Enum ServerIdError 

pub enum ServerIdError {
    InvalidFormat {
        id: String,
    },
    DisallowedCharacter {
        id: String,
        code_point: u32,
    },
}

Error returned when a candidate string fails the invariant ServerId::new enforces.

Every variant’s #[error(...)] message formats its stored string field with {:?} (Debug), not {} (Display) — this is a required second layer of defense, not incidental formatting, and must not be “simplified” to {}. sanitize_untrusted_inline only neutralizes &/</> plus the control/bidi-reordering characters sanitize_untrusted_text targets; it deliberately leaves other characters untouched (e.g. U+200C/U+200D, orthographically load-bearing in some scripts and emoji ZWJ sequences — see that function’s doc comment), so the stored field can still carry a raw invisible or format character. Debug’s own escaping (\u{200d} rather than the literal character) is what keeps that residual case from smuggling an invisible payload into LLM-facing or terminal-rendered error text (issues #425/#430); switching to Display would silently reopen that channel for every field this crate stores unsanitized-but-quoted this way.

Examples

use mcp_execution_core::{ServerId, ServerIdError};

let err = ServerId::new("../etc").unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, ServerIdError::InvalidFormat { .. }));

Variants

InvalidFormat

id is not a single non-empty path segment: it is empty, or contains a .., a path separator, or a root/prefix component.

Fields

id: String

Sanitized form of the rejected input (see sanitize_untrusted_inline): control characters, bidi-reordering characters, and other invisible/structural characters are neutralized, and &/</> are entity-escaped, since this value is attacker-controlled and reaches LLM-facing error text.

DisallowedCharacter

id is a well-formed path segment but contains a character that is not UTS #39 Identifier_Status=Allowed (see crate::first_disallowed_identifier_char).

Fields

id: String

Sanitized form of the rejected input (see sanitize_untrusted_inline): control characters, bidi-reordering characters, and other invisible/structural characters are neutralized, and &/</> are entity-escaped, since this value is attacker-controlled and reaches LLM-facing error text.

code_point: u32

Unicode scalar value of the first disallowed character found, computed from the raw (unsanitized) input.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for ServerIdError

fn clone(&self) -> ServerIdError

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for ServerIdError

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Display for ServerIdError

fn fmt(&self, __formatter: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Eq for ServerIdError

impl Error for ServerIdError

fn source(&self) -> Option<&(dyn Error + 'static)>

Returns the lower-level source of this error, if any.

fn description(&self) -> &str

👎Deprecated since 1.42.0:

use the Display impl or to_string()

fn cause(&self) -> Option<&dyn Error>

👎Deprecated since 1.33.0:

replaced by Error::source, which can support downcasting

fn provide<'a>(&'a self, request: &mut Request<'a>)

🔬This is a nightly-only experimental API. (error_generic_member_access)

Provides type-based access to context intended for error reports.

impl PartialEq for ServerIdError

fn eq(&self, other: &ServerIdError) -> bool

Equality operator ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Inequality operator !=.

impl StructuralPartialEq for ServerIdError