Struct ToolRegistry 

pub struct ToolRegistry { /* private fields */ }

Implementations

impl ToolRegistry

pub fn new( config: &Config, channel_registry: Arc<ChannelRegistry>, db: Arc<Database>, memory_backend: Arc<MemoryBackend>, ) -> Self

pub fn new_sub_agent( config: &Config, db: Arc<Database>, channel_registry: Option<Arc<ChannelRegistry>>, allow_session_tools: bool, ) -> Self

Create a restricted tool registry for sub-agents. When allow_session_tools is true, orchestration tools are exposed for depth-limited child spawning.

pub fn add_tool(&mut self, tool: Box<dyn Tool>)

pub fn add_tool_with_risk(&mut self, tool: Box<dyn Tool>, risk: ToolRisk)

Register a tool with an explicit effective risk that replaces the name-derived tool_risk at the policy/approval choke points. Used for MCP tools whose server carries a trust tier.

pub fn register_mcp_tools(&mut self, mcp_manager: &McpManager)

Register every MCP tool from mcp_manager, mapping each server’s trust tier onto the tool’s effective risk. Shared by all boot paths (runtime, ACP) so trust tiers are honored uniformly.

pub fn effective_tool_risk(&self, name: &str) -> ToolRisk

Effective risk of a tool: registration-time override first, then the shared name-derived mapping.

pub fn definitions(&self) -> Vec<ToolDefinition>

pub fn definitions_for(&self, auth: &ToolAuthContext) -> Vec<ToolDefinition>

The catalog auth is actually allowed to use: Self::definitions minus every tool whose call execute_with_auth would block under the operator’s tool_policy (global rules and capability grants). The model is not offered what it cannot run, and a denied tool’s existence is not advertised. Warn-mode violations stay visible: the call runs and is audited. This is advisory only; the choke point in execute_with_auth still enforces the policy on every call.

pub async fn execute(&self, name: &str, input: Value) -> ToolResult

pub async fn execute_with_auth( &self, name: &str, input: Value, auth: &ToolAuthContext, ) -> ToolResult