Enum RoomMessage 

pub enum RoomMessage {
    MemberAnnounce {
        sender_fingerprint: String,
        wrapped_session_key: Option<String>,
        display_name: Option<String>,
        sender_ed25519_pubkey: Option<String>,
    },
    SessionKeyRequest {
        requester_fingerprint: String,
    },
    Encrypted {
        sender_fingerprint: String,
        session_id: String,
        ciphertext_b64: String,
    },
    Plain {
        sender_fingerprint: String,
        body: String,
    },
    MemberLeave {
        sender_fingerprint: String,
    },
    RotateRoomKey {
        rotator_fingerprint: String,
        new_salt: Vec<u8>,
    },
    Typing {
        sender_fingerprint: String,
    },
    FileOffer {
        sender_fingerprint: String,
        file_id: String,
        name: String,
        size_bytes: u64,
        mime: Option<String>,
        chunk_count: u32,
        encrypted_meta: Option<EncryptedFileMeta>,
    },
    FileChunk {
        sender_fingerprint: String,
        file_id: String,
        chunk_index: u32,
        total_chunks: u32,
        data_b64: String,
    },
    OwnerGrant {
        room_id: String,
        target_fingerprint: String,
    },
    BanMember {
        room_id: String,
        target_fingerprint: String,
    },
    SasInit {
        tx_id: String,
        ephemeral_x25519_pubkey_b64: String,
        target_fingerprint: String,
    },
    SasResponse {
        tx_id: String,
        ephemeral_x25519_pubkey_b64: String,
    },
    SasConfirm {
        tx_id: String,
        matched: bool,
    },
    JoinRefused {
        room_id: String,
        target_fingerprint: String,
        reason: String,
    },
    CodeJoinRequest {
        room_id: String,
        joiner_x25519_pubkey_b64: String,
        code: String,
    },
    CodeJoinResponse {
        room_id: String,
        target_fingerprint: String,
        owner_x25519_pubkey_b64: String,
        owner_session_id: String,
        wrapped_session_key_b64: String,
        nonce_b64: String,
    },
    ProfileUpdate {
        sender_fingerprint: String,
        username: Option<String>,
        updated_at: i64,
    },
    ContactRequest {
        requester_fingerprint: String,
        display_name: Option<String>,
        note: Option<String>,
        sender_ed25519_pubkey: Option<String>,
    },
}

All messages on a room’s per-room topic.

Variants

MemberAnnounce

Announce my presence in the room. For encrypted rooms, also share my Megolm session key (passphrase-wrapped).

Fields

sender_fingerprint: String

wrapped_session_key: Option<String>

base64(nonce || chacha20poly1305_ciphertext) of the Megolm SessionKey, encrypted under the passphrase-derived key. None for unencrypted rooms.

display_name: Option<String>

Optional human-readable display name. Serde defaults to None for forward compat with older peers.

sender_ed25519_pubkey: Option<String>

Base64 of the sender’s 32-byte Ed25519 public key. Lets every existing member learn the new member’s pubkey on first contact, so they can verify future SignedRoomMessage envelopes from this fingerprint. #[serde(default)] for forward compat: a pre-0.3.0 peer that doesn’t send this still works, but its signed messages can’t be verified until it re-announces.

SessionKeyRequest

A request from a recently-joined member: “I need session keys”. Existing members respond with MemberAnnounce.

Fields

requester_fingerprint: String

Encrypted

An encrypted message in an encrypted room.

Fields

sender_fingerprint: String

session_id: String

ciphertext_b64: String

base64-encoded MegolmMessage bytes

Plain

A plaintext message in an unencrypted room.

Fields

sender_fingerprint: String

body: String

MemberLeave

Explicit leave notification.

Fields

sender_fingerprint: String

RotateRoomKey

“I’m rotating the room key — derive a new passphrase key from new_salt + the new passphrase you’ll be told out-of-band, then wait for my MemberAnnounce.” Phase 3 v1: simplistic — only the rotator’s outbound changes; receivers must opt in by entering the new passphrase to decrypt new wrapped session keys.

Fields

rotator_fingerprint: String

new_salt: Vec<u8>

Argon2id salt for the new passphrase-derived key.

Typing

Ephemeral “I’m typing” signal. TTL on the receive side is 3s.

Fields

sender_fingerprint: String

FileOffer

Announce a file the sender is about to push. The receiver creates an attachment row (status=offered) and waits for chunks. For encrypted rooms encrypted_meta carries the Megolm-wrapped file key + ChaCha20 nonce.

Fields

sender_fingerprint: String

file_id: String

name: String

size_bytes: u64

mime: Option<String>

chunk_count: u32

encrypted_meta: Option<EncryptedFileMeta>

FileChunk

One chunk of an in-flight file. Receivers reassemble by index and verify the final SHA-256 against file_id.

Fields

sender_fingerprint: String

file_id: String

chunk_index: u32

total_chunks: u32

data_b64: String

base64 of raw chunk bytes (plaintext bytes for unencrypted rooms, ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphertext for encrypted).

OwnerGrant

Phase B: an existing owner promotes target_fingerprint to owner. MUST be sent inside WireMessage::Signed — the signer must be on the room’s current owner_fingerprints list for honest receivers to apply the change.

Fields

room_id: String

target_fingerprint: String

BanMember

Phase B: an existing owner bans target_fingerprint from the room. MUST be sent inside WireMessage::Signed. Honest clients then ignore the banned fingerprint’s MemberAnnounce + messages. The cryptographic enforcement is the immediate RotateRoomKey that the banning owner sends right after.

Fields

room_id: String

target_fingerprint: String

SasInit

Phase G: SAS verification step 1. The initiator picks a random tx_id and an ephemeral X25519 keypair, sends the pubkey. MUST be sent inside WireMessage::Signed so the receiver can bind this ephemeral key to the initiator’s Ed25519 identity.

Fields

tx_id: String

ephemeral_x25519_pubkey_b64: String

target_fingerprint: String

SasResponse

Phase G: SAS step 2 — responder’s ephemeral X25519 pubkey. Both sides now have what they need to compute the shared secret and derive the SAS code locally. Signed.

Fields

tx_id: String

ephemeral_x25519_pubkey_b64: String

SasConfirm

Phase G: SAS step 3 — once both sides have OOB-compared the derived code and pressed “Match”, each broadcasts this. On receiving the partner’s matched=true, the local side flips verified=1 for the partner’s fingerprint. Signed.

Fields

tx_id: String

matched: bool

JoinRefused

Phase E: an existing owner of a verified_only room is telling target_fingerprint (an unverified joiner) why their announce went unanswered. Replaces a silent hang on the joiner’s side. Signed.

Fields

room_id: String

target_fingerprint: String

reason: String

CodeJoinRequest

Phase F: a joiner is asking to enter a room using a short-lived owner-issued code (no passphrase). Includes the joiner’s ephemeral X25519 pubkey for ECDH key delivery. Signed (so the owner knows who’s asking).

Fields

room_id: String

joiner_x25519_pubkey_b64: String

code: String

CodeJoinResponse

Phase F: an issuing owner’s response to a valid CodeJoinRequest. Carries the owner’s ephemeral X25519 pubkey + the current Megolm session key wrapped under the ECDH-derived key. Joiner does X25519 the other direction, derives the same wrap key, unwraps the session key. Signed.

Fields

room_id: String

target_fingerprint: String

owner_x25519_pubkey_b64: String

owner_session_id: String

wrapped_session_key_b64: String

nonce_b64: String

ProfileUpdate

Phase 0.5: a peer is announcing (or clearing) their self-declared username. MUST be sent inside WireMessage::Signed — receivers require verified_signer == sender_fingerprint. Last-write-wins by updated_at (monotonic ms). username = None clears the previously-set username and the peer renders as [anonymous].

Fields

sender_fingerprint: String

username: Option<String>

updated_at: i64

ContactRequest

huddle 1.0: a contact/DM request delivered to the target’s relay inbox (inbox_room_id). MUST be sent inside WireMessage::Signed — the signer’s fingerprint IS the requester’s identity (the whole point: it proves who’s asking). Carries the requester’s Ed25519 pubkey so the recipient can TOFU-pin it and later derive the DM ECDH key without a round-trip.

Fields

requester_fingerprint: String

display_name: Option<String>

note: Option<String>

sender_ed25519_pubkey: Option<String>

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for RoomMessage

fn clone(&self) -> RoomMessage

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for RoomMessage

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for RoomMessage

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Serialize for RoomMessage

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.