pub struct PermissionRequestUrl {
pub intention: String,
pub kind: PermissionRequestUrlKind,
pub managed_approval_required: Option<bool>,
pub redirected_from: Option<String>,
pub request_sandbox_bypass: Option<bool>,
pub request_sandbox_bypass_reason: Option<String>,
pub tool_call_id: Option<String>,
pub url: String,
}Expand description
URL access permission request
Fields§
§intention: StringHuman-readable description of why the URL is being accessed
kind: PermissionRequestUrlKindPermission kind discriminator
managed_approval_required: Option<bool>Whether managed policy requires a human response and forbids host auto-approval
redirected_from: Option<String>Immediately preceding URL when this request is for a redirect target
request_sandbox_bypass: Option<bool>True when the tool is asking to run this URL fetch outside the sandbox, after the network policy denied the approved URL or the sandbox proxy could not reach it (host opted in via sandbox.allowBypass). The model cannot ask for this; only the tool raises it. This is a request, not a grant: the fetch runs only if the user approves this permission request. Hosts should highlight the elevated risk in the approval UI.
request_sandbox_bypass_reason: Option<String>What the tool tells the user about the bypass on offer: which policy rule blocked the call, or why it cannot be sandboxed. Only meaningful when requestSandboxBypass is true.
tool_call_id: Option<String>Tool call ID that triggered this permission request
url: StringURL to be fetched
Trait Implementations§
Source§impl Clone for PermissionRequestUrl
impl Clone for PermissionRequestUrl
Source§fn clone(&self) -> PermissionRequestUrl
fn clone(&self) -> PermissionRequestUrl
1.0.0 (const: unstable) · Source§fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)
fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)
source. Read more