Struct SecurityReachability 

pub struct SecurityReachability {
    pub reachable_from_entry: bool,
    pub reachable_from_untrusted_source: bool,
    pub taint_confidence: Option<TaintConfidence>,
    pub untrusted_source_hop_count: Option<u32>,
    pub untrusted_source_trace: Vec<TraceHop>,
    pub blast_radius: u32,
    pub crosses_boundary: bool,
}

Graph-derived reachability ranking signal for a security candidate. Computed from the existing module graph after detection, never proven exploitable. Used to surface candidates that sit on a request/runtime-reachable surface, receive same-module source evidence, or are import-reachable from an untrusted-source module above isolated helpers or scripts.

This is a relative-ordering signal, NOT a confidence or signal_strength score: fallow does not prove the path is exploitable.

Fields

reachable_from_entry: bool

Whether the anchor module is reachable from a runtime/application entry point (route handlers, server entry, framework runtime roots), the closest graph proxy for an external/request input surface. Code reachable only from test entry points does not count.

reachable_from_untrusted_source: bool

Whether the anchor module is reachable over value imports from a module that reads a known untrusted input source. Module-level only: this does not prove a specific source value reaches the sink argument.

taint_confidence: Option<TaintConfidence>

Structured tier of the untrusted-source association: arg-level when the sink argument traces to a same-module source read (strong), module-level when only the module is import-reachable from a source (weak). Present exactly when reachable_from_untrusted_source is true, so a consumer can separate strong from weak candidates from this field alone without parsing the evidence string. Not an exploitability proof.

untrusted_source_hop_count: Option<u32>

Number of value-import hops from the untrusted-source module to the sink module when reachable_from_untrusted_source is true.

untrusted_source_trace: Vec<TraceHop>

Module-level import path from the untrusted-source module to the sink anchor. Empty when no source module reaches this candidate. The path is a ranking explanation, not a value-flow proof.

blast_radius: u32

Number of distinct modules that transitively depend on the anchor module (fan-in via the graph’s reverse-dependency index). A higher value means a wider surface: more call sites could route untrusted input into the sink.

crosses_boundary: bool

Whether the anchor module participates in an architecture-boundary violation found in the same run (as the importing or imported file). Optional pairing: a candidate that also crosses a declared boundary is a stronger review target.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for SecurityReachability

fn clone(&self) -> SecurityReachability

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for SecurityReachability

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Eq for SecurityReachability

impl PartialEq for SecurityReachability

fn eq(&self, other: &SecurityReachability) -> bool

Tests for self and other values to be equal, and is used by ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Tests for !=. The default implementation is almost always sufficient, and should not be overridden without very good reason.

impl Serialize for SecurityReachability

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.

impl StructuralPartialEq for SecurityReachability