Struct PeerInput 

pub struct PeerInput {
    pub header: InputHeader,
    pub directed_interaction_id: Option<InteractionId>,
    pub convention: Option<PeerConvention>,
    pub content: ContentInput,
    pub payload: Option<Value>,
    pub handling_mode: Option<HandlingMode>,
    pub sender_taint: Option<SenderContentTaint>,
    pub objective_id: Option<ObjectiveId>,
    pub system_prompts: Vec<String>,
    pub injected_context: Vec<ContentInput>,
}

Peer-originated input from comms.

Fields

header: InputHeader

directed_interaction_id: Option<InteractionId>

Exact per-input interaction identity for a host-residency-fenced supervisor-bridge delivery. Ordinary peer traffic and peer-only legacy bridge deliveries leave this absent.

This persisted field is capability-adjacent data, not authority. The runtime validates its independently carried input, correlation, idempotency, durability, and peer-shape facts before admission and mints terminal-publication metadata from the validated value.

convention: Option<PeerConvention>

The peer convention (message, request, response).

content: ContentInput

The peer content — the single typed owner of this input’s content fact (plain text or multimodal blocks). Message-style peer traffic uses this directly. Request/response prompt projection is runtime-owned and must be reconstructed from convention + payload + source rather than helper-rendered prose. The text projection is derived at read time via ContentInput::text_content; it is never stored separately.

payload: Option<Value>

Structured peer payload, when one exists.

For Request, this is the request params. For Response*, this is the response result payload. Message traffic leaves this unset.

handling_mode: Option<HandlingMode>

Optional handling-mode override for actionable peer inputs. When present on Message/Request/no-convention, overrides kind-based policy defaults. Forbidden on ResponseProgress; ResponseTerminal may carry a typed override for requester reaction urgency (enforced by [validate_peer_handling_mode]).

sender_taint: Option<SenderContentTaint>

Sender-declared content taint carried inside the signed comms envelope, when the sender made a declaration. None means “no declaration” — a real third state that must never be coalesced into meerkat_core::comms::SenderContentTaint::Clean. Content-adjacent payload only: it makes no admission or routing decision. Additive on durable input persistence (absent on older persisted inputs).

objective_id: Option<ObjectiveId>

system_prompts: Vec<String>

Ordinary System messages authored for this exact peer-delivered turn.

This is per-turn transcript content, not immutable session configuration. The runtime preserves exact bytes, duplicates, and admission order when merging a batch.

injected_context: Vec<ContentInput>

Host-attached injected context carried by supervisor-authored work deliveries (remote mob members over the supervisor bridge). Each entry lowers into a separate ConversationAppendRole::InjectedContext transcript append placed immediately BEFORE this input’s peer append, in order. Forbidden on steer-mode deliveries (the steer realization path carries no transcript appends — enforced by crate::peer_handling_mode::validate_peer_handling_mode). Additive on durable input persistence (absent on older persisted inputs).

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for PeerInput

fn clone(&self) -> PeerInput

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for PeerInput

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for PeerInput

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Serialize for PeerInput

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.