pub enum SignatureState {
Signed {
signer: String,
anchored: bool,
},
Unsigned,
}Expand description
Outcome of verifying the vault’s Ed25519 signature at load time.
An invalid signature never reaches here — it fails the load as tampering.
So the working state distinguishes “signed” from “unsigned” (integrity then
rests on git). The binary warns on Unsigned, and on a Signed that is not
yet anchored.
Variants§
Signed
A valid signature produced by signer (a current recipient).
anchored is whether the signer’s verifying key is trusted independently
of the (attacker-mutable) meta registry: always true for ssh-ed25519
signers (the key is in the recipient string), and true for age signers
whose key matched a prior local pin. When false — an age signer’s key seen
for the first time on this machine — the signature is trust-on-first-use,
not yet authenticated authorship; git commit signing is the anchor.
Unsigned
No signature present — the last writer had no signing-capable identity.
Trait Implementations§
Source§impl Clone for SignatureState
impl Clone for SignatureState
Source§fn clone(&self) -> SignatureState
fn clone(&self) -> SignatureState
1.0.0 (const: unstable) · Source§fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)
fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)
source. Read more