pub struct VerifyOptions {Show 22 fields
pub trust_pem: Option<String>,
pub tsa_trust_pem: Option<String>,
pub allowed_list_pem: Option<String>,
pub cawg_trust_pem: Option<String>,
pub cawg_allowed_certs_pem: Option<String>,
pub trust_anchor_not_before: Option<String>,
pub trust_anchor_not_after: Option<String>,
pub no_default_trust: bool,
pub cawg_did_documents: Option<HashMap<String, Value>>,
pub cawg_ica_trusted_issuers: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub cawg_ica_trust_anchors: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub cawg_ica_status_lists: Option<HashMap<String, String>>,
pub ocsp_responses: Option<HashMap<String, String>>,
pub ocsp_unreachable: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub external_data: Option<HashMap<String, String>>,
pub expected_seek_positions: Vec<usize>,
pub strict_conformance: bool,
pub cawg_strict_encoding: bool,
pub validation_time: Option<String>,
pub telemetry: TelemetryOptions,
pub online: Option<bool>,
pub online_allow_private_networks: bool,
}Fields§
§trust_pem: Option<String>PEM bundle of claim-signing trust anchors.
tsa_trust_pem: Option<String>PEM bundle of timestamp-authority trust anchors.
allowed_list_pem: Option<String>PEM bundle of directly allowed end-entity certificates.
cawg_trust_pem: Option<String>PEM bundle of trust anchors for CAWG named-actor (identity) X.509
credentials. None leaves identity signers untrusted (their
well-formedness is still validated).
cawg_allowed_certs_pem: Option<String>PEM bundle of directly allowed CAWG end-entity certificates.
trust_anchor_not_before: Option<String>RFC 3339 start of trust for every caller-supplied trust anchor. Before
this instant the caller’s anchors do not validate a signature, whatever
the anchor certificate’s own notBefore says. Bundled snapshots are
unaffected.
trust_anchor_not_after: Option<String>RFC 3339 end of trust for every caller-supplied trust anchor. After this instant the caller’s anchors no longer validate a signature. Bundled snapshots are unaffected.
no_default_trust: boolDisable the bundled C2PA, IPTC, and Encypher trust snapshots. By
default, caller-supplied PEM bundles extend those snapshots; setting
this to true evaluates only caller-supplied trust material.
cawg_did_documents: Option<HashMap<String, Value>>Pinned offline DID-document store for CAWG ICA issuers, keyed by primary DID (no fragment). Resolution never touches the network.
cawg_ica_trusted_issuers: Option<Vec<String>>ICA issuer DIDs trusted directly by the caller.
cawg_ica_trust_anchors: Option<Vec<String>>Trusted DID controller anchors. Issuers may trace to these anchors
through controller links in caller-pinned DID documents.
cawg_ica_status_lists: Option<HashMap<String, String>>Offline, decompressed revocation bitstrings keyed by
credentialStatus.statusListCredential URI and encoded as standard
base64. Missing lists fail closed without network access.
ocsp_responses: Option<HashMap<String, String>>OCSP responses a caller obtained online, keyed by the lowercase hex
SHA-256 of the certificate’s DER and encoded as standard base64 of the
DER OCSPResponse.
The SDK never fetches these for you at this layer: supply them from your own OCSP client, or let the SDK’s consent-gated fetcher do it. A response is trusted no further than any other input - it must still be signed by an authorized responder for the certificate in question, and it is evaluated under the C2PA 2.4 and CAWG 1.3 online rules.
ocsp_unreachable: Option<Vec<String>>Certificates whose OCSP responder was queried without a usable answer, by the same lowercase hex SHA-256 key.
Each entry registers the signingCredential.ocsp.inaccessible (or
cawg.x509.ocsp.inaccessible) informational code in place of the
ocsp.skipped code a purely offline run reports.
external_data: Option<HashMap<String, String>>Content of cloud-data and hashed external-reference assertions, keyed by the URI the assertion declares and encoded as standard base64.
The bytes are hashed against the assertion’s own alg/hash pair
before anything else is done with them.
expected_seek_positions: Vec<usize>Zero-based indexes into supplied fragments or stream segments where the player expects a discontinuity. Values must be unique, strictly increasing, and in bounds. Ignored by single-asset verification.
strict_conformance: boolApply the C2PA 2.4 Conformance Program posture instead of the default
generous core-spec read. This raises applicable SHOULD requirements to
the conformance bar and emits strict diagnostics in the reader report.
It also requires CAWG Identity 1.3 deterministic signer_payload CBOR;
the default accepts the CAWG 1.1 field order with
com.encypher.cawg.legacyProfile.
cawg_strict_encoding: boolRefuse the CAWG field-order signer_payload encoding that c2pa-rs
writes, without applying the rest of the conformance posture. When
unset, the default accepts it with the informational
com.encypher.cawg.legacyProfile; strict_conformance refuses it
either way.
validation_time: Option<String>RFC 3339 validation instant. Current UTC time is used when omitted.
telemetry: TelemetryOptionsFailure telemetry override. None uses the saved per-user preference.
online: Option<bool>Allow this verification to fetch what the asset references: a manifest
store held elsewhere, certificate revocation status, a did:web
document, externally stored assertion content. None reads the
ENCYPHER_C2PA_ONLINE environment variable and otherwise stays
offline.
A library call never consults the saved per-user choice and never prompts: the caller decides here, or the operator decides through the environment. Whatever is fetched is used as evidence only. The verdict is still reached by the same offline kernel.
online_allow_private_networks: boolIntranet mode: let online checks contact loopback, private, and
link-local addresses, and accept plaintext http for every purpose
rather than for OCSP alone.
Off by default: a file that names an internal host would otherwise turn
this verifier into a probe of the network it runs on. Turn it on for a
deployment whose manifest repository or OCSP responder lives on a
private address, and for tests that serve from 127.0.0.1. Setting it
declares that this machine’s own network is trusted; do not set it on a
host that verifies files sent in by strangers.