zift 0.2.2

Scan codebases for embedded authorization logic and generate Policy as Code (Rego/OPA today)
Documentation 
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[rule]
id = "ts-jwt-verify-decode"
languages = ["typescript", "javascript"]
category = "middleware"
confidence = "medium"
description = "JWT token verification or decode (authz decision point)"
# Split out from the original `ts-jwt-token-check` rule. The `verify`
# and `decode` family are authz decision points — they extract the
# claims the request will be authorized against. The companion rule
# `ts-jwt-sign-issue` covers `sign`, which is token *issuance*
# (typically for outbound integrations) — different category, lower
# confidence, kept separate so users can filter without losing the
# authz signal.
#
# Surfaced by the corpus shakedown on Ghost: its report was dominated
# by `jwt.sign(...)` calls — outbound token issuance, not authz
# decisions. Keeping verify/decode here at medium confidence preserves
# the authz signal while moving sign-issuance noise to its own rule.
query = """
(call_expression
  function: (member_expression
    object: (identifier) @obj
    property: (property_identifier) @method)
  arguments: (arguments
    (_) @arg)
) @match
"""

[rule.predicates.obj]
match = "(?i)^(jwt|jsonwebtoken|jose|token|auth)$"

[rule.predicates.method]
match = "^(verify|decode)$"

[[rule.tests]]
input = """
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, secret);
"""
expect_match = true

[[rule.tests]]
input = """
const claims = jsonwebtoken.decode(token);
"""
expect_match = true

# `sign` now belongs to ts-jwt-sign-issue.
[[rule.tests]]
input = """
const token = jwt.sign({ sub: userId }, secret);
"""
expect_match = false

[[rule.tests]]
input = """
signer.sign(httpRequest);
"""
expect_match = false

[[rule.tests]]
input = """
decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });
"""
expect_match = false