Struct RateLimitingSecurityConfig 

pub struct RateLimitingSecurityConfig {

    pub enabled: bool,
    pub requests_per_second: u32,
    pub burst_size: u32,
    pub auth_start_max_requests: u32,
    pub auth_start_window_secs: u64,
    pub auth_callback_max_requests: u32,
    pub auth_callback_window_secs: u64,
    pub auth_refresh_max_requests: u32,
    pub auth_refresh_window_secs: u64,
    pub failed_login_max_attempts: u32,
    pub failed_login_lockout_secs: u64,
    pub requests_per_second_per_user: Option<u32>,
    pub redis_url: Option<String>,
    pub trust_proxy_headers: bool,
    pub trusted_proxy_cidrs: Option<Vec<String>>,
}

Minimal mirror of the [security.rate_limiting] TOML section, deserialized from the compiled schema’s security.rate_limiting JSON key.

Fields

enabled: bool

Enable rate limiting.

requests_per_second: u32

Global request rate cap (requests per second, per IP).

burst_size: u32

Burst allowance above the steady-state rate.

auth_start_max_requests: u32

Auth initiation endpoint — max requests per window.

auth_start_window_secs: u64

Auth initiation window in seconds.

auth_callback_max_requests: u32

OAuth callback endpoint — max requests per window.

auth_callback_window_secs: u64

OAuth callback window in seconds.

auth_refresh_max_requests: u32

Token refresh endpoint — max requests per window.

auth_refresh_window_secs: u64

Token refresh window in seconds.

failed_login_max_attempts: u32

Maximum failed first-factor login attempts before lockout.

Mirrors the CLI [security.rate_limiting] failed_login_max_attempts field. The off-the-shelf binary performs no first-factor login of its own (OIDC/JWT is validated cryptographically and first-factor auth is delegated to the provider; TOTP MFA is a library-only feature), so it cannot enforce this. A value tuned away from the default is rejected at startup in production (#356); see failed_login_lockout_check.

failed_login_lockout_secs: u64

Lockout window in seconds after failed_login_max_attempts is exceeded. Not enforced by the binary — see failed_login_max_attempts.

requests_per_second_per_user: Option<u32>

Per-authenticated-user request rate in requests/second. Defaults to 10× requests_per_second if not set.

redis_url: Option<String>

Redis URL for distributed rate limiting (not yet implemented).

trust_proxy_headers: bool

Trust X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For headers for the client IP.

Enable only when FraiseQL is deployed behind a trusted reverse proxy (e.g. nginx, Cloudflare, AWS ALB) that sets these headers. Enabling without a trusted proxy allows clients to spoof their IP address.

trusted_proxy_cidrs: Option<Vec<String>>

CIDR ranges trusted as proxy IPs (e.g. ["10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12"]).

When set and trust_proxy_headers = true, X-Forwarded-For is only honoured when the direct connection IP falls within one of these CIDR ranges. Requests arriving from outside these ranges use the connection IP directly, preventing clients from spoofing their address by setting X-Forwarded-For.

When None and trust_proxy_headers = true, all proxy IPs are trusted (less secure — a startup warning is emitted).

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for RateLimitingSecurityConfig

fn clone(&self) -> RateLimitingSecurityConfig

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for RateLimitingSecurityConfig

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Default for RateLimitingSecurityConfig

fn default() -> RateLimitingSecurityConfig

Returns the “default value” for a type.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for RateLimitingSecurityConfig

where RateLimitingSecurityConfig: Default,

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.