pub struct ProxySession { /* private fields */ }Expand description
Platform-neutral authenticated proxy admission state.
Implementations§
Source§impl ProxySession
impl ProxySession
Sourcepub fn new(config: ProxyConfig) -> Result<Self, ProxyError>
pub fn new(config: ProxyConfig) -> Result<Self, ProxyError>
Open one non-cloneable proxy session.
Sourcepub const fn endpoint(&self) -> LoopbackEndpoint
pub const fn endpoint(&self) -> LoopbackEndpoint
Exact numeric loopback endpoint.
Browser callback authorization value.
Sourcepub const fn registry_generation(&self) -> u64
pub const fn registry_generation(&self) -> u64
Current in-memory publication-registry generation.
Sourcepub fn publication_count(&self) -> usize
pub fn publication_count(&self) -> usize
Number of publication records currently resident in memory.
Sourcepub fn authentication_challenge(&self) -> Vec<u8> ⓘ
pub fn authentication_challenge(&self) -> Vec<u8> ⓘ
Bounded 407 response for missing/invalid proxy authentication.
Sourcepub fn admit_connect(
&mut self,
engine: &Engine,
client: SocketAddr,
request_head: &[u8],
now: u64,
) -> Result<PendingConnect, ProxyError>
pub fn admit_connect( &mut self, engine: &Engine, client: SocketAddr, request_head: &[u8], now: u64, ) -> Result<PendingConnect, ProxyError>
Admit one strict authenticated loopback CONNECT before origin TLS.
now must come from the native host’s trusted nondecreasing clock.
Rollback is rejected. Expired pending records are removed before the
capacity check, and every returned handle carries its exact exclusive
deadline.
Atomically publish one engine-issued provider authority.
The context is consumed even when publication fails. Expired or engine-invalid records are reclaimed before uniqueness and capacity checks without advancing the generation because they can no longer authorize a tunnel. Current records are unchanged unless every authority, lifecycle, bound, time, uniqueness, capacity, and expected-generation check succeeds.
Atomically replace one exact-origin publication with fresh authority.
The old handle and replacement context are consumed. Replacement cannot change the logical origin, publication identity, process, or listener.
Atomically revoke one exact-origin publication.
The handle is consumed and the generation advances only after the exact publication and expected registry generation match.
Convert one pending CONNECT into a short-lived exact-origin grant.
The pending token is consumed before any publication or engine check can succeed or fail. The published admission remains usable for another separately authenticated CONNECT only while every generation remains current.
Sourcepub fn revalidate_tunnel_grant(
&mut self,
engine: &Engine,
grant: &TunnelGrant,
expected_registry_generation: u64,
now: u64,
) -> Result<(), ProxyError>
pub fn revalidate_tunnel_grant( &mut self, engine: &Engine, grant: &TunnelGrant, expected_registry_generation: u64, now: u64, ) -> Result<(), ProxyError>
Revalidate a grant immediately before native listener or origin I/O.
This check is intentionally generation-wide: any publish, replace, or revoke invalidates an outstanding grant until the CONNECT is admitted again. It also rejects another process/listener instance, a replaced or revoked exact-origin publication, security-invalidating engine transition, and expiry. Ordinary later engine admissions do not revoke the retained opaque authority.
Sourcepub fn cancel(&mut self, pending: &PendingConnect) -> Result<(), ProxyError>
pub fn cancel(&mut self, pending: &PendingConnect) -> Result<(), ProxyError>
Cancel one exact pending request.