Struct AutoAcceptPolicy 

pub struct AutoAcceptPolicy {
    pub pairing: bool,
    pub pre_pair: bool,
    pub store_share: bool,
    pub verify_share: bool,
    pub discovery: bool,
    pub get_share: bool,
    pub unpair: bool,
    pub update_channel_info: bool,
}

Per-flow opt-in for auto-accepting incoming requests.

Default = every field false (no flow auto-accepted; process() emits DeRecEvent::ActionRequired like today). When a field is true, process() invokes the equivalent of super::DeRecProtocol::accept internally and emits DeRecEvent::AutoAccepted in place of DeRecEvent::ActionRequired, followed by the same flow events the caller would have seen from a manual accept.

Wire the policy through super::DeRecProtocolBuilder::with_auto_accept.

Per-flow notes

• Self::pairing covers both standard and replica pairing. Standard pairing transitions the channel to Paired immediately; auto-accepting it skips any UI confirmation of “User X wants to pair.” Replica pairing leaves the channel in Pending until both sides run verify_fingerprint(), so auto-accept here is benign (channel is inert until the out-of-band fingerprint match).
• Self::pre_pair gates the plaintext PrePair leg of HashedKeys pairing. The MITM defence is on the scanner side (binding-hash check) and is unaffected by this flag, but enabling it turns the initiator into a request-amplification oracle: any party that knows the contact’s nonce + channel_id can elicit a key-publish response. Prefer to keep this off unless you control both ends of the transport (LAN, integration tests).
• Self::unpair is destructive — accepting deletes the local channel record and any shares/secrets associated with it. The DeRecEvent::Unpaired event still fires (after the deletion), so observability is preserved, but the user has no chance to intervene before the data is gone. Apps that want a “are you sure?” gate should keep this off.
• Self::update_channel_info silently overwrites the stored channel record with the peer’s new transport / communication info. Cryptographically safe (only the paired peer can send it), but a compromised peer key gets weaponised faster — outbound traffic on the channel re-routes to whatever endpoint the peer announced.

All other fields wrap routine request/response flows and have no security-sensitive caveats beyond “the caller decided not to gate them.”

Fields

pairing: bool

pre_pair: bool

store_share: bool

verify_share: bool

discovery: bool

get_share: bool

unpair: bool

update_channel_info: bool

Implementations

impl AutoAcceptPolicy

pub fn all() -> Self

Enable auto-accept for every flow. Equivalent to setting every field to true — read the field-level docs on AutoAcceptPolicy before using this in production; several flows are state-changing or expose a request-amplification surface.

pub fn allows(&self, action: &PendingAction) -> bool

true when the policy opts in to auto-accepting the given action. Used by super::DeRecProtocol::process at the auto-accept intercept site.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for AutoAcceptPolicy

fn clone(&self) -> AutoAcceptPolicy

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Copy for AutoAcceptPolicy

impl Debug for AutoAcceptPolicy

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Default for AutoAcceptPolicy

fn default() -> AutoAcceptPolicy

Returns the “default value” for a type.

impl Eq for AutoAcceptPolicy

impl PartialEq for AutoAcceptPolicy

fn eq(&self, other: &AutoAcceptPolicy) -> bool

Equality operator ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Inequality operator !=.

impl StructuralPartialEq for AutoAcceptPolicy