polyc_crypto/

approval_assertion.rs

//! Canonical signing for an approval's asserted responder (`#1553`).
//!
//! An [`AssertedApproval`] is the edge's signed statement of *which human*
//! resolved a pending approval. It rides inside the
//! [`ApprovalResponseRequest`] it describes, and it commits to that whole
//! request: this module's [`APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX`] followed by
//! the buffa encoding of the request with the assertion's `signature_hex`
//! cleared. Both signer and verifier clear that one field before encoding, so
//! the signature covers every other field of the request — including the
//! `turn_id`, the `decision` oneof, an `Approve`'s `modified_args_json` and
//! `injected_context`, the `resolve_token`, and the asserted `responder` — but
//! not itself.
//!
//! Signing the whole request rather than just the identity is the point.
//! An assertion over `(turn_id, request_id, conversation_id, responder)` alone would
//! leave a validly-signed envelope replayable with approve swapped for deny,
//! or with the arguments that actually execute rewritten
//! (`docs/reference/verified-approver.md`, decision 3). [`canonical_bytes`]
//! clones the whole request and clears only that one field, so any field
//! later added to either message is covered without further change here.
//!
//! The domain prefix is a sibling of
//! [`crate::edge_identity`]'s `EDGE_IDENTITY_DOMAIN_PREFIX`: a signature
//! minted as an edge-identity envelope never verifies as an approval
//! assertion, and the reverse (INV-A4, proven by
//! `edge_identity_signature_never_verifies_as_an_approval_assertion` and its
//! mirror rather than assumed from the two constants differing).
//!
//! Use [`attach_approval_assertion`] to put a signed assertion on a request,
//! or [`sign_approval_assertion`] for the signature alone;
//! [`verify_approval_assertion`] checks it against the candidate signing keys
//! the caller resolved for the asserting edge. The verifier never panics — a
//! malformed `signature_hex` surfaces as `false`.

use buffa::Message as _;
use polyc_proto::proto::polychrome::approval::v1::{ApprovalResponseRequest, AssertedApproval};

use crate::{Signer, verify};

/// Domain-separation prefix prepended to an approval assertion's signed bytes
/// (trailing NUL, exactly like `edge_identity`'s own prefix, so no legal
/// buffa encoding can extend it into a prefix collision).
///
/// The exact bytes are load-bearing: changing them invalidates every
/// currently-live approval assertion. Pinned in
/// `polyc-conformance-vectors::APPROVAL_ASSERTION` (`crates/conformance-vectors/vectors/approval-assertion.json`).
pub const APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX: &[u8] = b"polychrome.approval-assertion.v1\0";

/// Canonical bytes for the assertion carried on `request`.
///
/// [`APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX`] followed by the encoding of the whole
/// request with the assertion's `signature_hex` cleared, so the signature
/// commits to everything *except* itself.
///
/// A request carrying no assertion still has canonical bytes — they simply
/// describe a request with an absent assertion. That case is never signed in
/// practice; [`verify_approval_assertion`] refuses it before reaching here.
#[must_use]
pub fn canonical_bytes(request: &ApprovalResponseRequest) -> Vec<u8> {
    let mut canonical = request.clone();
    if let Some(assertion) = canonical.asserted_approval.as_option_mut() {
        assertion.signature_hex.clear();
    }
    let encoded = canonical.encode_to_vec();
    let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX.len() + encoded.len());
    bytes.extend_from_slice(APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX);
    bytes.extend_from_slice(&encoded);
    bytes
}

/// Sign the canonical bytes of `request`; returns the lowercase-hex signature
/// suitable for [`AssertedApproval::signature_hex`].
///
/// The request must already carry the assertion being signed — the signature
/// covers the asserted `edge_id` and `responder` too. Prefer
/// [`attach_approval_assertion`], which makes that ordering impossible to get
/// wrong.
#[must_use]
pub fn sign_approval_assertion(signer: &Signer, request: &ApprovalResponseRequest) -> String {
    crate::hex::lower(&signer.sign(&canonical_bytes(request)))
}

/// Put `assertion` on `request` and sign it in place.
///
/// Whatever `signature_hex` `assertion` arrives with is irrelevant:
/// [`canonical_bytes`] clears the field before encoding, and the minted
/// signature then replaces it.
pub fn attach_approval_assertion(
    signer: &Signer,
    request: &mut ApprovalResponseRequest,
    assertion: AssertedApproval,
) {
    request.asserted_approval = buffa::MessageField::some(assertion);
    let signature = sign_approval_assertion(signer, request);
    if let Some(attached) = request.asserted_approval.as_option_mut() {
        attached.signature_hex = signature;
    }
}

/// Verify the assertion carried on `request`.
///
/// `candidate_public_keys` are the enrolled signing keys the caller resolved
/// for the asserting `AssertedApproval::edge_id`, encoded the way [`verify`]
/// expects.
///
/// Returns `false` when the request carries no assertion, when its
/// `signature_hex` is not valid hex, or when no candidate key verifies the
/// signature — never panics. Every candidate is checked with no early exit,
/// mirroring `ingest_gate`'s edge-envelope scan, so the number of candidates
/// examined does not become a signal for which key matched.
///
/// A caller that needs to know *which* key matched (to prefer an `Active` key
/// over a `Retiring` one, as edge-envelope verification does) calls this once
/// per candidate instead.
#[must_use]
pub fn verify_approval_assertion<'a, K>(
    candidate_public_keys: K,
    request: &ApprovalResponseRequest,
) -> bool
where
    K: IntoIterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
{
    let Some(assertion) = request.asserted_approval.as_option() else {
        return false;
    };
    let Some(signature) = crate::hex::decode(&assertion.signature_hex) else {
        return false;
    };
    let bytes = canonical_bytes(request);
    let mut verified = false;
    for public_key in candidate_public_keys {
        if verify(public_key, &bytes, &signature) {
            verified = true;
        }
    }
    verified
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    #![allow(clippy::pedantic, clippy::nursery, missing_docs)]

    use polyc_proto::proto::polychrome::approval::v1::{
        Approve, Deny, approval_response_request::Decision,
    };
    use polyc_proto::proto::polychrome::persona::v1::ExternalIdentity;

    use super::*;

    fn sample_responder() -> ExternalIdentity {
        ExternalIdentity {
            provider: "chat".to_owned(),
            scope: "team-1".to_owned(),
            external_id: "U123".to_owned(),
            display_name: "Ada".to_owned(),
            ..Default::default()
        }
    }

    fn sample_assertion() -> AssertedApproval {
        AssertedApproval {
            edge_id: "chat".to_owned(),
            responder: buffa::MessageField::some(sample_responder()),
            ..Default::default()
        }
    }

    fn sample_request() -> ApprovalResponseRequest {
        ApprovalResponseRequest {
            turn_id: "018f47f0-5f70-7cc5-98df-123456789abc".to_owned(),
            request_id: "req-1".to_owned(),
            conversation_id: "chat:team-1:general".to_owned(),
            resolve_token: "token-1".to_owned(),
            decision: Some(Decision::Approve(Box::new(Approve {
                reason: "looks right".to_owned(),
                ..Default::default()
            }))),
            ..Default::default()
        }
    }

    fn signed_request(signer: &Signer) -> ApprovalResponseRequest {
        let mut request = sample_request();
        attach_approval_assertion(signer, &mut request, sample_assertion());
        request
    }

    /// Candidate-key list of one, the shape every test below verifies with.
    fn keys(public_key: &[u8]) -> [&[u8]; 1] {
        [public_key]
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trips() {
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let request = signed_request(&signer);
        assert!(
            !request
                .asserted_approval
                .as_option()
                .unwrap()
                .signature_hex
                .is_empty()
        );
        assert!(verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request));
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_responder_fails() {
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = signed_request(&signer);
        request.asserted_approval.as_option_mut().unwrap().responder =
            buffa::MessageField::some(ExternalIdentity {
                external_id: "U999".to_owned(),
                ..sample_responder()
            });
        assert!(
            !verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request),
            "swapping the asserted responder must invalidate the signature (INV-A3)"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_decision_fails() {
        // Decision 3: an assertion that covered only the identity would stay
        // valid with approve swapped for deny. The canonical bytes are the
        // whole request, so it does not.
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = signed_request(&signer);
        request.decision = Some(Decision::Deny(Box::new(Deny {
            reason: "looks right".to_owned(),
            ..Default::default()
        })));
        assert!(
            !verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request),
            "swapping approve for deny must invalidate the signature (INV-A5)"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_modified_args_fails() {
        // The other half of decision 3: the decision variant is unchanged,
        // but what actually executes is not.
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = signed_request(&signer);
        request.decision = Some(Decision::Approve(Box::new(Approve {
            modified_args_json: r#"{"path":"/"}"#.to_owned(),
            reason: "looks right".to_owned(),
            ..Default::default()
        })));
        assert!(!verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request));
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_occurrence_identity_fails() {
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = signed_request(&signer);
        request.turn_id = "018f47f0-5f70-7cc5-98df-123456789abd".to_owned();
        assert!(
            !verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request),
            "an assertion is bound to one approval occurrence's turn (INV-A5)"
        );

        let mut request = signed_request(&signer);
        request.request_id = "req-2".to_owned();
        assert!(
            !verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request),
            "an assertion is bound to one request_id (INV-A5)"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_conversation_id_fails() {
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = signed_request(&signer);
        request.conversation_id = "chat:team-1:secrets".to_owned();
        assert!(
            !verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request),
            "an assertion is bound to one conversation_id (INV-A5)"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_resolve_token_fails() {
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = signed_request(&signer);
        request.resolve_token = "token-2".to_owned();
        assert!(!verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request));
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_edge_id_fails() {
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = signed_request(&signer);
        request.asserted_approval.as_option_mut().unwrap().edge_id = "messaging".to_owned();
        assert!(!verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request));
    }

    #[test]
    fn wrong_key_fails() {
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let other = Signer::from_seed(42);
        let request = signed_request(&signer);
        assert!(!verify_approval_assertion(
            keys(&other.public_key_bytes()),
            &request
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verifies_against_any_candidate_key() {
        // Rotation overlap: the caller hands over every candidate key and one
        // of them is the signer's.
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let retiring = Signer::from_seed(42);
        let retiring_pk = retiring.public_key_bytes();
        let active_pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let request = signed_request(&signer);
        let candidates: [&[u8]; 2] = [&retiring_pk, &active_pk];
        assert!(verify_approval_assertion(candidates, &request));
    }

    #[test]
    fn no_candidate_keys_fails() {
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let request = signed_request(&signer);
        let candidates: [&[u8]; 0] = [];
        assert!(!verify_approval_assertion(candidates, &request));
    }

    #[test]
    fn absent_assertion_fails() {
        // Decision 4: no assertion is not an error here, just "unverified".
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let request = sample_request();
        assert!(!verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request));
    }

    #[test]
    fn unsigned_assertion_fails() {
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = sample_request();
        request.asserted_approval = buffa::MessageField::some(sample_assertion());
        assert!(!verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request));
    }

    #[test]
    fn garbage_signature_hex_returns_false_not_panic() {
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = signed_request(&signer);
        for garbage in ["not-hex!", "abc", "", "zz", &"ab".repeat(4096)] {
            request
                .asserted_approval
                .as_option_mut()
                .unwrap()
                .signature_hex = garbage.to_owned();
            assert!(
                !verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request),
                "malformed signature_hex {garbage:?} must return false, not panic"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_stale_signature_does_not_change_the_minted_one() {
        // `canonical_bytes` clears `signature_hex` before encoding, so an
        // assertion arriving with a leftover (or attacker-chosen) signature
        // mints the identical signature one arriving clean does. Without that
        // clear, the signature would depend on the value it replaces and no
        // two signers would agree on the same request.
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();

        let mut clean = sample_request();
        attach_approval_assertion(&signer, &mut clean, sample_assertion());

        let mut stale = sample_request();
        attach_approval_assertion(
            &signer,
            &mut stale,
            AssertedApproval {
                signature_hex: "deadbeef".to_owned(),
                ..sample_assertion()
            },
        );

        assert_eq!(
            clean.asserted_approval.as_option().unwrap().signature_hex,
            stale.asserted_approval.as_option().unwrap().signature_hex
        );
        assert!(verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &stale));
    }

    #[test]
    fn undomained_signature_is_rejected() {
        // A signature the SAME signer minted over the RAW request encoding
        // (no domain prefix at all) must never verify.
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = sample_request();
        request.asserted_approval = buffa::MessageField::some(sample_assertion());
        let raw = request.encode_to_vec();
        request
            .asserted_approval
            .as_option_mut()
            .unwrap()
            .signature_hex = crate::hex::lower(&signer.sign(&raw));
        assert!(!verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request));
    }

    #[test]
    fn edge_identity_signature_never_verifies_as_an_approval_assertion() {
        // INV-A4, forward direction. The signer mints a signature over this
        // request's canonical payload but under the EDGE-IDENTITY domain
        // prefix — the exact confusion a shared prefix would allow. Uses the
        // real `edge_identity` constant, not a copy.
        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut request = sample_request();
        request.asserted_approval = buffa::MessageField::some(sample_assertion());
        let encoded = request.encode_to_vec();

        let mut cross_domain = Vec::new();
        cross_domain.extend_from_slice(crate::edge_identity::EDGE_IDENTITY_DOMAIN_PREFIX);
        cross_domain.extend_from_slice(&encoded);
        request
            .asserted_approval
            .as_option_mut()
            .unwrap()
            .signature_hex = crate::hex::lower(&signer.sign(&cross_domain));

        assert!(
            !verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request),
            "a signature minted under the edge-identity prefix must not verify as an approval \
             assertion (INV-A4)"
        );

        // The same signer over the SAME payload under the approval prefix
        // does verify — proving the rejection above is the prefix doing the
        // work, not an unrelated mismatch.
        let mut same_domain = Vec::new();
        same_domain.extend_from_slice(APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX);
        same_domain.extend_from_slice(&encoded);
        request
            .asserted_approval
            .as_option_mut()
            .unwrap()
            .signature_hex = crate::hex::lower(&signer.sign(&same_domain));
        assert!(verify_approval_assertion(keys(&pk), &request));
    }

    #[test]
    fn approval_assertion_signature_never_verifies_as_an_edge_identity_envelope() {
        // INV-A4, reverse direction: a signature minted under the APPROVAL
        // prefix must not verify as an edge-identity envelope.
        use polyc_proto::proto::polychrome::agent::v1::AssertedAttribution;

        let signer = Signer::from_seed(41);
        let pk = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let mut envelope = AssertedAttribution {
            edge_id: "chat".to_owned(),
            conversation_id: "chat:team-1:general".to_owned(),
            nonce: "nonce-1".to_owned(),
            issued_unix_ms: 1_700_000_000_000,
            caller: buffa::MessageField::some(sample_responder()),
            exec_id: "exec-1".to_owned(),
            content_hash: crate::edge_identity::content_hash_hex(b"messages-bytes"),
            ..Default::default()
        };
        let encoded = envelope.encode_to_vec();

        let mut cross_domain = Vec::new();
        cross_domain.extend_from_slice(APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX);
        cross_domain.extend_from_slice(&encoded);
        envelope.signature_hex = crate::hex::lower(&signer.sign(&cross_domain));
        assert!(
            !crate::edge_identity::verify_edge_assertion(&pk, &envelope),
            "a signature minted under the approval-assertion prefix must not verify as an \
             edge-identity envelope (INV-A4)"
        );

        // Same signer, same payload, correct prefix: verifies. Isolates the
        // rejection above to the domain separation.
        crate::edge_identity::sign_edge_assertion_into(&signer, &mut envelope);
        assert!(crate::edge_identity::verify_edge_assertion(&pk, &envelope));
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_two_domain_prefixes_are_distinct_and_nul_terminated() {
        assert_ne!(
            APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX,
            crate::edge_identity::EDGE_IDENTITY_DOMAIN_PREFIX
        );
        assert_eq!(APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX.last(), Some(&0u8));
    }
}

/// Drives `polyc-conformance-vectors::APPROVAL_ASSERTION` (`crates/conformance-vectors/vectors/approval-assertion.json`) — the pinned,
/// implementation-independent vectors for this artifact, so a future port in
/// another language cannot silently disagree about the canonical bytes, the
/// domain prefix, or which mutations must break a signature.
#[cfg(test)]
mod conformance {
    #![allow(clippy::pedantic, clippy::nursery, missing_docs)]

    use buffa::Message as _;
    use polyc_proto::proto::polychrome::approval::v1::{
        Approve, Deny, approval_response_request::Decision,
    };
    use polyc_proto::proto::polychrome::persona::v1::ExternalIdentity;
    use serde_json::Value;

    use super::*;

    const VECTORS: &str = polyc_conformance_vectors::APPROVAL_ASSERTION;

    fn vectors() -> Value {
        serde_json::from_str(VECTORS).expect("the conformance vector file is valid JSON")
    }

    fn hex_of(v: &Value, path: &[&str]) -> Vec<u8> {
        let mut node = v;
        for key in path {
            node = &node[*key];
        }
        crate::hex::decode(node.as_str().expect("a hex string")).expect("valid hex")
    }

    /// The vector's request, rebuilt field by field from the JSON — so the
    /// test proves the encoder agrees with the vector, not merely that the
    /// vector agrees with itself.
    fn vector_request(v: &Value) -> ApprovalResponseRequest {
        let r = &v["vector"]["request"];
        let approve = &r["decision"]["Approve"];
        let responder = &r["asserted_approval"]["responder"];
        ApprovalResponseRequest {
            request_id: r["request_id"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
            conversation_id: r["conversation_id"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
            resolve_token: r["resolve_token"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
            decision: Some(Decision::Approve(Box::new(Approve {
                modified_args_json: approve["modified_args_json"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
                injected_context: approve["injected_context"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
                reason: approve["reason"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
                approved_for_session: approve["approved_for_session"].as_bool().unwrap(),
                ..Default::default()
            }))),
            asserted_approval: buffa::MessageField::some(AssertedApproval {
                edge_id: r["asserted_approval"]["edge_id"]
                    .as_str()
                    .unwrap()
                    .to_owned(),
                responder: buffa::MessageField::some(ExternalIdentity {
                    provider: responder["provider"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
                    scope: responder["scope"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
                    external_id: responder["external_id"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
                    display_name: responder["display_name"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
                    time_zone: responder["time_zone"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned(),
                    ..Default::default()
                }),
                ..Default::default()
            }),
            ..Default::default()
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_pinned_domain_prefix_is_the_one_this_crate_uses() {
        let v = vectors();
        assert_eq!(
            v["domain_separation"]["approval_assertion_prefix_ascii"]
                .as_str()
                .unwrap()
                .as_bytes(),
            APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX
        );
        assert_eq!(
            hex_of(&v, &["domain_separation", "approval_assertion_prefix_hex"]),
            APPROVAL_ASSERTION_DOMAIN_PREFIX
        );
        assert_eq!(
            v["domain_separation"]["edge_identity_prefix_ascii"]
                .as_str()
                .unwrap()
                .as_bytes(),
            crate::edge_identity::EDGE_IDENTITY_DOMAIN_PREFIX
        );
        assert_eq!(
            v["signature_scheme"]["namespace_ascii"]
                .as_str()
                .unwrap()
                .as_bytes(),
            crate::NAMESPACE
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_known_good_vector_reproduces_its_bytes_and_signature() {
        let v = vectors();
        let request = vector_request(&v);

        assert_eq!(
            request.encode_to_vec(),
            hex_of(&v, &["vector", "expected_request_encoding_hex"]),
            "the buffa encoding of the vector's request must match the pinned bytes"
        );

        let canonical = canonical_bytes(&request);
        assert_eq!(
            canonical,
            hex_of(&v, &["vector", "expected_canonical_bytes_hex"]),
            "canonical bytes must be the domain prefix followed by that encoding"
        );

        // The exact ed25519 preimage: commonware's union_unique, whose
        // namespace length varint is a single byte at this length.
        let mut preimage = vec![u8::try_from(crate::NAMESPACE.len()).unwrap()];
        preimage.extend_from_slice(crate::NAMESPACE);
        preimage.extend_from_slice(&canonical);
        assert_eq!(
            preimage,
            hex_of(&v, &["vector", "expected_ed25519_message_hex"])
        );

        let private_key = hex_of(&v, &["signer", "ed25519_private_key_hex"]);
        let signer = Signer::from_key_bytes(&private_key).expect("valid key material");
        let public_key = signer.public_key_bytes();
        assert_eq!(
            public_key,
            hex_of(&v, &["signer", "ed25519_public_key_hex"]),
            "the pinned public key must be the one the pinned private key derives"
        );

        let expected_signature = v["vector"]["expected_signature_hex"].as_str().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            sign_approval_assertion(&signer, &request),
            expected_signature,
            "signing the vector's request must reproduce the pinned signature"
        );

        let mut signed = request;
        signed
            .asserted_approval
            .as_option_mut()
            .unwrap()
            .signature_hex = expected_signature.to_owned();
        assert!(
            verify_approval_assertion([public_key.as_slice()], &signed),
            "the known-good vector must verify"
        );
    }

    /// Applies each `must_not_verify` mutation to the known-good request,
    /// checks the mutated request encodes to the bytes the vector pinned for
    /// it (so the vector and this code describe the same mutation), and then
    /// checks the pinned signature no longer verifies.
    #[test]
    fn every_pinned_mutation_breaks_verification() {
        let v = vectors();
        let private_key = hex_of(&v, &["signer", "ed25519_private_key_hex"]);
        let signer = Signer::from_key_bytes(&private_key).expect("valid key material");
        let public_key = signer.public_key_bytes();
        let good_signature = v["vector"]["expected_signature_hex"].as_str().unwrap();

        let base = {
            let mut base = vector_request(&v);
            base.asserted_approval
                .as_option_mut()
                .unwrap()
                .signature_hex = good_signature.to_owned();
            base
        };

        let cases = v["must_not_verify"].as_array().expect("a list of cases");
        assert_eq!(cases.len(), 6, "every pinned case must be exercised");

        for case in cases {
            let id = case["id"].as_str().unwrap();
            let mut request = base.clone();

            match id {
                "tampered-responder" => {
                    request
                        .asserted_approval
                        .as_option_mut()
                        .unwrap()
                        .responder
                        .as_option_mut()
                        .unwrap()
                        .external_id = "U0EVE".to_owned();
                }
                "tampered-decision" => {
                    request.decision = Some(Decision::Deny(Box::new(Deny {
                        reason: "approved by Ada".to_owned(),
                        ..Default::default()
                    })));
                }
                "tampered-modified-args" => {
                    let Some(Decision::Approve(approve)) = request.decision.as_mut() else {
                        panic!("the vector's decision is an Approve");
                    };
                    approve.modified_args_json = r#"{"path":"/etc/shadow"}"#.to_owned();
                }
                "tampered-resolve-token" => {
                    request.resolve_token = "resolve-token-conformance-2".to_owned();
                }
                "cross-domain-edge-identity" | "malformed-signature-hex" => {
                    // These leave the request alone and change only the
                    // signature; handled below.
                }
                other => panic!("unhandled conformance case {other}"),
            }

            assert_eq!(
                crate::hex::lower(&canonical_bytes(&request)),
                case["canonical_bytes_hex"].as_str().unwrap(),
                "case {id}: the mutation applied here must be the one the vector pinned"
            );

            let signatures: Vec<String> = case["signature_hex"].as_str().map_or_else(
                || {
                    case["signature_hex_values"]
                        .as_array()
                        .expect("one of signature_hex / signature_hex_values")
                        .iter()
                        .map(|s| s.as_str().unwrap().to_owned())
                        .collect()
                },
                |s| vec![s.to_owned()],
            );

            for signature in signatures {
                request
                    .asserted_approval
                    .as_option_mut()
                    .unwrap()
                    .signature_hex = signature.clone();
                assert!(
                    !verify_approval_assertion([public_key.as_slice()], &request),
                    "case {id}: signature {signature:?} must not verify"
                );
            }
        }
    }
}