Expand description
Provenance signatures for polychrome.
Wraps commonware-cryptography ed25519 so the harness can sign the bytes
that back a tool call’s signature field and the control plane can verify
them. A fixed NAMESPACE provides cross-domain separation (a signature
minted here cannot be replayed in another context).
This primitive is runtime-agnostic — it does not pull in commonware-runtime
or commonware-p2p.
Modules§
- approval
- HITL approval payload encoders/decoders and signer.
- canon
- Canonical JSON form for approval and mandate args binding.
- grant
- Remembered-approval grant canonicals and their verification path.
- handoff
- Canonical signing for handoff (sub-agent transfer) provenance.
- hex
- Lowercase-hex encoding shared by every signed-artifact module.
- mandate
- AP2-style pre-authorization mandates: canonical signing plus the chain that narrows them (Intent → Cart → Payment).
- sensitive
Sensitive<T>: a secret-value wrapper that redactsDebug/Display, never serializes, and zeroizes its contents on drop (#1169).- subagent
- Canonical signing for sub-agent delegation provenance (
#872). - tls
- Shared CA-bundle PEM loading for TLS trust stores.
- toolcall
- Canonical signing for tool-call provenance.
Structs§
- Signer
- An ed25519 signing key.
Enums§
- Signer
Error - Raised building a
Signerfrom raw key-material bytes (#784) — e.g. loaded from a secret store — rather than the insecure deterministicSigner::from_seed.
Constants§
- NAMESPACE
- Domain-separation namespace prepended to every polychrome signature.
Functions§
- verify
- Verify
sigovermsgagainst an encodedpublic_key.