Struct holochain_zome_types::signature::Signature
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The raw bytes of a signature. The equality is not different, it’s just constant time, so we can derive a hash. For an actually secure thing we wouldn’t want to just assume a safe default hashing But that is not what clippy is complaining about here.
Tuple Fields
0: [u8; 64]
Trait Implementations
Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer. Read more
Trivial new type derivation. Secrets should have private interiors and be constructed directly from fixed length arrays of known length.
Constant time equality check. This mitigates timing attacks where a remote agent can reverse engineer data by measuring tiny changes in latency associated with optimised equality checks. More matching bytes = more latency = vulnerability. This type of attack has been successfully demonstrated over a network despite varied latencies.
This method returns an ordering between self
and other
values if one exists. Read more
This method tests less than (for self
and other
) and is used by the <
operator. Read more
This method tests less than or equal to (for self
and other
) and is used by the <=
operator. Read more
This method tests greater than (for self
and other
) and is used by the >
operator. Read more
Auto Trait Implementations
impl RefUnwindSafe for Signature
impl UnwindSafe for Signature
Blanket Implementations
Mutably borrows from an owned value. Read more
Compare self to key
and return true
if they are equal.
pub fn vzip(self) -> V
Attaches the provided Subscriber
to this type, returning a
WithDispatch
wrapper. Read more
Attaches the current default Subscriber
to this type, returning a
WithDispatch
wrapper. Read more