Crate leviath_sys 

Platform/OS-specific system calls for Leviath, isolated behind one cross-platform API.

Every #[cfg(unix)]/#[cfg(windows)] branch and platform permission/signal/TTY primitive used anywhere in the workspace lives here - nowhere else. The unavoidable OS-level unsafe is delegated to audited crates (nix) and safe std APIs, so this crate itself contains no unsafe. Callers use the plain functions re-exported at the crate root and never write a #[cfg] of their own.

Why this crate exists

1. De-duplication. The process_group detach and Permissions::from_mode(0o600) logic each has exactly one implementation here, rather than being spread across call sites in leviath-cli.
2. Per-OS coverage correctness. Because all platform code is gathered into cfg-gated submodules (platform), the non-target implementations (#[cfg(windows)] on a Linux CI run) are simply not compiled, so the coverage tool never sees them as gaps. The Linux-visible code paths are all reachable from real unit tests.
3. Testability. Every function in this crate is exercised by real unit tests - the syscalls here are either safe to call under test (chmod on a tempfile) or split behind an injected seam (tty::osc52_write_via takes the tty opener + sink; perms’ hardening op is a fn pointer). The only genuinely-untestable real-I/O leaves (opening /dev/tty, writing the real stdout()) are composed in the CLI binary, not here - so this crate contains no #[cfg(not(test))].

Re-exports

pub use browser::open_url;

pub use perms::ensure_file_private;

pub use perms::secure_dir_perms;

pub use perms::secure_file_perms;

pub use perms::write_private;

pub use process::peer_uid;

pub use process::configure_detached;

pub use process::current_uid;

pub use process::kill_process_group;

pub use sandbox::ContainerRunSpec;

pub use sandbox::container_exec_argv;

pub use sandbox::container_rm_argv;

pub use sandbox::container_run_argv;

pub use sandbox::detect_container_engine;

pub use sandbox::namespace_argv;

pub use sandbox::namespace_supported;

pub use tty::osc52_write_via;

Modules

browser

Opening a URL in the user’s default browser.

keychain

The OS credential store: macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, and the Secret Service on other Unixes.

perms

File and directory permission hardening.

process

Process control: detached spawning.

sandbox

Sandbox command construction for isolated tool execution.

tty

Terminal clipboard support via the OSC52 escape sequence.