Struct SandboxDecisionDataBypassDecided 

pub struct SandboxDecisionDataBypassDecided {
    pub command: Option<String>,
    pub confidence: Option<SandboxDenialConfidence>,
    pub control: SandboxControl,
    pub denial_class: Option<SandboxDenialClass>,
    pub denied_resource: Option<String>,
    pub enforcement_point: SandboxEnforcementPoint,
    pub kind: SandboxDecisionDataBypassDecidedKind,
    pub outcome: SandboxOutcome,
    pub platform: SandboxPlatform,
    pub process_name: Option<String>,
    pub source: SandboxBypassSource,
    pub tool_call_id: Option<String>,
}

A request to run outside the process sandbox was resolved. This is what makes an inactive enforcement_state readable: without it, a command that ran unsandboxed because a person approved a bypass looks identical to one that ran unsandboxed because the session never had a sandbox. Reported only when a sandbox was in force, since bypassing a disabled sandbox bypasses nothing. Carries neither backend nor attestation: the verdict comes from the runtime’s own permission flow or the local escalation prompt, not from a containment backend and not from the built-in policy check, so source is what records where it came from.

Fields

command: Option<String>

Command the verdict governs. Populated only when content capture is enabled.

confidence: Option<SandboxDenialConfidence>

How strong the evidence behind denialClass was. Present exactly when denialClass is, so a verdict that relaxed the sandbox on a guess is distinguishable from one that relaxed it on a recorded refusal. Named to match access_denied, which reports the same pair.

control: SandboxControl

Always bypass.

denial_class: Option<SandboxDenialClass>

Bounded class of the access whose refusal raised this escalation. Omitted for a pre-execution bypass, such as a detached command that cannot be sandboxed and therefore resolves no denial.

denied_resource: Option<String>

Resource whose refusal raised this escalation. Populated only when content capture is enabled.

enforcement_point: SandboxEnforcementPoint

Runtime subsystem the bypass applies to

kind: SandboxDecisionDataBypassDecidedKind

Sandbox decision variant discriminator.

outcome: SandboxOutcome

Whether the bypass was granted: approved or declined. declined also covers the cases where nobody answered, since the sandboxed denial stands either way.

platform: SandboxPlatform

Host operating-system family

process_name: Option<String>

Executable image associated with the denial that raised this escalation, normalized to a basename. Populated only when content capture is enabled.

source: SandboxBypassSource

Where the request originated. Orthogonal to outcome.

tool_call_id: Option<String>

Tool call the decision belongs to, for span correlation only. Never exported as a telemetry attribute or metric dimension.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for SandboxDecisionDataBypassDecided

fn clone(&self) -> Self

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for SandboxDecisionDataBypassDecided

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Default for SandboxDecisionDataBypassDecided

fn default() -> Self

Returns the “default value” for a type.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for SandboxDecisionDataBypassDecided

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl Serialize for SandboxDecisionDataBypassDecided

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.