Struct LocalProcessCredentials 

pub struct LocalProcessCredentials { /* private fields */ }

Credentials handler for the local-process deployer.

Holds the configured port range (defaults to DEFAULT_PORT_RANGE). The handler is the same singleton for the whole process — there is nothing per-env to remember today.

Implementations

impl LocalProcessCredentials

pub fn new() -> Self

pub fn with_port_range(range: RangeInclusive<u16>) -> Self

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for LocalProcessCredentials

fn clone(&self) -> LocalProcessCredentials

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for LocalProcessCredentials

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Default for LocalProcessCredentials

fn default() -> Self

Returns the “default value” for a type.

impl DeployerCredentials for LocalProcessCredentials

fn requires_credentials_material(&self) -> bool

Whether this deployer requires real credential material at all.

fn required_capabilities(&self) -> Vec<Capability>

The set of capabilities the deployer’s credentials must satisfy. Order is stable — the CLI renders this as the column order in gtc op credentials requirements output. Used both as the declaration of what would be checked (--schema-like surface) and as the iteration order for validate.

fn validate(&self, ctx: &ValidationContext<'_>) -> RequirementsReport

Probe the env’s local state against [required_capabilities]. The validator MUST NOT mutate ctx and MUST NOT panic on probe failure; it returns a structured Failed or Skipped entry instead.

fn bootstrap( &self, _input: &BootstrapInput<'_>, ) -> Result<BootstrapOutcome, BootstrapError>

Run the deployer’s bootstrap path against ephemeral admin credentials.

fn rollback_bound_material(&self, _env_id: &EnvId)

Best-effort compensating cleanup for a bootstrap that wrote durable credential material to a REMOTE backend (e.g. the K8s --bind path writes the minted bearer into an in-cluster Secret) but then failed a later persistence step. Without this a failed bootstrap could leave a live bearer in the backend while the env stays unbound. The CLI calls it on the bootstrap error path; the delete is idempotent (a never-written Secret 404s harmlessly), so an unconditional call is safe.

fn rotate_at(&self, _material: &str) -> Option<DateTime<Utc>>

The absolute time the given bound credential material should be rotated, derived from the material’s own self-reported lifetime (e.g. the K8s projected-ServiceAccount-token JWT’s iat/exp claims). Returns None when the lifetime can’t be determined.

fn rotation_due(&self, material: &str, now: DateTime<Utc>) -> bool

Whether the given bound material is at/past its rotation point.