Expand description
envseal — sudo can’t read your keys.
Write-only secret vault with process-level access control, out-of-band GUI approval, and a master key that is sealed to the physical device. Built for a world where AI agents have full shell access to developer machines.
§Security Architecture
- Passphrase-protected master key: Argon2id KDF, GUI-only entry.
- Hardware-sealed master key (
vault::hardware): outer wrap by Windows DPAPI, macOS Secure Enclave, or Linux TPM 2.0. A copy ofmaster.keydoes not decrypt on any other machine. - Memory hardening:
memfd_secreton Linux 5.14+,mlock+prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0)everywhere else,VirtualLockon Windows, zeroize on drop. - Environment sanitization:
LD_PRELOAD/LD_AUDIT/PYTHONPATH/NODE_OPTIONSdetection at every boundary. - Binary integrity (
policy::rules): SHA-256 hash verification before injection, argv-fingerprint binding so anAllow Alwaysforwrangler deploydoesn’t extend towrangler --shell evil. - Policy signing: HMAC-SHA256 tamper detection on
policy.toml. - Sandbox tiers (
sandbox): None / Hardened / Lockdown across Linux namespaces, macOS SBPL, Windows Job Objects (latter via pre-spawnCREATE_SUSPENDED+NtResumeProcessso the child is born inside the job). - Out-of-band approval (
gui): GUI popup or paired-device relay; relay-required mode fails closed if relay is unavailable. - Developer-migration UX (
migration): preexec hooks for bash/zsh/fish, shell-history scanner, drop-in compatibility shims forop/doppler/vaultCLI surfaces. - Zero CLI surface: secrets never appear in CLI args or shell history.
Re-exports§
pub use config as security_config;pub use config::totp;pub use execution::inject;pub use execution::supervised as supervisor;pub use file as envseal_file;pub use gui::relay;pub use vault::health as secret_health;pub use vault::keychain;
Modules§
- audit
- Audit log — append-only record of all secret access events.
- config
- Persistent configuration — security tiers, detection→policy overrides, on-disk persistence, and second-factor (TOTP) state.
- error
- Error types for envseal.
- execution
- Execution modes — every path through which a decrypted secret reaches a child process.
- file
.envsealfile format — drop-in.envreplacement.- guard
- Runtime security guards.
- gui
- Cross-platform GUI dialog orchestration. Cross-platform GUI dialog orchestration — the user-facing security boundary.
- migration
- Developer-migration tooling — make switching to envseal cheaper than continuing to paste secrets.
- ops
- High-level operations — the unified API for all envseal consumers.
- policy
- Whitelist policy management with integrity verification.
- sandbox
- Process sandbox — OS-level isolation expressed as an abstract tier.
- vault
- Vault — encrypted secret storage and master-key lifecycle.
Macros§
- envseal_
file - Expands to the file name in which it was invoked.