Struct TxOut

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pub struct TxOut {
    pub asset: Asset,
    pub value: Value,
    pub nonce: Nonce,
    pub script_pubkey: Script,
    pub witness: TxOutWitness,
}

Expand description

Transaction output

Fields§

§asset: Asset

Committed asset

§value: Value

Committed amount

§nonce: Nonce

Nonce (ECDH key passed to recipient)

§script_pubkey: Script

Scriptpubkey

§witness: TxOutWitness

Witness data - not deserialized/serialized as part of a TxIn object (rather as part of its containing transaction, if any) but is logically part of the txin.

Implementations§

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impl TxOut

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pub const RANGEPROOF_MIN_VALUE: u64 = 1u64

Rangeproof minimum value

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pub const RANGEPROOF_EXP_SHIFT: i32 = 0i32

Rangeproof exponent shift

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pub const RANGEPROOF_MIN_PRIV_BITS: u8 = 52u8

Rangeproof Minimum private bits

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pub const MAX_MONEY: u64 = 2_100_000_000_000_000u64

Maximum explicit amount in a bitcoin TxOut

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pub fn new_not_last_confidential<R, C, S>( rng: &mut R, secp: &Secp256k1<C>, value: u64, address: &Address, asset: AssetId, spent_utxo_secrets: &[S], ) -> Result<(Self, AssetBlindingFactor, ValueBlindingFactor, SecretKey), ConfidentialTxOutError>
where R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Signing, S: Into<SurjectionInput> + Copy,

Creates a new confidential output that is not the last one in the transaction. Provide input secret information by creating SurjectionInput for each input. Inputs for issuances must be provided in the followed by inputs for input asset.

For example, if the second input contains non-null issuance and re-issuance tokens, the spent_utxo_secrets should be of the form [inp_1, inp_2, inp_2_issue, inp2_reissue,…]

If the issuance or re-issuance is null, it should not be added to spent_utxo_secrets

§Returns:

A tuple of (TxOut, AssetBlindingFactor, ValueBlindingFactor, ephemeral secret key SecretKey) sampled from the given rng

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pub fn with_txout_secrets<R, C, S>( rng: &mut R, secp: &Secp256k1<C>, spk: Script, receiver_blinding_pk: PublicKey, ephemeral_sk: SecretKey, out_secrets: TxOutSecrets, spent_utxo_secrets: &[S], ) -> Result<Self, ConfidentialTxOutError>
where R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Signing, S: Into<SurjectionInput> + Copy,

Similar to TxOut::new_not_last_confidential, but takes input the asset, value blinding factors and ephemeral secret key instead of sampling them from rng. The rng is only used in surjection proof creation while selecting inputs

Use the txout_secrets to specify the secrets to use while creating this output. Use the ValueBlindingFactor::last method to compute the blinding factor for the last input.

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pub fn to_non_last_confidential<R, C, S>( &self, rng: &mut R, secp: &Secp256k1<C>, blinder: PublicKey, spent_utxo_secrets: &[S], ) -> Result<(TxOut, AssetBlindingFactor, ValueBlindingFactor, SecretKey), ConfidentialTxOutError>
where R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Signing, S: Into<SurjectionInput> + Copy,

Convert a explicit TxOut into a Confidential TxOut. The blinding key is provided by the blinder parameter. The initial value of nonce is ignored and is set to the ECDH pubkey sampled by the sender.

§Returns:

A tuple of (AssetBlindingFactor, ValueBlindingFactor, ephemeral secret key SecretKey) sampled from the given rng

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pub fn new_last_confidential<R, C>( rng: &mut R, secp: &Secp256k1<C>, value: u64, asset: AssetId, spk: Script, blinder: PublicKey, spent_utxo_secrets: &[TxOutSecrets], output_secrets: &[&TxOutSecrets], ) -> Result<(Self, AssetBlindingFactor, ValueBlindingFactor, SecretKey), ConfidentialTxOutError>
where R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Signing,

Creates a new confidential output that IS the last one in the transaction.

Inputs for issuances must be provided in the followed by inputs for input asset. For example, if the second input contains non-null issuance and re-issuance tokens, the spent_utxo_secrets should be of the form [inp_1, inp_2, inp_2_issue, inp2_reissue,…] If the issuance or re-issuance is null, it should not be added to spent_utxo_secrets

§Returns:

A tuple of (AssetBlindingFactor, ValueBlindingFactor, ephemeral secret key SecretKey) sampled from the given rng

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pub fn with_secrets_last<R, C>( rng: &mut R, secp: &Secp256k1<C>, value: u64, spk: Script, blinder: PublicKey, asset: AssetId, ephemeral_sk: SecretKey, out_abf: AssetBlindingFactor, spent_utxo_secrets: &[TxOutSecrets], output_secrets: &[&TxOutSecrets], ) -> Result<(Self, ValueBlindingFactor), ConfidentialTxOutError>
where R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Signing,

Similar to TxOut::new_last_confidential, but allows specifying the asset blinding factor and the ephemeral key. The value-blinding factor is computed adaptively

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pub fn unblind<C: Verification>( &self, secp: &Secp256k1<C>, blinding_key: SecretKey, ) -> Result<TxOutSecrets, UnblindError>

Unblinds a transaction output, if it is confidential.

It returns the secret elements of the value and asset Pedersen commitments.

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impl TxOut

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pub fn new_fee(amount: u64, asset: AssetId) -> TxOut

Create a new fee output.

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pub fn is_null_data(&self) -> bool

Whether this data represents nulldata (OP_RETURN followed by pushes, not necessarily minimal)

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pub fn is_pegout(&self) -> bool

Whether this output is a pegout, which is a subset of nulldata with the following extra rules: (a) there must be at least 2 pushes, the first of which must be 32 bytes and the second of which must be nonempty; (b) all pushes must use a push opcode rather than a numeric or reserved opcode

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