Enum DelegateRequest 

#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum DelegateRequest<'a> {
    ApplicationMessages {
        key: DelegateKey,
        params: Parameters<'a>,
        inbound: Vec<InboundDelegateMsg<'a>>,
    },
    RegisterDelegate {
        delegate: DelegateContainer,
        cipher: [u8; 32],
        nonce: [u8; 24],
    },
    UnregisterDelegate(DelegateKey),
    RegisterDelegateWithPredecessors {
        delegate: DelegateContainer,
        cipher: [u8; 32],
        nonce: [u8; 24],
        predecessors: Vec<DelegateKey>,
    },
}

Variants (Non-exhaustive)

Non-exhaustive enums could have additional variants added in future. Therefore, when matching against variants of non-exhaustive enums, an extra wildcard arm must be added to account for any future variants.

ApplicationMessages

Fields

key: DelegateKey

params: Parameters<'a>

inbound: Vec<InboundDelegateMsg<'a>>

RegisterDelegate

Fields

delegate: DelegateContainer

cipher: [u8; 32]

nonce: [u8; 24]

UnregisterDelegate(DelegateKey)

RegisterDelegateWithPredecessors

Registers a delegate AND requests a one-shot, node-side copy-forward of the LOCAL-scope secrets belonging to predecessors into the newly registered delegate’s own secret namespace.

predecessors are the delegate keys of retired generations of this delegate. It is a list because a user may skip one or more generations between the version they last ran and the current one, so several prior namespaces can need forwarding in a single registration. The copy-forward is:

• consent-gated on the client side — the node performs NO execution of any old delegate WASM; it only copies the already-sealed LOCAL-scope secret bytes it holds for a predecessor into the successor’s namespace,
• best-effort over unknown predecessors — the server silently ignores any predecessor key it does not hold, and
• idempotent per (predecessor -> successor) pair — re-registering with the same predecessors copies nothing new.

cipher and nonce mirror DelegateRequest::RegisterDelegate purely for field-shape parity. The node has ignored both since freenet-core#4140 (secrets are sealed client-side), so they carry no behavior here either; they exist only so the two registration variants stay structurally identical.

Fields

delegate: DelegateContainer

cipher: [u8; 32]

nonce: [u8; 24]

predecessors: Vec<DelegateKey>

Implementations

impl DelegateRequest<'_>

pub fn into_owned(self) -> DelegateRequest<'static>

pub fn key(&self) -> &DelegateKey

Trait Implementations

impl<'a> Clone for DelegateRequest<'a>

fn clone(&self) -> DelegateRequest<'a>

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl<'a> Debug for DelegateRequest<'a>

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl<'de: 'a, 'a> Deserialize<'de> for DelegateRequest<'a>

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl<'a> From<DelegateRequest<'a>> for ClientRequest<'a>

fn from(op: DelegateRequest<'a>) -> Self

Converts to this type from the input type.

impl<'a> Serialize for DelegateRequest<'a>

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.