pub struct SandboxDecisionDataPolicyResolved {Show 21 fields
pub add_current_working_directory: bool,
pub allow_bypass: bool,
pub allow_local_network: bool,
pub allow_outbound: bool,
pub backend: SandboxBackend,
pub control: SandboxControl,
pub degradation_reason: Option<SandboxDegradationReason>,
pub denied_paths_count: i64,
pub effective_filesystem_policy: Option<SandboxFilesystemPolicyDetails>,
pub enforcement_point: SandboxEnforcementPoint,
pub gh_auth: bool,
pub git_auth: bool,
pub keychain_access: bool,
pub kind: SandboxDecisionDataPolicyResolvedKind,
pub outcome: SandboxOutcome,
pub platform: SandboxPlatform,
pub policy_source: SandboxPolicySource,
pub proxy_mode: SandboxProxyMode,
pub readonly_paths_count: i64,
pub readwrite_paths_count: i64,
pub tool_call_id: Option<String>,
}Fields§
§add_current_working_directory: boolWhether the current working directory was granted automatically
allow_bypass: boolWhether callers may opt an individual command out of the sandbox
allow_local_network: boolWhether the sandboxed process may reach loopback and private-range addresses
allow_outbound: boolWhether the sandboxed process may open outbound network connections
backend: SandboxBackendProcess-containment implementation backing the sandbox
control: SandboxControlEnforcement mechanism this decision describes
degradation_reason: Option<SandboxDegradationReason>Why enforcement is weaker than configured, when it is
denied_paths_count: i64Number of denied path rules in the effective policy
effective_filesystem_policy: Option<SandboxFilesystemPolicyDetails>Effective filesystem rules. Populated only when content capture is enabled; the counts above are always present.
enforcement_point: SandboxEnforcementPointRuntime subsystem that applied the policy
gh_auth: boolWhether the sandbox policy permits GitHub CLI credentials inside the sandbox. A policy capability, not proof that a credential was injected into this spawn: injection is per-command
git_auth: boolWhether the sandbox policy permits git credentials inside the sandbox. A policy capability, not proof that a credential was injected into this spawn: injection is per-command
keychain_access: boolWhether the macOS keychain was reachable from inside the sandbox. Always false on other platforms.
kind: SandboxDecisionDataPolicyResolvedKindSandbox decision variant discriminator.
outcome: SandboxOutcomeWhether the resolved policy is fully active or degraded
platform: SandboxPlatformHost platform the sandbox is running on
policy_source: SandboxPolicySourceWhether the policy came from built-in defaults or user configuration
proxy_mode: SandboxProxyModeWhether outbound traffic is unproxied, routed through a loopback proxy, or routed through an external proxy
readonly_paths_count: i64Number of read-only path rules in the effective policy
readwrite_paths_count: i64Number of read-write path rules in the effective policy
tool_call_id: Option<String>Internal tool-call ID, used only to correlate the decision with its owning span. Omitted when the decision is not attributable to a tool call.