pub struct SandboxRecord {
pub enforcing: bool,
pub mode: String,
pub granted_digest: String,
pub dropped: Vec<DroppedGrant>,
}Expand description
What the sandbox actually installed, recorded at the moment it sealed.
A seatbelt profile cannot be widened after sandbox_init, so this is fixed
for the process’s lifetime — the same lifetime as the lock file it rides in.
Without it, profile.yaml is the only readable account of an agent’s
permissions, and it describes what was asked for rather than what took
effect.
Fields§
§enforcing: boolFalse means the kernel sandbox is NOT installed and only advisory hooks remain — the agent then has MORE access than its profile grants, which is the opposite of every other failure here and the one worth shouting.
mode: String"macos-sbpl", "linux-landlock", "advisory-only", …
granted_digest: StringDigest of entitlements.filesystem as sealed. Comparing it against the
profile on disk answers “were grants changed since this agent started”
without anyone tracking that — and unlike card_digest it does not move
when an unrelated field does, so it cannot raise a false alarm.
dropped: Vec<DroppedGrant>Grants that did not reach the kernel. Empty is the normal case.
Trait Implementations§
Source§impl Clone for SandboxRecord
impl Clone for SandboxRecord
Source§fn clone(&self) -> SandboxRecord
fn clone(&self) -> SandboxRecord
1.0.0 (const: unstable) · Source§fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)
fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)
source. Read more