public_key
            );
            assert_eq!(signer.identity().key_id(), expected_key_id);
        }

        assert_identity::<ApprovalRole>(
            0x0b,
            "66be7e332c7a453332bd9d0a7f7db055f5c5ef1a06ada66d98b39fb6810c473a",
            "3957902d0fa1c0870ea038f7a4b11e3285138f241eb25ca7461252ffa32302dd",
        );
        assert_identity::<SessionRole>(
            0x0c,
            "0b513ad9b4924015ca0902ed079044d3ac5dbec2306f06948c10da8eb6e39f2d",
            "b8123f51278253aa6f42d45c176c5dbcc28de411185c4c4cf3a37b09be8afacc",
        );
        assert_identity::<TurnReadRole>(
            0x0d,
            "91a28a0b74381593a4d9469579208926afc8ad82c8839b7644359b9eba9a4b3a",
            "5f9b2a2076cbde4a81150c4d8b164b95053f35bcaae5780310a2936590e44672",
        );
        assert_identity::<WebSessionGrantRole>(
            0x0e,
            "0beef5a9e679e6a3e134fe27837bff32c7cb5f5d44ea09bcb0e542bad6a4c0cc",
            "69650566262e58960bc2aa618913468aed27aa5e60d0badb3906935065ba63d6",
        );
        assert_identity::<JournalAttestationRole>(
            0x0f,
            "d9bf2148748a85c89da5aad8ee0b0fc2d105fd39d41a4c796536354f0ae2900c",
            "430dad21c1b44d5872905d82907089116378d6866bb7ac5858c96090d7314435",
        );
        assert_identity::<HandoffRole>(
            0x10,
            "5c9c6df261c9cb840475776aaefcd944b405328fab28f9b3a95ef40490d3de84",
            "c46c8e3f82b40e38adc7ad36620d22dd245cfe62a398b85b294ee9dd288abc7a",
        );
        assert_identity::<SubagentRole>(
            0x11,
            "d04ab232742bb4ab3a1368bd4615e4e6d0224ab71a016baf8520a332c9778737",
            "3eb64fb1252c81f8faa7fa15f4e5ecb4acf5b2dc119a3795d7576465dab22180",
        );
    }

    /// Every signed artifact kind must reject every other kind's signature.
    ///
    /// The matrix uses one private key relabeled into both roles. That removes
    /// key separation as the reason a cross-kind check fails, so only the
    /// artifact domain can carry the property.
    #[test]
    fn each_signed_artifact_kind_rejects_every_other_kind() {
        type Sign = fn(&HandoffSigner, &SubagentSigner, &[u8]) -> Vec<u8>;
        type Classify = fn(
            &RoleTrustSet<HandoffRole>,
            &RoleTrustSet<SubagentRole>,
            &[u8],
            &[u8],
            &[u8],
        ) -> SignatureVerdict;

        let handoff_signer = HandoffSigner::from_seed(31);
        let subagent_signer: SubagentSigner = handoff_signer.relabel_for_test();
        let handoff_trust = RoleTrustSet::<HandoffRole>::current(&handoff_signer);
        let subagent_trust = RoleTrustSet::<SubagentRole>::current(&subagent_signer);
        let canonical = b"identical canonical bytes";
        let kinds: [(&str, Sign, Classify); 4] = [
            (
                "handoff",
                |handoff, _, bytes| handoff.sign_handoff(bytes),
                |handoff, _, key, bytes, signature| handoff.classify_handoff(key, bytes, signature),
            ),
            (
                "handoff-denied",
                |handoff, _, bytes| handoff.sign_handoff_denied(bytes),
                |handoff, _, key, bytes, signature| {
                    handoff.classify_handoff_denied(key, bytes, signature)
                },
            ),
            (
                "subagent-spawn",
                |_, subagent, bytes| subagent.sign_subagent_spawn(bytes),
                |_, subagent, key, bytes, signature| {
                    subagent.classify_subagent_spawn(key, bytes, signature)
                },
            ),
            (
                "subagent-result",
                |_, subagent, bytes| subagent.sign_subagent_result(bytes),
                |_, subagent, key, bytes, signature| {
                    subagent.classify_subagent_result(key, bytes, signature)
                },
            ),
        ];

        let public_key = handoff_signer.public_key_bytes();
        for (source_name, sign, _) in &kinds {
            let signature = sign(&handoff_signer, &subagent_signer, canonical);
            for (target_name, _, classify) in &kinds {
                let verdict = classify(
                    &handoff_trust,
                    &subagent_trust,
                    &public_key,
                    canonical,
                    &signature,
                );
                let expected = if source_name == target_name {
                    SignatureVerdict::Verified
                } else {
                    SignatureVerdict::Invalid
                };
                assert_eq!(
                    verdict, expected,
                    "a {source_name} signature checked as {target_name}",
                );
            }
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_signature_from_an_untrusted_key_classifies_as_untrusted() {
        let deployment = HandoffSigner::from_seed(41);
        let stranger = HandoffSigner::from_seed(42);
        let trust = RoleTrustSet::<HandoffRole>::current(&deployment);
        let canonical = b"handoff canonical bytes";

        assert_eq!(
            trust.classify_handoff(
                &deployment.public_key_bytes(),
                canonical,
                &deployment.sign_handoff(canonical),
            ),
            SignatureVerdict::Verified
        );
        assert_eq!(
            trust.classify_handoff(
                &stranger.public_key_bytes(),
                canonical,
                &stranger.sign_handoff(canonical),
            ),
            SignatureVerdict::Untrusted
        );
        assert_eq!(
            trust.classify_handoff(
                &deployment.public_key_bytes(),
                b"tampered canonical bytes",
                &deployment.sign_handoff(canonical),
            ),
            SignatureVerdict::Invalid
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_retired_key_stays_trusted_for_its_role() {
        let current = SubagentSigner::from_seed(43);
        let retired = SubagentSigner::from_seed(44);
        let trust =
            RoleTrustSet::<SubagentRole>::checked(vec![current.identity(), retired.identity()])
                .expect("valid role history");
        let canonical = b"subagent result canonical bytes";

        for signer in [&current, &retired] {
            assert_eq!(
                trust.classify_subagent_result(
                    &signer.public_key_bytes(),
                    canonical,
                    &signer.sign_subagent_result(canonical),
                ),
                SignatureVerdict::Verified
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_malformed_embedded_key_classifies_as_invalid() {
        let signer = HandoffSigner::from_seed(45);
        let trust = RoleTrustSet::<HandoffRole>::current(&signer);
        let canonical = b"handoff canonical bytes";

        assert_eq!(
            trust.classify_handoff(b"not-a-key", canonical, &signer.sign_handoff(canonical)),
            SignatureVerdict::Invalid
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn verdict_names_are_stable() {
        assert_eq!(SignatureVerdict::Verified.as_str(), "verified");
        assert_eq!(SignatureVerdict::Invalid.as_str(), "invalid");
        assert_eq!(SignatureVerdict::Untrusted.as_str(), "untrusted");
        assert_eq!(SignatureVerdict::Untrusted.to_string(), "untrusted");
    }
}